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INTRODUCTION
THE THEME OF commercial markets whose expansion out-paces the development of social norms is recurrent in the Amer-
ican story.1 Enthusiasm seizes the American consciousness as
1. In classic descriptions of the American character, the free market and wealth
gained in the market often take precedence over other cultural values. De Tocqueville, for
example, commented as follows on the American character:
In Europe, people talk a great deal of the wilds of America, but the Americans
themselves never think about them: they are insensible to the wonders of inani-
mate Nature, and they may be said not to perceive the mighty forests which
surround them till they fall beneath the hatchet. Their eyes are fixed upon an-
other sight: the American people views its own march across these wilds - dry-
ing swamps, turning the course of rivers, peopling solitudes, and subduing Na-
ture. This' magnificent image of themselves does not meet the gaze of the
Americans at intervals only; it may be said to haunt every one of them in his
least as well as in his most important actions, and to be always flitting before his
mind..
It would seem as if every imagination in the United States were upon the
stretch to invent means of increasing the wealth and satisfying the wants of the
public. The best-informed inhabitants of each district constantly use their infor-
mation to discover new truths which may augment the general prosperity; and if
they have made any such discoveries, they eagerly surrender them to the mass of
the people.
If I were to inquire what passion is most natural to [Americans] ... I
could discover none more peculiarly appropriate to their condition than this love
of physical prosperity .
• ..Carefully to satisfy all, even the least wants of the body, and to provide
the little conveniences of life, is uppermost in every mind .
...The doctrine of interest rightly understood is not then new, but among
the Americans of our time it finds universal acceptance: it has become popular
there; you may trace it at the bottom of all their actions, you will remark it in
all they say.
A. DE ToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 292, 317, 339, 338, 333 (H. Reeve trans.
1946).
If there is an "American" story in literature, it attests not merely to a national preoc-
cupation with commercial markets but also a notable ambivalence about the appropriate
scope of their reach. See, e.g., T. DREISER, THE FINANCIER (1946); S. LEWIS, BABBITT
(1922). Literature reflecting ambivalence about the market-orientation of American con-
sciousness often affirms a keen regard for the inalienability and indefeasibility of family
loyalties and personal integrity. See, e.g., J. CONRAD, NOSTROMO (1921); N. HAWTHORNE,
THE SCARLET LETTER (1892); H. JAMES, THE GOLDEN BOWL (1904); H.B. STOWE, UNCLE
ToM's CABIN (1852). The same ambivalence is examined in a recent sociological study of
the interplay between aggressive individualism and community solidarity in contemporary
America. See R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF
THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985) (a compilation
of four research studies of the relationship between public and private life in America).
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ideas and other resources become available for commercial ex-
ploitation and as markets for new products emerge. Today, the
field of applied biology is fertile ground. for this enthusiasm.2 The
instinct for commercial exploitation now extends to the most
profound biological process, human reproduction.3 In past eras, ef-
fective exploitation of new resources has depended upon the pro-
mulgation of legal forms guarding potential investors' expectations
sufficiently to ensure adequate investment of capital. The quest
Narrative jurisprudence stresses the importance of stories and myths such as these for
organizing law in relation to basic values and the reciprocal effect of law as narrative,
fashioning and orienting the cultural universe. See C. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FUR-
THER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 173 (1983) (law as a "distinctive manner
of imagining the real"); J.B. WHITE, HERACLEs' Bow; ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND PO-
ETICS OF THE LAW (1985) (viewing law as a rhetorical and literary endeavor acting
through language, culture, and community, thereby changing these facets of society);
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 68 (1983) (the existence of legal institutions is dependent on narratives for mean-
ing). For an application of the reasoning of narrative jurisprudence in the area of family
law, see M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 112-42 (1987). For an
application of narrative jurisprudence to contract, see Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruc-
tion of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 997, 999-1000 (1985).
In interpreting the meaning and value of proposed modes of distributing procreative
resources and parental rights, the question arises: is this another story of the mastery of
commercial markets or a tale of the inalienability and indefeasibility of family loyalities
and personal integrity? The most famous passage from the Baby M case illustrates this
conflict: "There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy. In America,
we decided long ago that merely because conduct purchased by money was 'voluntary' did
not mean that it was good or beyond regulation and prohibition." In re Baby M, 109 N.J.
396, 440, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (1988) (citing minimum wage laws, laws prohibiting gen-
der-based wage discrimination, child labor laws, and worker safety laws).
2. See C. GROBSTEIN, FROM CHANCE TO PURPOSE 135 (1981) (noting the emergence
of "a larger and enlarging biotechnology, already palpable in agriculture and medicine,
growing on the horizon in energy and materials production").
3. The growing number of entrepreneurs in this field includes Randolph and Richard
Seed whose Chicago-based Reproduction & Fertility Clinic provides such services as surro-
gate embryo transfer and New York's Idant Corporation, a thriving interstate business that
stores, sells, and distributes human semen. Shapiro, New Innovations in Conception and
Their Effects upon Our Law and Morality, 31 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 37, 44 n.42, 52 (1986).
4. This process was seen, for example, in England's enclosure movement which led to
developments in the law of real property advantageous to the wool industry. T. MORE,
UTOPIA 24-28 (E. Surtz ed. 1964); Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968) (analogizing from enclosure to the need to restrict reproductive rights as a
preventive measure for overpopulation). More recently, it has been seen in the recognition
of the patentability of primitive living organisms. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 307 (1980) (a genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil
was deemed patentable, as a new and useful manufacture or composition of matter).
Claims to an ownership interest in higher species and human tissue cultures also have been
recognized. E.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 249 Cal. Rptr.
494 (1988) (the human donor of bodily tissue which gave rise to a patented cell line was
held to have a property interest in his tissue and the cell-line that arose from it), rev'd, 51
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for a legal response to the new technologies of human reproduc-
tion has produced more than one model incorporating legal forms
associated-with expanding economic markets.' In particular, con-
tract has been proposed as a basis for the reorganization and redi-
rection of human reproductive behavior.6 Some advocates of con-
tract equate the value of contract in this context with its value in
more traditional commercial areas.7 Other advocates do not ac-
knowledge contract's commercial character, but propose it as a
means of expressing individual reproductive identity8 or distribut-
Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1990) (invalidating property interest in
excised human tissue); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PUB. No. 5, 101ST CONG.,
1ST SEss., NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE 12 (1989) (special
report) (patent granted to Harvard University for a mouse that is highly susceptible to
cancer).
5. This task has already begun, to some extent, in the related field of human organ
and tissue exchange. See Andrews, My Body, My Property, HASTINGS CENTER REP. Oct.
1986, at 28, 28 (discussing legal ramifications of declaring that body parts are property
which can be bought or sold); Healey, Legal Regulation of Artificial Insemination and the
New Reproductive Technologies, in GENETICS AND THE LAW III 139, 143 (A. Milunksy &
G. Annas eds. 1984) ("One other aspect of the cultural transition is the increased commer-
cialization in health care" reflected by "the financial rewards associated with the sale of
organs or body parts."); Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property
Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 212 (1986)
(discussing an individual's right to exploit the commercial value of his body).
Comparable recognition of property interests in human gametes and embryos has been
proposed. See infra note 835. In contrast, model legislation in the area of "new human
reproduction" appears to be intended to organize the labor market in a new area of the
service economy. See, e.g., Section of Family Law Adoption Committee and Ad Hoc Sur-
rogacy Committee, Draft ABA Model Surrogacy Act, 22 FAM. L.Q. 123 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Model Surrogacy Act].
6. The use of contract to organize what amounts to a market in procreative resources
and parental rights has been proposed by academic commentators, e.g., Hollinger, From
Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 865 (1985) (arguing legal efforts to prohibit these procreative markets
would be unwise); by governmental commissions, e.g., 2 ONT. LAW REFORM COMM'N, RE-
PORT ON HUMAN ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION & RELATED MATTERS (1985) [hereinafter
ONTARIO COMM'N] (noting legal ramifications of private contractual arrangement for arti-
ficial incentives); and under proposed legislation, UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED
CONCEPTION ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 87 (Supp. 1990) [hereinafter UNIF. STATUS ACT] (pro-
posing regulation of surrogacy agreements for the benefit of the child conceived).
7. See, e.g., Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate
Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21 (1989) (arguing that contracts of
"hired maternity" no less than contracts routinely enforced by law in other areas, are en-
tered into voluntarily, maximize value through market incentives, and promote the legiti-
mate interests of the parties involved). In this article the practice generally known are
"surrogate motherhood" is called "hired maternity." For a discussion of the signification of
these terms, see infra note 413.
8. See, e.g., Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate
Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1941-49 (1986) (discussing paternalistic views held by
courts towards a woman's right to choose reproductive alternatives). Even in these cases
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ing scarce resources among classes of previously disadvantaged
individuals.'
Positions expressly placing the law of human reproduction in
economic categories face considerable obstacles to acceptance.10
As distinct from some areas of applied biology, human reproduc-
tion has inextricable links with fundamental facets of social and
personal identity. An industry of human reproductive biology
would fulfill tasks not on the margin of experimentation or innova-
tion like most new areas of exploitation, but rather at the core of
humanity's most ancient, universal, and personal wants."' Changes
in the law enabling such an industry might well eliminate or
transform accustomed aspects of personal and social life. Thus,
the legal literature contains an element of caution concerning neg-
ative social consequences, a persistent counterpoint to the excite-
ment regarding marketable innovation that is the leitmotif of
much writing on law and the new reproductive technologies.12
Regardless-of whether it relies on the categories of commerce.
or economics, any proposal using contract for ordering the new
the discussion is often implicitly organized around the idea of identifying and satisfying a
market. E.g., Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure
of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 942, 944-46 (1986) (discussing the factors
driving the quest for alternative reproductive technologies, including both social and eco-
nomic forces).
9. For a framework arranging the new reproductive technologies based on distribu-
tive concerns, see Dresser, Social Justice in New Reproductive Techniques, in GENETICS
AND THE LAW III, supra note 5, at 159-74. The theme also appears in Robertson, Procrea-
tive Liberty and the Control of Conception. Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV.
405, 428 (1983) ("a legal distinction based on the natural lottery of physical equipment is
not reasonable").
10. The cognitive structure of human awareness of cultural, moral, and legal
problems presupposes certain subliminal propositions which the mind resists abandoning.
See L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); P. JOHNSON-LAIRD,
MENTAL MODELS (1983). Shifts in such subliminal cognitive commitments can occur on a
global level within a culture. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
110-34 (1962).
11. Personal fulfillment in relationships with others must be distinguished from needs
subject to fulfillment in discrete transactions. See E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY
(1950); R. LiFTON, THE LIFE OF THE SELF (1976).
12. See Annas & Elias, Social Policy Considerations in Noncoital Reproduction, in
GENETICS AND THE LAW III, supra note 5, at 147; Note, Toward a Dignified Theory of
Children: Prohibition of Collaborative Reproduction, 19 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1091 (1988).
Compare L. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE (1985) (viewing scientific ad-
vances in light of ethical considerations); P. RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF
GENETIC CONTROL (1970) (arguing that moral and religious considerations should always
prevail in the context of the new reproductive technologies). The classic warning of the
political and moral dangers posed by scientific intervention in the process of human repro-
duction was sounded by Aldous Huxley. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946).
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human reproduction requires examination in light of its deeper
implications. A particular proposal may absorb the ordering of
human reproduction into the commercial marketplace, or may
borrow contract principles from the commercial market in an at-
tempt to integrate them into the private realm of reproductive ex-
pression or fulfillment. However, the latter approach, no less than
the former, unsettles conceptual boundaries long held basic to the
legal ordering of central societal concerns. 13 Such concerns extend
to the basis of rights,'14 the grounds for the legal coercion of indi-
vidual choice and action, 15 the limits on alienation of fundamental
aspects of human personality,'" and the definition of the respective
societal spheres of market, family, and politics.' 7
Assessment of the validity of contract proposals for respond-
ing to the new reproductive technologies has been made difficult
by a myopic view of the relevant parameters. In most studies, the
social context has been too narrowly and uncritically drawn. The
context often encompasses only an artificially constructed class of
consumers and a set of actions construed as choices among items
of medical treatments.' 8 Despite the potential for these proposals
13. This occurs at "the level of deep structure." Rosenfeld, Justice and Contract:
The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L.
REv. 769, 808-09 (1985).
14. Despite some post-liberal critical re-evaluation, the notion of rights continues to
be considered indispensable for understanding or evaluating the legal system. See R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); D. LYONS. RIGHTS (1979).
15. Liberalization of rules governing private conduct is not an adequate concept for
describing the dilemma facing the legal system. The new reproductive arrangements are
creating conflicts, in which someone suffers the "jurispathic violence" of a legally-enforced
defeat. Allen, Privacy. Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEo. L.J. 1759, 1761 (1988).
On the meaning of "jurispathic," see Cover, supra note 1, at 40-44 (courts are jurispathic
insofar as they establish laws that reflect the community's story).
16. So thoroughgoing is this challenge that the antislavery amendment to the U.S.
Constitution enters the discussion. See Means, Surrogacy v. The Thirteenth Amendment, 4
N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 445 (1987).
17. The way that these arrangements are characterized transcends the individuals
involved and serves morally and cognitively to organize our societal world. See Watson,
The Future of Asexual Reproduction, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BioETHics 599, 605
(1978) (noting the general discomfort in society regarding new and proposed reproductive
technologies, such as cloning). For an application of the idea of "spheres" of social life, see
M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
18. For an example of this approach in a popular work, see L. ANDREWS, NEW CON-
CEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS, INCLUDING
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
(1984) (reviewing new infertility treatments for consumers). However, this approach im-
poses unacceptable methodological constraints on scholarly studies adopting it. See, e.g.,
Dresser, supra note 9, at 159-60 (limiting the scope of analysis concerning the ethical and
political considerations involved in the new reproductive technologies to problems arising in
[Vol. 41:1
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to reshape American law substantially, the implications for basic
legal structures generally have not been explored."9 Discussion
usually has been restricted to the applicability of discrete legal
doctrines or to the requirements of adjudication between certain
specific kinds of disputants2 0 Consideration has not been given to
the full spectrum of implicated societal values being advanced or
subordinated."
the health care field); Robertson, supra note 8, at 942-47 (confining the discussion of social
pressures to problems arising from infertility, both medical and non-medical). One source
of this truncated methodology is undoubtedly the breadth of the definition of health and
the medical profession seen in some contemporary schools of bio-ethics and medicine. See
Thomasma, The Goals of Medicine and Society, in THE CULTURE OF BIOMEDICINE 34-54
(D. Brock ed. 1985) (assuming the role of the medical profession in society to include all
aspects of social interaction).
The inadequacy of the approach becomes clear when oneconsiders that the "[u]se of
these technologies need not be confined - nor is it likely to be confined - to the scale of
individual couples making private decisions, nor to treatment of infertility. Indeed, several
proposals for additional uses have already been placed before the public." L. KAss, supra
note 12, at 61.
19. But see Annas & Elias, supra note 12, at 148-52 (exploring "the most important
policy issues raised by [the new reproductive] techniques").
20. For frequently cited contributions at this level, see Note, Surrogate Motherhood
and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1986) (examining the rela-
tionship between hired maternity and state adoption laws); M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTH-
ERHOOD (1988) (surveying various positions for dealing with hired maternity issues). How-
ever, "there comes a point in the moral discourse surrounding reproductive interventions
when one must step aside from the casuistry of individual interventions and view the future
possibilities and directions in aggregate and in the light of over-all convictions. ... R.
MCCORMICK, How BRAVE A NEW WORLD? 334 (1981).
21. The need for a framework facilitating such consideration has been confirmed by
many. See, e.g., Wadlington, Family Law Begs for Broad Review, N.J.L.J., Feb. 18, 1988,
at 31, col. 1, col. 4 (noting the lack of a clear public-policy framework within which alter-
native forms of reproduction can be evaluated in relation to fundamental questions of per-
sonal and societal values). A variety of academic legal commentators have attempted to
provide a framework. E.g., Eaton, Comparative Responses to Surrogate Motherhood, 65
NEB. L. REV. 686 (1986) (analyzing various studies on hired maternity and proposing
guidelines to deal with common conflict situations); Hollinger, supra note 6, at 868 (sug-
gesting the "urgent need for the creation and clarification of a legal framework within
which contemporary efforts to produce or procure children can take place"); Robertson,
supra note 8, at 939-1041 (proposing reproductive freedom as a framework for dealing
with new technologies); Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive
Technologies, 96 YALE LJ. 187 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Redefining Mother] (proposing
a new reproduction issue framework based on stages in the procreative process).
Proposed frameworks often fail to assess concrete issues against a sufficiently broad
background, either within family law or within the horizon of relevant social values. A
particularly pervasive handicap is legalistic dependence on the "fundamental right/compel-
ling state interest" framework of constitutional jurisprudence. Without a broader philo-
sophical and jurisprudential justification, this dependence leads to begging all the most
important questions. See, e.g., Comment, Baby-Sitting Consideratior Surrogate Mother's
Right to "Rent Her Womb"for a Fee, 18 GONZ. L. REV. 539, 552-65 (1982-83) (support-
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This article inquires into the meaning and value of contract
as a principle for ordering technologically assisted human repro-
duction. The article seeks to provide an analytically sound defini-
tion of this contractual option for ordering the new reproductive
technologies, an accurate statement of its current legal status, and
an assessment of its theoretical cogency and political and practical
appeal. The purpose of the article is the clarification and critique
of contract-based proposals for a new legal ordering of human re-
production. On a more general level, it seeks to contribute to a
sound conceptual framework for the ongoing discussion of the le-
gal implications of new reproductive technologies.
Methodologically, the article first pursues a schematic under-
ing a gestational mother's right to contract on constitutional grounds); Note, supra note 8,
at 1936-55 (evaluating the constitutionality of statutory authorization for specific perform-
ance of hired maternity contracts); Note, Prohibiting Payments to Surrogate Mothers:
Love's Labor Lost and the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 715,
735-45 (1987) (assessing the constitutionality of baby-selling laws).
A cost-benefit framework in this area also typically assumes more than it explains or
justifies. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 9, at 423-27 (assessing the benefits of new repro-
ductive technologies without considering the ethical questions raised). A number of govern-
mental and professional committees and agencies have contributed studies, both nationally
and internationally, that provide a foundation for working towards the goal. See, e.g., ETH-
ICS ADVISORY BOARD: DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, REPORT & CONCLU-
SIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN In Vitro FERTILIZATION AND EM-
BRYO TRANSFER (1979) [hereinafter ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD]; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES (1988) [hereinafter OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT]; COMITt CONSULTATIF NATIONAL D'ETHIQUE POUR LES SCI-
ENCES DE LA VIE ET DE LA SANT-, AVIS SUR LES PROBLEME ETHIQUES NES DES TECH-
NIQUES DE REPRODUCTION ARTIFICIELLE (1984) [hereinafter COMITt CONSULTATIF NA-
TIONAL]; Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation, 16 ORIGINS 1 (1987) [herein-
after Vatican Congregation]. For a general analysis of such committee and agency state-
ments, see Walters, Ethics and the New Reproductive Technologies: An International Re-
view of Committee Statements, HASTINGS CENTER REP. June 1987, special supplement, at
4; COMM. TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL, & LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION, REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF EMBRYOS PRODUCED BY In Vitro FERTIL-
IZATION (1984) [hereinafter WALLER REP.]; DEP'T OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SEC. REPORT OF
THE COMM. OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY (1984) [hereinafter
WARNOCK REP.]; ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6. American Fertility Society, Ethical
Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1S-945
(1986) (suggesting roles Congress can play in the regulation of new reproductive
technologies)
Ethicists also have generated voluminous commentary, but the value of their work is
limited by a failure to understand the legal dimension. E.g., P. SINGER & D. WELLS, MAK-
ING BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF CONCEPTION (1985) (noting the lack of
public consensus on the ethical issues raised by new reproductive technologies); TEST-TUBE
BABIES: A GUIDE TO MORAL QUESTIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
(1982) (providing a wide-ranging discussion of the ethical problems associated with IVF,
while failing to examine the legal issues involved).
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standing of several hypothetical applications of contract to the le-
gal ordering of technologically assisted human reproduction. To
facilitate this discussion a definition of contract is proposed. The
article then develops a general taxonomy of legal approaches to
the new reproductive technologies that builds on a critique of tax-
onomies proposed by others. Finally, the first section identifies the
analytically distinct applications of contract within the taxonomy
it proposes.
The inquiry's intermediate task is to describe the status of
contract in the ordering of human reproduction under present law
and under proposals for legal reform. This status is complex under
existing law. Therefore, the second section develops, as a. baseline,
an analysis of the law of the marriage contract and the traditional
nonenforcement of ordinary contracts within the domain of mar-
riage and family. To comprehend the evolution the law has under-
gone in response to the new reproductive technologies, this section
examines the contractual aspect of existing statutory schemes gov-
erning artificial insemination by donor,2 as well as judicial and
legislative responses to hired maternity contracts.2 3 As a proposal
for further legal reform, it explores the contractual aspect of a
recently promulgated model statute: the Uniform Status of Chil-
dren of Assisted Conception Act24 At each step, the analysis is
related back to the taxonomic scheme offered in the article's pfe-
liminary section. The section's purpose is to restate, within a uni-
fied analytical framework, the concrete choices facing courts and
legislatures with regard to the role of contract in ordering human
reproduction.
The article's final aim is a normative evaluation of the basic
options under existing law and of proposals for legal reform which
apply contract to order human reproduction. As a prelude, the
third section describes the contemporary sociological and techno-
logical conditions that urge reconsideration of the law's response
22. Critics have argued that existing law on artificial insemination by donor ("AID")
is an inadequate point of departure in draft legislation to other new reproduction technolo-
gies. See, e.g., Annas & Elias, supra note 12, at 149-50 (AID "is an unfortunate para-
digm" because it leaves social issues unresolved). See generally infra text accompanying
notes 372-411.
23. Hired maternity has received the greatest publicity among issues of applied
human biology. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §
20.8 (2d ed. 1987). See generally infra notes 412-532 and accompanying text.
24. UNIF. STATUS ACT, supra note 6; see infra notes 533-77 and accompanying text.
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to human reproduction. 5 It then evaluates contract normatively
as an instrument of legal reform in the field under four key con-
siderations: the basis for legally recognizing rights;26 the grounds
for enforcing promises;27 the limits to alienation of rights or other
aspects of personality; 28 and the balance among family, market,
and politics, as spheres of human activity.29 The conclusion of this
normative evaluation is that there are no compelling reasons for,
and many grounds that compel against, adopting contract as a
principle for ordering the new reproductive technologies. The arti-
cle ultimately concludes that the contractual reallocation of pro-
creative resources and parental rights is an unsatisfactory solution
to the question of human procreation in a technological age.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION: THE ROLE OF CONTRACT
UNDER HYPOTHETICAL ALTERNATIVES IN THE LEGAL
ORDERING OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION
Too often, the extensive literature on law and new reproduc-
tive technologies offers a survey of technological novelty, human
anguish, and patches of legal doctrine, plausible enough perhaps
yet somehow still askew."0 Proposed legal solutions present pic-
25. The legal response to the new reproductive technologies is "likely to be a political
and moral battleground for the rest of the century," Robertson, supra note 9, at 408.
26. See, e.g., M. BAYLES, PRINCIPLES OF LAW: A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 170-92
(1987) (defining contract rights as duties created by the terms of the contract).
27. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980) (discussing the extent and circumstances to which
promises are enforceable and legally binding according to modern contract law).
28. See, e.g., Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (dis-
cussing the effect of market alienation on the rights of parties involved in prostitution, baby
selling, and hired maternity).
29. See, e.g., Olsen, The Family and the Market. A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (examining the ineffectiveness of efforts to reform
the social role of women and arguing for the transcendence of the traditional dichotomy
between market and family).
30. See Allen, supra note 15, at 1759 ("[there is] a search for agreement about the
paradigms of social experience to which surrogacy-related roles and transactions are prop-
erly analogized."); Healey, supra note 5, at 140 ("[M]any areas of legal ambiguity and
uncertainty" exist in the literature). Family law as a whole, moreover, has been said to be
in "conceptual disarray." Weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Marriage 13 FAM. L.Q. 415
(1979). The present objective is not to return to a rigid conceptual framework that restricts
authentic human flourishing. See Olsen, supra note 29, at 1560 (the traditional dichotomy
between family and'market has had a destructive effect on various strategies intended to
improve the lives of women). Rather, the aim is coherence, as measured by the quality of
discourse about a particular pressing societal problem, and it presumes that prescriptive
and constructive coherence are meaningful goals.
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tures of law and reality confounding any coherent meaning for
essential distinctions such as those between the public and the pri-
vate, the personal and the impersonal, and the intimate and the
arm's length. 1 In general, the discussion lacks adequate efforts to
integrate the analysis within a larger framework of societal values,
or within the system of, law as a whole. Confusion about the
meaning of basic terms pervades the literature.
A systematic review of the implications of a concept as basic
to the legal system as contract for ordering the new reproductive
methods should offer conceptual clarification to the general dis-
cussion. This exercise also provides a foundation for the substan-
tive analysis and evaluation which are this article's ultimate goals.
To do this, a definition of contract is needed. 2
A. A Definition of Contract
Contract historically has been one of the central concepts, if
not the central concept, defining the legal structure of liberal
Western society.33 A variety of developments, however, have led to
31. The descriptive and predictive value of the distinction between public and private
has been questioned. See Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Dis-
tinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1357 (1982) (noting the blurring of the private/public
distinction and questioning its continued utility); Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay
in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1215-20 (1983) (questioning the value of the
distinction between public and private as it pertains to contracts of adhesion). The claim
here is not that there should be an a priori conceptual content to the terms "public" and
"private," but that legal proposals can be assessed by how well they create a social universe
that can be coherently described using such basic terms.
32. The purpose of the definition offered here is a formal analysis of the hypothetical
range of applications contract could have in resolving a potential source of social disorder.
The definition is formal and presupposes a minimal underlying orientation to certain broad
values. However, the value and meaning of contract for ordering the new reproductive
technologies will vary depending on how this simple formal definition is given further and
more explicit content in relation to important substantive values. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 179-223.
Arthur Corbin provides a realist's salutary caution against formalist misunderstand-
ings at this juncture:
Definitions [of contract] have been constructed by almost all writers on law and
in many thousands of judicial opinions.. . . It is a very common error to sup-
pose that legal terms, such as contract, have one absolute and eternally correct
definition. The fact is that all such terms have many usages, among which every
one is free to select. One usage is to be preferred over another only in so far as it
serves our necessity and convenience.
I A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3 (1952) (footnote omitted). Friedman suggests
that most textbook definitions are not particularly helpful in isolating the societal meaning
or value of contract. L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 15 (1965).
33. For example, contract was the subject of the first American legal casebook, C.
1990]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
uncertainty about the meaning, nature, and scope of contractual
relationships.3 4 The classical definition of contract, stated in per-
haps its clearest form by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in the late
nineteenth century,85 has a considerable continuing influence on
the general orientation of the legal system, even as it corresponds
less and less with the way agreements are actually made and
enforced.36
Holmes viewed contract as the enforcement of bargains made
in a business or commercial setting37 whether the promisee has
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871); L. FRIEDMAN,
sipra note 32, at 211. The foundational insights underlying contract's central role in lib-
eral Western society were made by Adam Smith. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NA-
TURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). On the central role of contract,
see generally E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.2 (1982) (noting that a free enterprise
economy relies on direct bilateral exchanges between individuals); J. HURST, LAW AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 301 (1984) (noting that contracts express self-interests and advance
public policy by putting economic resources to use); W. SEAGLE, THE HISTORY OF LAW
253-72 (1946). (discussing the preeminent place of contracts through ancient and classical
periods and into its maturity in modern times).
34. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (arguing that con-
tract is becoming subsumed within tort law).
35. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 289-307 (1938). Gilmore argues that classical
contract theory was "pieced together" most notably by Holmes "in broad philosophical
outline," but also by Williston, who gives a "meticulous, although not always accurate,
scholarly detail" of the theory in his 1920 treatise. G. GILMORE, supra note 34, at 14. The
pivotal role Gilmore assigns Holmes has been criticized. Speidel, An Essay on the Re-
ported Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1170-71 (1975).
While Gilmore's emphasis on Holmes may be exaggerated, the exaggeration is illuminat-
ing. What distinguishes Holmes from his immediate precursors .is his willingness to genera-
lize about the formal requirements of contract, without relying on the historic scope of the
actual common law forms. Cf. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§
45-47 (1880) (discussing elements needed to assume proper consideration for contract for-
mation). One does not have to accept Holmes's formalism to benefit from the leverage his
ahistorical formulations provide for explorations of what the law was, is, or may become.
Holmes, of course, defies easy categorization, being simultaneously a precursor of the for-
malists and realists. E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 114-16 (1962). '
36. For an explanation of the idea that legal concepts can exert a "gravitational"
pull upon the deep structures of the legal system, transcending their particular application,
see G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW (1985).
37. O.W: HOLMES, supra note 35, at 289-307. The justification of contract enforce-
ment was closely linked to its economic productivity. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, §
1.3. In the classical theory, bargains were understood to be enforceable formally within a
scope narrowly circumscribed by "legality." In a typical treatise of the classical era, sec-
tions on "consideration" and "agreement" were matched by sections on the limits of
"form," "capacity," and "consent," as well as "legal object." E.g., Id. § 1.1; J. LAWSON,
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF CONTRACTS AT LAW AND EQUITY 3 (1893).
Blackstone's earlier explanation of the scope of the legal object of contract essentially re-
mained current:
The last species of offences which especially affect the commonwealth are those
against the public police or economy. By the public police or economy I mean
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actually invested in performing the bargain or otherwise relied on
it.38 Any promise which reasonably appeared to be "bargained
for," that is, reciprocally exchanged for a "legal detriment" on the
part of the promisee, was enforceable at law. The rule in business
was pacta sunt servanda.3 9
In this view of contract, the value of individual autonomy re-
quires the consistent legal enforcement of promises struck in the
course of economic cooperation, without regard to the fairness of
the bargain or the apparent wisdom of the joint project.4 0 The cri-
teria of enforcement are voluntariness, or consent, and cooperation
in the form of business or commercial exchange. Freedom of indi-
vidual action requires a corresponding nonenforcement of involun-
tary duties of kinship or social convention, with the exception of
certain carefully defined family duties.41 It also requires the non-
the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals
of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their
general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good man-
ners, and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.
4 W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *162 (W. Lewis ed. 1897)
(emphasis in the original). As objects which were to be considered illegal or against public
policy, Blackstone included clandestine and bigamous marriage contracts. Id. at *163-65.
A fundamental feature of the enforcement of promises in the classical scheme was thus the
limitation of its application to exchanges that fit within the sphere of the commercial
bargain.
38. The idea of the "simple contract" was classically defined as "a bargain," and, as
such, distinguished from its close cousins, promises under seal and negotiable instruments.
E.g., C. ASHLEY, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1911). Holmes's paradigm is a promise to
"transport a cask of brandy to Cambridge." O.W. HOLMES, supra note 35, at 290. Willis-
ton begins his treatise by distinguishing the bargained for exchange as being "of much
greater importance," than other types of enforceable promises such as those under seal. 1
S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2A (3rd ed. 1957); see also E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 33, § 1.1 (discussing the importance of an exchange between the parties in
terms of evaluating a contract's enforceability).
39. Literally, "agreements are to be kept." The maxim is "[a]n abbreviated form of
the rule stated in Justinian's Code 2, 3, 29, an expression of the principle that undertakings
and contracts must be observed and implemented." D. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION
TO LAW 912 (1980). For a general discussion of the principle associated with the maxim,
see Note, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 783, 783-85 (1941) (arguing that a
theory of practiced dependability controls the development of contract law).
40. C. LANGDELL, supra note 35, § 148. This is expressed in the maxim that a "pep-
percorn" is adequate consideration for a promise. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at
*440. The pure value of certainty concerning future expectation is an essential aspect of
contract, in this view. As such, contract is defined as excluding present barters and dona-
tions. A. CORBIN, supra note 32, § 4 (1952); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 1.1.
41. "In essence, the role of modern contract can be summarized as the concurrent
dissociation of organic relationships and the recombination of abstracted monads into ex-
ternal relationships of limited association entailing narrowly circumscribed forms of social
cooperation." Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 810; see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, §
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enforcement of simple promises classified as "gratuitous."42 Vol-
untary, cooperative exchanges of promises in family settings and
social relationships are, in this view, nonenforceable, both for the
sake of further validating the freedom of the individual and for
exempting such settings and relationships from the intrusive
mechanism of legal enforcement.4"
As measured by the criterion of consent, contract obligation
is distinguished from involuntary obligation in tort or criminal
law. As measured by promise, it is distinguished from present
gifts and barter. As measured by the criterion of commercial or
business exchange, it is distinguished from both gratuitious
promises and exchanges within family or informal social contexts.
The justification for this distinction is the moral meaning attached
to the autonomous choice of one party to induce a future act of
will by another in a market setting.44 Since the time of Holmes,
more prosaic justifications have been tied to the evidentiary, cau-
tionary, and channelling functions, which bargain effectively
serves within society.45
1.1 (discussing the law's primary concern with an exchange between parties in order to give
rise to an enforceable contract).
42. The emergence of the nonenforceability of gratuitous promises under the com-
mon law appears originally to have presupposed the concurrent enforcement of such
promises, in at least some circumstances, within the ecclesiastical courts, under designation
asfidesfacta. H. POTTER, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITU-
TIONS, 450 (4th ed. 1958). Yet, the classical treatment of common law contract makes it
axiomatic that bargains are enforceable, and gratuitous promises are not. E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 33, §§ 1.1, 2.5; J. LAWSON, supra note 37, § 91.
43. "'Purposive contracts' ... neither affect 'the status of the parties nor give rise
to new qualities of comradeship' but aim solely 'at some specific (especially economic)
performance or result.'" Kronman & Posner, Notes and Questions, in THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTRACT LAW 261-62 (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1979) (quoting M. WEBER, LAW
IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (E. Shils & M. Rheinstein trans. 1954)); see E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 33, § 2.2. The nonenforcement of contract obligation within the confines of the
marital relationship was, until recently, well settled. See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2
K.B. 571, 121 L.T.R. 346, 88 L.J.K.B. 1,054, 35 T.L.R. 609, 63 Sol. J. 661 (C.A.) (holding
that a husband's promise to pay his estranged wife's living expenses is not intended to be a
legally enforceable bargain). For reference to the thesis of Sir Henry Maine that the move-
ment of progressive societies is away from familial relationship and towards contract, see
infra note 655.
44. See P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 713 (1986)
(noting that the market rewards those who articulate their future needs); see also infra
text accompanying note 687.
45. See Note, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-06 (1941) (dis-
cussing formalities historically associated with contracts). Earlier in history, only written
promises made under seal were enforceable at law as opposed to promises exchanged in




This definition of contract is insufficient for two reasons.
First, it presupposes a clear distinction between market and family
as well as the appropriate role of contract in the context of family
relationship, the very question contemporary developments in
human reproduction put at issue. These presuppositions must be
discarded in order for the definition to serve as a useful analytical
tool. Second, the definition no longer fully corresponds to the law
of contract as it has evolved since the time of Holmes. Contractual
obligation may now be imposed based on a promise unsupported
by a bargain, as long as the promise foreseeably induces measura-
ble detrimental reliance on the part of the promisee" or, in cer-
tain narrow cases, as long as the promise is given with requisite
formal attestation. In addition, commercial bargain alone no
longer guarantees the legal enforcement of a promise. A promise
is unenforceable if obtained in an unfair bargain. "Contract with-
out bargain" is mainly the product of the promissory estoppel doc-
trine; "bargain without contract" flows from the doctrine of
unconscionability.48
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). Gilmore credits Corbin
with demonstrating that Holmes had distorted the common law cases and with responsibil-
ity for the corrective inclusion of § 90 in the Restatement. G. GILMORE, supra note 34, at
64.
47. Although the seal is either no longer recognized, or merely creates a presumption
of consideration, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 96A statutory note, topic 3
(1979) (tables of relevant state laws), a modern trend has acknowledged formal contracts
where adequate attestation exists. MODEL WRITTEN OBLIGATIONS ACT, 9C U.L.A. 378
(1957) requires the enforcement of any writing that contains an express statement that it is
intended as legally binding. This proposal has been enacted only in Pennsylvania. Uniform
Written Obligations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 6-8 (Purdon 1988). In New York
promises are enforced as long as they are written, signed, and reciie some past benefit
received. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1105 (McKinney 1990). New Mexico makes written
promises binding without consideration. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-7-2 (1978). Lord Mansfield
attempted to make a written promise binding without consideration, but was reversed by
his successors on the bench. Pillans and Rose v. Van Mierop and Hopkins, 3 Burr. 1663, 97
Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765).
48. On promissory estoppel, under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, see
generally Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678
(1984) (tracing the development of promissory estoppel doctrine and its relation to broader
developments in contract law). Even in commercial settings, the doctrine has led to the
enforcement of promissory obligation where bargain is absent. See, e.g., Drennan v. Star
Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958) (defendant's estimate used in plaintiff's
bid on construction contract held enforceable as an irrevocable offer); Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965) (plaintiff given franchise for a store based
on reliance on defendant's promises).
On unconscionability, under U.C.C. § 2-302 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 208, see generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 9-37,
9-38, 9-39, 9-40 (3d ed. 1987) (discussing the language, history and application of U.C.C.
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In addition to the doctrine of unconscionability, state neutral-
ity with respect to the enforcement of private bargains has been
eroded on another front. In matters important to consumer wel-
fare such as employment, housing, and insurance, the government
may dictate some, or all the terms of contract.49 In the course of
performance, the state may participate in the contractual relation-
ship, through its regulatory structure, as though it were a third
party to the agreement - for example, the involvement of the
Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service in em-
ployer-employee arrangements. The existence of complex govern-
mental regulation may make performance as much a matter of
complying with governmental regulations as with the provisions of
the contract itself - for example, under contracts implicating
federal and state environmental protection laws.
As a consequence of the changing status of both bargain and
consent as criteria of the enforceability of promises, further ele-
ments in Holmes's definition must be modified if a credible defini-
tion of contract is to be fashioned. The solution of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts is to define contract as any promise
the law makes legally enforceable.5 0 Contract becomes any con-
sent given under conditions the law establishes for enforcement.
§ 2-302); Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 752-54
(1982) (reconciling U.C.C. § 2-302 and the bargain principle); Leff, Unconscionability and
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) (analyzing the pur-
pose, language, and result of U.C.C. § 2-302); Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Con-
sumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1970) (applying U.C.C. § 2-302 to consumer
sales and the burden of proof). For important early cases illustrating unconscionability, see,
e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (discussing
factors involved in determining unconscionable clauses); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (arguing that disclaimer of implied warranty by
automobile manufacturer is against public policy).
49. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 48, §§ 1-3 (noting increased legisla-
tive restrictions on contractual freedom); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 1.7 (discussing
the evolution of government limitation on contract in the twentieth century); Linzer, The
Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law
Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323 (1986) (discussing court-imposed restrictions on private law);
Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 941 (1971) (dis-
cussing the beneficial effects of governmental interference in the evolution of private law).
50. "A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1932). The definition is retained in the Second Restate-
ment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979). It is derived from Williston, the
principal drafter of the first Restatement: "A contract is a promise, or set of promises, to
which the law attaches legal obligation." 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 38, § 1. The Uniform
Commercial Code defines contract as the total legal obligation resulting from the parties'
agreement, which, in turn, is defined as bargain. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), (11) (1989).
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Although the Restatement definition does not shatter doctrinal
contradictions implicit in the cases, it is so clearly tautological as
to be conceptually inadequate. 5' Consent is a necessary, though
not a sufficient, element of any definition of contract. Some fur-
ther criterion is required to establish what promises are enforcea-
ble as a matter of contractual obligation.
The idea of contract requires an element of collaboration be-
tween private parties. If state involvement eliminated all vestiges
of exchange between private parties, the resulting legal form
would no longer be contract. Thus, an activity coordinated entirely
by the state but involving the legal enforcement of consensual ob-
ligations by individuals, would not be contract, at least in the par-
adigmatic sense, although it would satisfy the Restatement defini-
tion. 2 In the view proposed here, government contracts for
services of which the state is the only end user, such as military
service, are contracts by analogy only."' Yet, because the state is
no longer neutral about the content or fairness of contracts, a defi-
nition of contract treating it as a strictly private arrangement,
cannot be accepted either. In place of this strict notion of contract
as private, it is necessary to substitute a more minimal require-
ment: to qualify as contract, a promise must look towards some
form of cooperation between two persons, neither of whom, in
principle, is required by law to be the state.54
A looser notion of reciprocity in some form of private cooper-
ation may be substituted for bargain in the strict classical sense.
Bargain remains as one, though not the only, form of reciprocity.
Subsequent foreseeable reliance on a promise resulting in detri-
ment to the promisee is also reciprocal, as is the formally attested
simple promise given to another as a guarantee of performance. 55
51. For other criticism of the Restatement definition, see G. GILMORE, supra note 34.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979).
53. Where the state functions in a role that is- not distinctively and exclusively gov-
ernmental, such as buying or selling goods, hiring clerical staff, or contracting to construct
buildings, it enters into a contract. However, where the state acts in a role exclusively
reserved to it, either intrinsically or by governmental decree or enactment, its arrangements
are better viewed as administrative than as contractual. Exampleswould include employ-
ment relations with elected officials and military personnel and agreements to buy defense
equipment. However, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that "[w]hen the
United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed gen-
erally by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals." Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 559 (1933).
54. In adoption proceedings, consent is given but is not an application of contract. In
re Adoption of Anonymous, 286 A.D. 161, 165, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90, 94 (1955).
55. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52,
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This definition of contract is broad enough that it begins to over-
lap with categories traditionally distinguishable from contract
such as intentional tort. Ultimately, however, it remains analyti-
cally distinct. Under the law of contract, so defined, legal obliga-
tion arises from any of a range of responses that a promise by one
private person may elicit in another.5 6 Within the broad class of
cases covered by this definition, the law may further narrow the
scope of promises subject to enforcement based on different policy
considerations. 57
In the present discussion, then, contract will be assumed to
mean a promise that is legally enforceable because it satisfies the
following conditions: it is given in furtherance of social reciproc-
ity, whether in the form of a reciprocal bargain between promisor
and promisee, promissory inducement of detrimental reliance by
the promisee, or solemnly attested promissory assurance; neither
party is an agency of the government functioning in a role that is
distinctively and exclusively governmental; and the promise is oth-
71-72 (1936). Standard treatises distinguished between simple contracts, which were bar-
gains, and formal contracts under seal. Gradually the latter have disappeared. Now, an
equivalent form may be returning, based not on the value of honor, but rather on a prag-
matic value. Negotiable instruments were and are a thriving alternative based on formality.
U.C.C. §§ 3-305, 3-306, 3-408 (1989) (providing formalities for negotiable instruments).
The definition proposed here is not unlike "the relations among parties to the process of
projecting exchange into the future." I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 4 (1980);
see also Gordon, Macauley, Macneil and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Con-
tract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 565, 569.
56. In the definition offered here, contract is a promise given in the setting of so-
cially-recognized cooperation. Therefore, narrower justifications for enforcement founded
on expectation or reliance interests and the like need not be considered, although they may
play a decisive role in the scope society gives promissory obligation. Goetz & Scott, supra
note 27, at 1261-62.
57. As demonstrated in the final section of this article, some normative theories of
contract are quite selective in the precise forms of social cooperation they deem to warrant
contractual obligation. These may allow fewer exceptions which Gilmore referred to as the
new "formalism." G. GILMORE, supra note 34. However, the standard treatment of con-
tract assumes, as does present legal practice, that alienability by contract is restricted
wherever it "is reasonably designed to attain or encourage accepted social or economic
ends." D. FESSLER & P. LOISEAUX, CONTRACTS: MORALITY, ECONOMICS AND THE MAR-
KETPLACE: CASES AND MATERIALS 812 (1982). Earlier authors treated such limits to con-
tract under the heading of "illegality," later authors generally treat it under "public pol-
icy." A. CORBIN, supra note 32, § 1375. Most contemporary discussions assume a
background of historical flux in the types of transactions that have "marched in and out of
the area of contract." The early nineteenth century saw the scope of this field expand and
"grow fat" with the "spoils of other fields." However, contemporary public policy develop-
ments have limited the ambit of contract, making it a residual field. Skepticism about this




erwise of a kind that is enforced by law. Involuntary liabilities
imposed by the state in its police power or under' criminal law and
nonpromissory tort law are not contract. Voluntary duties under-
taken in relation to an activity over which the state exercises a
monopoly are not contract, nor are voluntary exchanges and other
forms of future-oriented private cooperation that are not legally
enforceable. The purpose of the present article is to understand
and evaluate the potential role of contract, as defined, for the new
legal ordering of human reproduction.
B. The Role of Contract in Two Existing Taxonomies of Legal
Approaches to the New Reproductive Technologies
With "jurisprudence. . . poised on the brink of its evolution-
ary surge," an analytically sound map of alternative approaches in
lawmaking with regard to artificially assisted human reproduction
is a priority.58 Two frameworks devised for this purpose merit re-
view. One is proposed in the Ontario Law Reform Commission's
Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Mat-
ters.59 The other is offered in an influential article by Professor
Walter Wadlington.60 Each framework utilizes contract. Although
neither taxonomy fully coheres or even intends to account consist-
ently for the potential role of contract, each offers an opportunity
for critically discerning conceptual distinctions important to an
analytically sound framework.
1. The Ontario Law Reform Commission Taxonomy
Charged by the provincial Attorney General with studying
the legal implications of the' new reproductive technologies, the
Ontario Law Reform Commission published its conclusions in the
58. Dickens, Surrogate Motherhood: Legal and Legislative Issues, in GENTIrcs AND
THE LAW III, supra note 5, at 187. Walter Wadlington notes that the new reproductive
technologies have the potential to serve as a catalyst for reordering family law generally.
Wadlington, Baby M: Catalyst for Family Law Reform, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 1 (1989); Wadlington, supra note 21; Wadlington, Artificial Conception.: The Chal-
lenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REv. 465, 507-11 (1983) [hereinafter Wadlington, Artifi-
cial Conception].
59. ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6. For a less successful framework proposed by a
governmental study, see the scheme of the Office of Technology Assessment, which melds
"static," "private ordering,". "inducement," "regulatory," and "punitive" categories bor-
rowed eclectically from other schemes, into a loose pastiche. Its inducement and punitive
categories should, for example, actually be considered modes of implementing a "regula-
tory" approach. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra notre 21, at 285-88.
60. Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 58.
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Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Mat-
ters." The report recommends a unified legislative response to
these technologies. 2 To facilitate this goal the Commission ana-
lyzed several conceptual alternatives.6 3 The importance of the
Commission's analysis is underscored both by the Commission's
prestige64 and by the decisive impact of its conclusions on the con-
tent of the National Conference of Commissioners' Uniform Sta-
tus of Children of Assisted Conception Act6 5
According to the Commission's classification, legislative ap-
proaches to the new reproductive technologies can be placed on a
spectrum defined at one end by a state preference for private in-
tention and at the other by state preference for community norms
of behavior.6 One type of legislative response would require con-
sistently honoring private intentions; the Commission names this
the "private ordering" option. 7 Another type, the "state regula-
tion" model, would support community norms.6 8 A third type, the
"hybrid" or "flexible" approach, draws on both pure types inter-
changeably, as circumstances dictate.6 9 Closer analysis discloses
the role of contract in each of the three alternatives and the de-
gree of conceptual soundness to be accorded the Commission's
scheme.
61. ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6, at 1.
62. Id. at 105. Other governmental and professional bodies have made similar, if
somewhat less schematic and often more ethically-oriented recommendations. See, e.g.,
COMM. TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL & LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION, REPORT ON DONOR GAMETES IN IVF (1983); COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND
SOCIETY, HUMAN PROCREATION: ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW TECHNIQUES [hereinafter
DUNSTAN REP.]; ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 21; ROYAL COLLEGE OF OBSTETRI-
CIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE 'OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNE-
COLOGISTS ETHICS COMMITrEE ON IN VITRO FERILISATION OR EMBRYO REPLACEMENT
AND TRANSFER (1983); WALLER REP., supra note 21; WARNOCK REP., supra note 21;
American Fertility Society, supra, note 21, at Supp. I.
63. ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6, at 105-30.
64. One commentator claims that "[tihe Ontario Report is remarkably thorough and
may well serve as the basis for comprehensive legislation in this area." Eaton, supra note
21, at 703 (1986).
65. UNIF. STATUS ACT, supra note 6, § 5-6, at 93-96. In its "Alternative A," this
section requires the court to approve hired maternity agreements before they can be valid,
closely following the recommendations of the Law Reform Commission. ONTARIO COMM'N,
supra note 6, at 239-62.
66. ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6, at 106-07.
67. Id. at 106.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 107.
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a. The Private Ordering Model
In the private ordering model, the state restricts its purposes
in the area of assisted human reproduction to furthering the inten-
tions of private parties." As envisioned by the Commission, such
an approach imposes no restrictions on eligibility for available re-
productive opportunities.71 It does not screen participants or re-
quire medical supervision. 2 It requires no governmental approval
or filing as condition for recognizing a parent-child relationship.7 3
Individuals are free to choose gamete donors at will and to assign
child custody, as they like.74 The state intervenes in a parent-child
relationship formed through assisted conception only in the event
of parental neglect or abuse."5
The Commission suggests that the closest analogue to this ap-
proach under existing law is the "legal model of natural reproduc-
tion. ' 76 Existing law can hardly be characterized as laissez faire
with respect to the initiation by individuals of reproduction.7
Nevertheless, the law does assume the individual's right to initiate
procreation without undue governmental interference. Those who
procreate without technological assistance need no special govern-
mental approval to reproduce or to obtain recognition of the par-
ent-child relationship.78 The law intervenes in the "naturally" oc-
curring parent-child relationship only in the exceptional cases of
divorce or parental abuse.79 Ancillary fertility treatments are free
from special regulation where conception occurs through natural
means.80 The Commission believes natural reproduction provides a
legal model of "private decision-making" and "state non-interven-
tion"81 that parallels its concept of "private ordering" for techno-
logically assisted reproduction.
However, the analogy fails because the Commission includes
70. Id. at 107-08.




75. Id. at 110.
76. Id. at 108.
77. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 23, §§ 2.12 (dealing with marriage eligibil-
ity criteria related to reproductive function), 4.1-4.5 (dealing with strictures against
illegitimacy).
78. Id. §§ 4.1-4.5.
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contract as an essential element of the "private ordering" of the
new reproductive technologies. According to the Commission, pri-
vate ordering in the domain of technologically assisted reproduc-
tion includes the legal enforcement of contracts for the purchase
and sale of gametes and for transfer of parental rights.8 2
The inclusion of contract cannot be considered an insignifi-
cant addition to the legal model of natural reproduction. This
model establishes more than the attitude of the state toward indi-
vidual choices to procreate. It also determines the basis for recog-
nizing parent-child relationships, and for legally resolving conflict-
ing parental claims of the two or more adults who have
contributed procreative "resources" to the conception of a child.
Under received law, contract is excluded, at least nominally, from
answering these questions.8 3
In the existing legal framework, families comprise an impor-
tant constituent part of the private realm. Natural reproductive
arrangements are so fundamentally private that public tools of
law enforcement, like that of contract, remain presumptively ex-
cluded from their sphere.8 4 By analogizing the private ordering
option to the legal ordering of natural reproduction, the Commis-
sion appears to advance this sort of privacy. But, this meaning of
privacy does not correspond to the one that the Commissioners
ascribe to the "private" ordering option. This option actually
places the mechanism of the state within the sphere of "privacy"
to decide disputes between parties. The meaning of privacy that
matches the content of the Commission's "private ordering"
model is one encountered in legal discussions of the market as a
product of state-enforced private contract: 5 it is the privacy of
82. The Ontario Commission explicitly utilizes contract in the allocation of gametes
and parental rights:
The private ordering model would conceivably permit a gamete donor to con-
tract for the sale of sperm or ova on condition that he or she would bear no legal
relation to any child resulting from the use of such gametes . . . . [A]rtificially
conceived children would be placed and named in accordance with private
agreements.
Id. at 109.
83. See H. CLARK, supra note 23, §§ 19.10, 20.4 (The court may in its discretion
entirely disregard any contract between natural parents allocating custody of a child.).
84. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732, 743, 393 N.E.2d 836, 843 (1979).
See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 5.4 (discussing the traditional unenforce-
ability of contracts related to marriage); S. GREEN & J. LONG, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
LAW AGREEMENTS 209 (1984) (noting the traditional invalidation of agreements in which
sexual relations serve as consideration).
85. See infra notes 814-17 and accompanying text.
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Lochner v. New York.86 The Commission purports to build the
private ordering model by analogy to procreation in the natural
family, when its implicit reference is to the commercial
marketplace.
b. The Model of State Regulation
At the other end of the spectrum, the Commission constructs
a model of "state regulation."8 In this approach, the state seeks
primarily the enforcement of community norms of behavior.88 In-
dividual preference is subordinate.8 9 As applied to ordering artifi-
cially assisted reproduction, this approach may lead the state to
regulate access to the new reproductive technologies;90 dictate the
medical context for their utilization;9' and decide the legal status
of the children conceived. 2 The Commission assumes that the
overriding public value giving direction to this scheme is the best
interest of the child.9
The Commissioners point to adoption law as analogous to
their model of state regulation. Under existing adoption law, no
one has a legal right to adopt a child.9 4 Personal privacy is sacri-
ficed under the scrutiny of the adoption screening process.9 5 Every
86. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In striking down labor legislation governing the working
hours of bakers, Mr. Justice Peckham reasoned that:
It seems to us that the real object and purpose were simply to regulate the hours
of labor between the master and his employees (all being men, sui juris), in a
private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals or in any real and sub-
stantial degree, to the health of the employees. Under such circumstances the
freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in relation to their
employment, and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with,
without violating the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 64; see also Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (fifth amendment
protects liberty of contract for labor); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (legislation
relating to labor contract violates liberty of contract); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908) (legislation restricting employer position in labor contracts is an unjustifiable inter-
ference in the liberty of contract); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (states can-
not abridge the right of citizens to contract outside its boundaries).
87. ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6, at 110-11.
88. Id. at 110
89. Id.
90. Id. at 133.
91. Id. at 135.
92. Id. at 133.
93. Id.
94. See Adoption of a Minor, 386 Mass. 741, 438 N.E.2d 38 (1982); Child Welfare
Act, Part II, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 66 § 33 (1980); Child & Family Services Act, Part III,
ONT. REv. STAT. ch. 55 (1984); ONTARIo COMM'N, supra note 6, at 111.
95. ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6, at 113.
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aspect of the adoption process from placement through final court
approval is supervised by state authority.9 6 Those who conform to
community standards are generally approved for adoption, while
those who do not conform are rejected.9 7 The Commission ob-
serves that state regulation could be modulated to allow varying
degrees of state control, and that its response to a given practice
might range from outright prohibition to minimal oversight. As an
existing analogue to the form of envisioned state regulation ad-
justed for more minimal control, the Commission cites the law on
step-parent adoption.98
Analogizing a state regulatory scheme for the new reproduc-
tive technologies to the existing adoption agency framework ig-
nores a crucial difference between adoption practice and proposed
state regulation of new reproduction methods. Existing adoption
law is premised on the state's parens patriae duty to protect the
welfare of a child in being. It imposes burdens on affected adults
strictly for this purpose. It does not address who has the right to
reproduce or how reproduction ought to be pursued. If a legal
structure modeled on adoption regulation were applied to control
reproductive choices, state regulation would extend significantly
beyond the scope of the existing parens patriae rationale and si-
multaneously conflict with state regulation of the marital contract
as well as individual freedom to pursue informal, nonmarital
procreation.
Curiously, the Commission illustrates the stronger form of
the model of state regulation by citing a form of "surrogate moth-
erhood" contract.9 9 The Commission envisions a contract requir-
ing judicial validation at formation and judicial supervision during
performance. 100 Even so, according to canons of "privacy" and
"state regulation," it is surprising that a contract between two pri-
vate persons who have initiated cooperation between themselves
should be considered a prime example of state regulation."'
96. Id. at 111-12.
97. Id. at 113.
98. Id. at 115. Minimal regulation might be employed if artificially conceived chil-
dren are viewed as having a presumptively closer bond with intended parents, than do
children with prospective adoptive parents. Id. at 116-17.
99. Id. at 233-36. See generally Knoppers & Sloss, Recent Developments: Legisla-
tive Reforms in Reproductive Technology, 18 OTTAWA L. REV. 663, 696-718 (1986) (dis-
cussing the "judicialization of pregnancy").
100. ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6, at 234-35, 249-55.
101. Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1323 (1982) (contrasting natural rights and positivist
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While the Commission supplies 'no critical note, the anomaly
seems rooted in the dichotomy underlying the Commission's
scheme of classification. This dichotomy exists between the state
enforcement of private intention on the one hand and public com-
munity standards on the other.102 Within this regime, the only sa-
lient trait distinguishing one legal alternative from another is the
degree to which state standards are imposed: a heavily regulated
contract falls necessarily within the model of state regulation.
c. The Preferred Approach
The Commission advocates a "hybrid" or "flexible" model. In
this model, the state balances values of private choice and commu-
nity norm.103 The Commission reasons that the law ordinarily
gives a presumption to individual freedom, and thus accords broad
scope to private intention as expressed in contract.104 However,
when a countervailing interest is at stake, the law tilts to a regula-
tory approach. 10 5 In the case of new reproductive technologies, the
welfare of the children provides a sufficient basis for regulation. 10 6
To the Commission, state regulation of artificially assisted repro-
duction is generally appropriate, and practices such as "surrogate
motherhood" ought to be governmentally controlled.10 7 Where ex-
perience shows that private ordering of a particular technology
happens to increase the welfare of children the law may dispense
with a regulatory approach and allow private ordering. The Com-
mission asserts that this is the case with Artificial Insemination by
Donor ("AID") and may also be so with In Vitro Fertilization
("IVF").108
The Commission has arranged the alternatives to place its
preferred approach in the middle. Whether this framework has
the conceptual integrity required to channel alternative ap-
proaches into a single scheme is open to debate. In distilled form,
the Commission's hybrid approach seems to amount to state regu-
lation, allowing private ordering only on an exceptional basis, as
theories of privacy with state action).
102. ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6, at 106-07, 110-11.
103. Id. at 107, 118-30.
104. Id. at 119.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 120.
107. Id. at 120, 122.
108. Id. at 121-22.
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state assessment of the children's welfare makes appropriate." 9
The Commission, however, provides no general test for determin-
ing when the children's welfare justifies allowing private ordering.
A more serious objection, conceptually, is that the relaxation of
state regulation in favor of private ordering on a technology-by-
technology basis appears self-contradictory. If the state makes a
case-by-case determination, the model remains state regulation,
even if it incidentally sanctions private agreements. The Comm-
mission, for instance, cites AID as the sort of private ordering that
is permissible under its hybrid approach but fails to note that AID
generally occurs within a strictly regulated scheme of state over-
sight. 10 The Commission's supposed third option is "state regula-
tion" fortified by some indeterminate incidental concern for pri-
vate preference."'
d. Summary Critique of the Commission's Taxonomy
One test of the functional validity and coherence of the Com-
mission's framework is whether it succeeds analytically in order-
ing the new human reproduction by distinguishing basic options
with respect to the role of contract. The dichotomy the Commis-
sion draws between private ordering and state regulation might
imply a distinction based on contract. However, the inference does
not obtain. Contract is a mode of ordering under all three alterna-
tives. It serves equally as a method for enforcing both private
choice and state interest in the welfare of the child. Not even the
Commission's so-called private ordering option takes its form from
the distinctive character of contractual cooperation between pri-
vate persons; it is derived from an abstract validation of individual
intention, treating contract as an incidental feature.1 12 Where con-
tract is mentioned in connection with any of the Commission's
three models, no apparent significance is attributed to the choice
of contract over any other mode of legal ordering. This is as true
of the choice of contract over some more static form of ordering in
the context of private ordering as it is of the choice of judicially
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). See generally
infra text accompanying notes 372-411.
111. The influence of libertarian principles expands where a public or governmental
consensus on the relevant issues is lacking, even within a framework generally reliant on
state conferral. ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6, at 119.
112. Id. at 107.
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supervised "surrogate motherhood" contracts in the context' of
state regulation. The Commission's framework fails to make
meaningful analytical distinctions in the application of contract to
the new reproductive technologies.
The framework suffers from a further, more fundamental an-
alytical defect. The Commission builds on a dichotomy between
laws facilitating private intention and laws implementing public
interest. Roughly, this dichotomy underlies the debate of the past
several decades on the merit of legal regulation of private, consen-
sual sexual acts."1 The dichotomy reduces the scope of relevant
inquiry to the "vertical" issue of whether the state or the individ-
ual should decide. Extending this dichotomy to organize the dis-
cussion of legal responses to technologically assisted procreation is
inappropriate. In the procreative context, there is a second, "hori-
zontal" issue: resolution of conflicts between and among various
adults over competing claims to the parent-child relationship. The
law must choose some basis for resolving such "horizontal" con-
flicts. The dichotomy that the Commission borrows from the de-
bate on the regulation of private consensual sex provides no mean-
ingful basis for such a choice.
The Commission's failure to consider the need for distinctions
regarding this horizontal conflict undermines the value of the di-
chotomy between public and private, even with respect to vertical
conflicts of individual versus state. The Commission's public or-
dering of reproduction yields enforcement of private hired mater-
nity contracts. Its private ordering yields an unprecedented entry
of the state into private family relationships for the purpose of
enforcing exchanges among family members. The organization of
the Commission's framework expressly depends on the distinction
between public and private, but ends in obfuscating it. The Com-
mission's inconsistencies ultimately produce a taxonomy which in-
cludes only one category, state action. The only question is
113. Compare P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1968) (so long as it is
based on deeply held public standards, the law can enter any private realm of morality)
with H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) (rejecting Devlin since there is
no necessary relationship between the preservation of society and the enforcement of soci-
ety's morality). Whether or not it is considered persuasive on a given issue, the basis for
governmental regulation of sexual conduct is a general concern for public morality. See
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). By contrast, the purpose of governmental regu-
lation of the new reproductive technologies would be to regulate the dominion of one person
over another who is emerging and.unemancipated, as well as the formation of the basic
unit of social life: the parent-child relationship.
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whether the state should act to enforce bargains or act to enforce
its own agenda. The only possible answer is that the state should
act on its own agenda, while including some deference to private
preference. In spite of the prestige of its drafters, the taxonomic
scheme of the Ontario Law Reform Commission is a failure. Its
particular danger is that it appears to facilitate ordered choice,
while it, in fact, obscures important choices.
2. Wadlington's Taxonomy of Approaches
In a short article entitled Artificial Conception: The Chal-
lenge for Family Law, Professor Walter Wadlington proposes a
separate taxonomy of legal responses to technologically assisted
reproduction. 114 Departing from the dichotomous approach used
by the Ontario Law Reform Commission, Wadlington constructs
a tripartite framework that classifies putative legal responses as
"static," "private ordering," or "state regulation."11 5 While still
imperfect, the Wadlington taxonomy 'represents a significant ad-
vance over that of the Ontario Law Reform Commission.
a. The Static Approach
In contrast to the Canadian report, Professor Wadlington dis-
tinguishes biological status from contract when analyzing the ba-
ses for recognizing parent-child relationships.1 Where the Com-
mission treats both elements as aspects of private ordering,
Wadlington makes -biological status the key to a separate model
which he terms the "static" approach.1 1 7 Under this approach, le-
gal recognition of "parenthood and all accompanying rights and
duties" flows from biological relationship.1 ' Legal validation of
parental status and social role is premised on biology. The ap-
proach is "static" in that biological status which is not alterable
by contractual exchange or other means determines legal status.
Wadlington disapproves of this approach; the only benefit he con-
cedes is that it engenders predictability of familial rights and du-
ties in the context of assisted reproduction.11 9 He advocates rejec-
'114. Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 58, at 496-97.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 496-503.
117. Id. at 496.
118. Id.
119. "Strict adherence to this approach might eliminate some existing confusion
about paternal status." Id.
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tion of this model because it would defeat the intended transfer of
parental rights in AID arrangements which he deems socially val-
uable. He also asserts that it would be detrimental in unspecified
ways to the best interests of children.120
Within Wadlington's taxonomy, the "static" approach is in-
tended to mirror received legal forms governing the family.1 21
However, such forms derive only in part from biological relation-
ship. They may also be based on marital relationship or de facto
rearing bond, each of which, no less than contract, must be distin-
guished from biology. 22 More than one claimant will always be
able to assert biological parenthood, making coiflict between bio-
logical parents unavoidable. Persons other than the biological par-
ents may be able to assert a rearing bond with the child and con-
flicts may arise in this connection as well. Some norm other than
biology is needed to resolve these conflicts. Thus, Wadlington's
definition of the "static" approach in exclusively biological terms
suffers from a serious conceptual lacuna. Recognizing this gap,
Bernard Dickens adds "social form" to biological relationship as a
basis of static ordering.12 3 Dickens observes, for example, that the
"static ordering" approach may restrict reproductive technologies
to married couples, and, in so doing, order procreative relationship
according to social form rather than biology.124
Wadlington, Dickens, and others criticize the static approach
for being a "rigid" concept that is socially conservative.1 25 They
also consider it "static" because it provides a rationale for ob-
structing legal change. 2 Proponents of the approach are said to
wish to "discourage" the use of the new technologies. 27 The ap-
proach includes penalties that could be imposed upon children.'28
However, it is not accurate to characterize the "static" approach
as especially rigid. Regardless of whether the results would be
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 355-65 (discussion of adoption); infra text
accompanying notes 347-48 (discussion of step-parent adoption).
123. Dickens, supra note 58, at 193.
124. Id.
125. Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 58, at 496; Dickens, supra note
58, at 193.
126. Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 58, at 496. Dickens, supra note
58, at 193.
127. Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 58, at 496.
128. Id.; Dickens, supra note 58, at 193 (possible penalties include denial of inheri-
tance rights in the estates of members of the child's social family).
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uniformly desirable, procreative relationships under this approach
could be as wide-ranging as biology and extended social coopera-
tion would allow. Rules for resolving post-natal conflicts would
rest on biological ties, the de facto bond between the biological
parents or between one biological parent and another person, and
the psychological rearing bond between the biological or adoptive
parent and child, rather than on contract or legislative decree. 129
Founded in equity, such rules would be inherently flexible com-
pared to corresponding rules under an approach based on contract
or state conferral. 130
Every legal approach to procreation implies some form of
penalty, whether implicit or express. 1  In the "static" approach,
penalties would be implicit and would affect children where the
emphasis on social form led to legally enforced definitions of legit-
imacy in terms of birth and parentage. Stressing legitimacy, how-
ever, is not essential to the "static" approach, but rather is only
one option historically associated with a single version of it.'32 On
the other hand, express penalties would probably be imposed on
those transferring parental rights by illegal contract, just as they
now are under statutes prohibiting baby-selling.13 3
Penalties under alternative approaches would be at least as
intrusive and burdensome. Under a contractual model, for exam-
ple, a so-called surrogate mother would be subject to subordinate
and "illegitimate" status in relation to the wife who is destined to
serve as the rearing mother.13 4 Persons with natural claims on
129. To some degree family law already embodies these rules. See infra text accom-
panying notes 343-46. The more informal the social cooperation that society chooses to
tolerate in conjunction with procreation, the greater the care required in formulating prin-
ciples for resolving conflicts among proliferating claimants to parental rights.
130. Society, to some extent, would have to tolerate more ad hoc adjudication of
conflicts, based on some general standard such as the "best interests of the child." Society
also would have to tolerate complex intimate or domestic relationships among adults and
children, leading to an increase in the number and kind of conflicts with a diminishing
ability on the part of courts to provide "clean" solutions.
131. The formal imposition of penalties is only one kind of legal penalty. Dean Cala-
bresi has stressed the punitive impact of the many indirect burdens allocated by the law. G.
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 111-13 (1970).
132. See generally H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971) (re-
viewing the distinctions in legal status between legitimate and illegitimate children);
Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy - Balancing
the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 494 n.135, 495-96 (1983)
(describing the dilemma of providing effective inducements to adults to structure child
rearing units in the interests of children while not unduly penalizing individual children).
133. At least twenty-four states have such laws. See Katz, supra note 20, at 8 n.34.
134. This was the source of much sympathy for Mary Beth Whitehead. See, e.g.,
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children who attempt to assert them in the face of contrary con-
tractual provisions might be subjected to extreme penalties. 135 In
fact, the only intrinsically "punitive" aspect of the static approach
derives from disappointed expectations where procreative intent
cannot be effected without contractually enforced exchange. 13 6 To
this extent, alternative approaches would create comparable frus-
trations, but would allocate them differently. 13 7 Conceptually, the
"static" ordering approach is not peculiarly punitive.
b. The Private Ordering Approach
"Private ordering" in Professor Wadlington's framework dif-
fers in an important respect from the private ordering of the On-
tario Law Reform Commission. It dispenses with any analogy to
the "legal model of natural reproduction," and is constructed ex-
clusively by reference to contract. According to Wadlington, "pri-
vate ordering" through contract "would allow individual decision-
making to control the definition of parental rights and duties
... M'8 Private ordering also "[would] allow tailored agree-
ments to meet specific needs according to the technique used and
the parties involved."'3 9 Wadlington notes that some degree of
commercialization in human procreation flows inevitably from this
option.140 As Bernard Dickens observes: "[ilt would ...accom-
modate commercialism in the supply of sperm, ova, and surrogate
services; and compel recognition in principle of whatever arrange-
ments private persons may determine among themselves to govern
the conception, prenatal carriage, birth, and custody of chil-
dren."M4 Wadlington correctly concludes that the model does not
Pollitt, Contracts and Apple Pie: The Strange Case of Baby M, THE NATION, May 23,
1987, at 667 (criticizing the trial court's decision to terminate the parental rights of a
biological mother).
135. They might, for example, be charged with "kidnapping" for attempting to as-
sert their natural parental relationship. See H. CLARK, supra note 23, §§ 11.2, 12.4.
136. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 8, at 1002-03.
137. These frustrations include conflicts with those who wish to assert natural paren-
tal rights notwithstanding prior assent to a contrary contractual understanding, e.g., In re
Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 411-17, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235-37 (1988), and children who want a
relationship with their biological parents. See Beyer & Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological
Parents: Their Effect on Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 FAM. L.Q.
233 (1986).
138. Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 58, at 496.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 496-97.
141. Dickens, supra note 58, at 193-94.
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require the exclusion of other approaches, but does demand pre-
dictability of enforcement within its allotted scope.142 While
Wadlington fails to address the broader implications of private or-
dering, he greatly enhances its value as an analytical tool by
plainly identifying it with contract.
State enforcement of rights and duties, in this view, is justi-
fied by reference to the meaning and value of promises made in
pursuit of private social cooperation. By allotting such promises
the power to preempt the meaning and value of both social form
and biology, this model directly advances individual autonomy.
c. The State Regulation Approach
In its broad outlines, Wadlington's version of state regulation
mimics that of the Canadian commission. 143 In both versions, the
state decides who will have access to the technologies and regu-
lates conduct to ensure the health and adequate rearing of chil-
dren. 44 Wadlington goes beyond the Ontario Commission to dif-
ferentiate several forms or styles of government regulation. 45
Government regulation might be delegated to the medical profes-
sion. 46 At an extreme of bureaucratization, the state might insti-
tute a super adoption agency, coordinating and supervising all ar-
tificially assisted human reproduction.147
As Bernard Dickens notes, state regulation can be further
categorized in terms of whether it utilizes inducement 48 or pro-
scription.1 49 The proscriptive approach is exemplified by a Florida
statute prohibiting the sale of human embryos. 50 An example of
inducement is the sort of AID statute that legally recognizes party
allocation of parental rights and duties on condition that insemi-
nation occur through the mediation of a licensed physician. 5' An
entire regime of "state regulation" can be imagined, in which pri-
vate initiative in compliance with state regulation effectively redis-
tributes rights and duties, otherwise statically ordered. Punish-
142. Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 58, at 496.
143. Id. at 497, 503-12; ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6, at 110-17.
144. Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 58, at 497.
145. Id. at 506.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 507.
148. Dickens, supra note 58, at 194-96.
149. Id. at 195.
150. FLA. STA. § 873.05 (1989).
151. E.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, supra note 110.
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ment under this "inducement" approach would be the implicit
discomfort of being subject to the rules of static ordering.
Wadlington, like the Ontario Law Reform Commission, fa-
vors the model of state regulation.' 52 But, he does not manage,
any more than does the Commission, to account for the difference
between a model grounded either statically or through private or-
dering but subject to state regulation and one that is grounded in
the positive power of government.' 53 Wadlington's version of the
state regulation approach fails to define the roles biological status,
social status, and contract are to have in conjunction with or sub-
ordinated to state power.
d. Assessment of Wadlington's Taxonomy
Wadlington's tripartite framework is conceptually more co-
herent than the Ontario Law Reform Commission's simplistic
dichotomy between state interest and private , intention.
Wadlington's categories allow valid distinctions among legal ap-
proaches according to their mode of resolving horizontal conflicts
between individuals, as well as vertical conflicts between individu-
als and the state and give contract an analytically distinct role on
both levels. Yet, to its credit, the Ontario Law Reform Commis-
sion's otherwise inadequate taxonomy is grounded in a unified an-
alytical inquiry, having set out to distinguish among answers to a
single question - the goal of state action. Wadlington's frame-
work lacks this analytical unity. It is not always clear what one
question each of his three approaches is designed to answer. At
various times, this issue appears to be the proper role of govern-
ment, the basis of parental rights, or the per se value to be ac-
corded to the new reproductive technologies. The undeniable func-
tional value of the categories of "biology," "contract," and "the
state" for distinguishing among relevant legislative proposals indi-
cates that, analytically, these categories are at least close to being
appropriate. To form the basis of a serviceable taxonomy, these
categories require more express and consistent integration into a
152. Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 58, at 507-12. See generally
Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 667 (the institutionalization of reproductive technol-
ogy requires the elaboration of an administrative and regulatory framework).
153. It is generally assumed that even a model relying heavily on contract would
entail regulation aimed at limiting the number of offspring per donor and recipient, screen-
ing for diseases, and keeping records. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note
21, at 244.
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unified field of analytical inquiry.
C. A Unified Field of Analysis for the Legal Ordering of the
New Reproductive Technologies
In recent decades, the legal ordering of human sexuality in
general has come to be associated with the particular issue of the
propriety of state interference in private, consensual sex acts. 54
The Ontario Law Reform Commission is not alone in analyzing
the legal response to the new reproductive technologies in these
terms. 155 Issues of sexuality, privacy, and the propriety of state
intervention are important and incidentally relevant but not the
essence of the problem posed for the law by the new reproductive
technologies.
The advent of the new reproductive technologies raises three
different, more fundamental issues concerning: the right to initiate
the procreation of a human person and to acquire the necessary
biological resources for the purpose, 15  the right to form and
154. See supra note 113. For an example of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on
the subject, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (upholding Georgia's criminal sodomy
law as applied to homosexual activity), reh'g denied, 478-U.S. 1039 (1986).
155. ONTARIO COMM'N, supra note 6, at 107; cf. Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99,
at 667 (examining mechanisms to regulate reproductive industry without impinging on per-
sonal choice).
The present inquiry is distinct from the issue of regulating the relationship between a
couple and a third party which does not grant the third party any rights in the embryo,
fetus, or child but does grant custody of the embryo during fertilization and prior to im-
plantation, as in arrangements with commercial sperm and embryo banks. See ONTARIO
COMM'N, supra note 6, Recommendation 17, at 277. A further concern beyond the scope of
the present inquiry is regulation of technologically assisted reproduction to advance public
health. See Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 685 (limiting use to minimize genetic
disorders caused by procreation within prohibited degrees of consanguinity); Vetri, Repro-
ductive Technologies and United States Law, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 505, 520 (1988)
(discussing donor selection, maximum use of donor sperm, and record keeping); see also
infra text accompanying note 590.
156. This question has been raised, in a more general way, in recent proposals that
prospective parents be subject to a licensing requirement. See Mangel, Licensing Parents:
How Feasible?, 2 FAM. L.Q. 17 (1988). Within the scope of the new reproductive technolo-
gies, the right to acquire "resources" contributing to a successful human gestation must be
distinguished analytically from the simple right to initiate procreation with the resources
the couple has in its given pool of such resources. See S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 84,
at 58. Transactions involving procreative resources, moreover, require management by
third parties. These tertiary relationships generate their own legal problems outside the
scope of the present study, which touch on contract and property issues. See OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 24. Such problems call for "regulation" and
are often discussed in the context of a general "regulatory model" for responding to the
new reproduction, e.g., Robertson, supra note 8, at 987-1000, but they are essentially unre-
lated to the three fundamental questions concerning basic human relationships under con-
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maintain a parent-child relationship, 157 and the standard to be
used in resolving conflicts among rival claims to a particular pa-
rental relationship.158 The one question unifying the diverse ways
of ordering the new reproductive technologies, then, is: What is
the basis of rights on each of these three levels? A valid analytical
framework for mapping the relevant legal options discloses the
many ways in which this question can be answered. Closer consid-
eration of the three contexts within which the question arises will
aid in the construction of such a framework.
Until the arrival of the new technologies, the right to initiate
the procreation of a human being was limited to those with the
requisite native fecundity. To be deemed legitimate, procreation
was further restricted to the confines of civil marriage. 59 Nonlegi-
timate procreation was, nonetheless, permitted to any fertile
couple.16 0 Because the new technologies allow the initiation of pro-
creation by a person lacking native fecundity, a fertile partner, or
both, these technologies force the formerly abstract question of
when, on whose part, and with what third party assistance society
should honor an intention to procreate.
Hypothetically, the right to initiate procreation could be allo-
cated by society in several analytically distinct ways. The right
might be recognized in the state only; or, conversely, it might be
limited to private parties. The right also might be shared by both
the state and individuals. If private persons have the right, it
might be recognized only in couples who naturally possess the full
complement of.genetic resources necessary to procreate within a
sideration here.
157. To say that the distinction between initiating procreation and asserting a par-
ent-child relationship is analytically necessary is not to say that it ultimately can or should
be validated morally or legally. Hired maternity arrangements have been criticized because
they "are designed to separate in the mind of the surrogate mother the decision to create a
child from the decision to have and raise that child." Krimmel, The Case Against Surro-
gate Parenting, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 35, 35, reprinted in Blo-ETHIcs 658
(R. Edwards & G. Graber eds. 1988); see also Robertson, supra note 9, at 411-13 (distin-
guishing the physical ability to procreate from the mental capacity to raise a child).
158. The question is similar to traditional disputes over child custody, with the sig-
nificant exception that competing claimants are at greater "armslength," never having
shared in a marriage or even coital relationship.
159. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 132, at 10 (defining illegitimate offspring as those
children born outside of marriage, including offspring resulting from adulterous unions);
infra text accompanying notes 331-42.
160. H. KRAUSE, supra note 132. The Supreme Court of the United States has long
recognized procreation as an individual right. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (prohibiting sterilization of prisoners).
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relational bond suited to rearing children. In the alternative, the
right to initiate procreation might be recognized in persons who,
either individually or as a couple, have at least a partial comple-
ment of genetic resources; or it might be recognized in any indi-
vidual or couple who intended to rear the child procreated, with-
out reference to whether they had even a partial complement of
the requisite resources. Finally, the right might be recognized in
any person, without regard to complement of resources or inten-
tion to rear the resulting infant.
In order for parties with less than the full complement of pro-
creative resources to have the right to procreate there must be a
reallocation at least of gametes and gestational capacity outside
the marriage relationship. Redistribution could be left to informal
social cooperation, accomplished by enforcing contractual ex-
changes, or effected by state decree.161 By whatever means accom-
plished, redistribution presents unique problems of legal ordering.
Unlike procreation within a marital relationship, any form of pro-
creation by redistribution brings together contributors, each of
whom may feel a personal stake in the procreative project, while
sharing no general community of interest for reaching shared de-
cisions. The need to adjudicate conflicts regarding control over the
procreative process and disposition of extracorporeal gametes and
embryos is foreseeable.6 2 Contributors alienating the physical re-
sources needed for a procreative project initiated by another may
feel a natural claim of identity and relationship with the resulting
child.'6 3 The child may, in later years, wish to assert a claim
against one of the contributors." The law will have to resolve
161. Distinctions can be drawn among those approaches that: prohibit transfers, in-
volve free present gifts and exchanges, result in governmental coercion on behalf of individ-
uals, and bring about governmental coercion to further governmental objectives.
162. See Davis v. Davis, No. E14496, 1989 Tenn App LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. filed
Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 642 (Ct. App. filed Sept. 13,
1990); see also Capron, Alternative Birth Technologies: Legal Challenges, 20 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 679, 687-89 (1987) (discussing unanswered questions surrounding the legal and
moral status of extracorporeal gametes and embryos).
163. See Hollinger, supra note 6, at 922 (1985) (discussing the feelings of sperm
donors toward their unknown children); Eisenman, Fathers, Biological and Anonymous,
and Other Legal Strangers: Determination of Parentage and Artificial Insemination of
Donor Under Ohio Law, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 383, 396 (1984) (noting that a donor father may
establish a legal parent-child relationship under Ohio law, if the donor learns the child's
identity).
164. See Eisenman, supra note 163, at 387; see, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon,
601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979) (suit brought by adult adoptees
challenging New York statute sealing adoption records except on showing of good cause);
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conflicting claims of identity and relationship. To the extent that
redistribution is enforced by contract or state conferral, there ex-
ists the possibility of legal coercion that invades the bodily privacy
and autonomy of the contributors and divides intimate emotional
relationships between natural parents and children.
Although the right to assert a parent-child relationship was
once considered a simple corollary of the right to initiate procrea-
tion, the new reproductive technologies sharpen the distinction be-
tween the two rights and urge independent inquiry into the for-
mer. At one time, it was assumed that although the right to a.
parent-child relationship might exist without participation in pro-
creation, as in adoption, a role in procreation necessarily gave rise
to parental rights.10 5 Under the new reproductive regime, a role in
procreation may be foreseen without the concomitant right to as-
sert a parent-child relationship. 6 Thus, the new technologies in-
vite broad reconsideration of the basis of a right to a parent-child
relationship. In the abstract, there are five imaginable bases of the
right: state conferral, original intention to initiate procreation, bio-
logical contribution whether genetic or gestational, de facto rear-
ing bond whether gestational or postparturial, or contractual as-
signment. These diverse grounds for recognizing a parent-child
relationship might exist in combination, or one of them might be
enacted to the exclusion of the others.
The third fundamental question which the emergence of tech-
nologically assisted reproduction raises is how to resolve conflicts
among competing claims to the same parental relationship.
Plainly, the more restrictive the law is in recognizing a right to
initiate procreation or to assert a claim to a parent-child relation-
ship, the fewer conflicts will arise. Yet even at its most restrictive,
the law on technologically assisted reproduction will be called
upon to resolve a greater diversity of conflicts than arose prior to
the emergence of the new technologies. 67 Prior to the advent of
J. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS: THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED PEOPLE (1973);
Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest and the Law, 11
FAM. L.Q. 185 (1977).
165. Except in slavery, where the child was disposable as a chattel of the mother's
owner. Means, supra note 16, at 447-49.
166. For example, under section 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act: "the donor of se-
men . . . is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby con-
ceived." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 110, at 301.
167. Reproduction was something undertaken by couples. Now that there may be a
third party involved, the law must resolve a more complex and potentially conflicting set of
relationships. Surrogate Mother Carries Child for Genetic Parents, Wall St. J., Aug. 28,
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the new reproductive technologies, a single progenitor and single
progenitrix might be at odds, following a divorce or conception out
of wedlock. Either or both biological parents might come into con-
flict with a party who enjoyed a psychological or nurturing bond
with the child. 68
With the new technologies, the legal claimants who might
come into conflict include all of the following: genetic father(s) or
mother(s);1 69 gestational mother; 70 custodial parent; 1 1 contrac-
tual parent; 17 2 parent by original procreative intent;173 and parent
by right of state conferral.17 4 To the extent that these parties have
legally cognizable claims, these claims may come into conflict, and
the law must be able to resolve them. In resolving disputes, the
law may hold that one party's claim simply cancels another's; in
the alternative, it may differentiate the parent-child relationship
into its constitutive elements, including formal status, custody and
right of visitation, and allocate these piecemeal among disputants.
The latter approach defines disputes in a way that minimizes
stakes and maximizes flexibility in finding remedies. Further, the
law could favor ad hoc adjudication, based on secondary criteria
1985, at 25, col. 6.
168. This status of "psychological parent" is determined strictly by the child's sense
of relationship. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 97-101 (1979) [hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].
169. "[I]t is now possible for a child to have five parents: a genetic and rearing
father and a genetic, gestational, and rearing mother." Annas & Elias, supra note 12, at
148. Another commentator has suggested that twelve combinations of "parental" coopera-
tion among a number of adults are possible. W. O'DONNELL & D. JONES, THE LAW OF
MARRIAGE AND MARITAL ALTERNATIVES 236 (1982); see also C. GROBSTEIN, supra note
2, at 43 (discussing technologies available that could result in offspring with four distinct
genetic parents).
170. The discrete occurrence of gestational motherhood occurs in ovum donation and
embryo transfer. The first child successfully gestated after embryo transfer was born on
February 3, 1984 in Los Angeles. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 51. The gestational mother
may or may not also be the intended mother. W. O'DONNELL & D. JONES, supra note 169,,
at 236.
171. This role has been called "social parent," Knoppers & Sloss supra note 99, at
707, or "psychological parent," W. O'DONNELL & D. JONES supra note 169, at 236.
172. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
173. The person who has the original intent to create a child would be deemed to
have a potentially alienable right to rear the child. The ground for recognizing the in-
tending party's claim could be understood in personal terms of donation to the resulting
child or as a proprietary interest, like filing a patent. In either case, a claim could be
asserted by filing a genetic description of the intended child in advance of conception. See
Note, Redefining Mother, supra note 21, at 189.
174. This claim resembles claims under existing adoption law, since the adoptive par-
ent may have become the child's psychological parent by the time of conferral.
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concerned with the character and conduct of the parties and con-
cerned with the best interest of the child or some other equitable
standard; it could prefer a constitutional or statutory framework
establishing priorities based either in fundamental rights or social
policy; or, it could choose to enforce priorities and rights estab-
lished by contract.
Devising a valid taxonomy of alternative legal approaches to
the new reproduction is a matter of identifying alternative modes
of response to the single question underlying the three foregoing
sets of problems. As stated above, this question centers on the ba-
sis for the legal recognition of rights. Analysis of the alternatives
that emerge upon consideration of the legal ordering of the three
foregoing problems discloses three values that might serve as that
basis. These values are state conferral, 7 5 individual autonomy, 78
and natural endowment. 177 They resemble the categories em-
ployed by Professor Wadlington, but differ in at least three impor-
tant ways. First, conferral by the state is not the same as regula-
tion by the state. Rights may be based on contractual transfer or
natural endowment, and yet may be heavily regulated. On the
other hand, rights conferred by the state may be relatively unreg-
ulated. Second, individual intention is recognized largely by en-
forcing contractual expectation, but it also may exist as a basis for
175. State conferral becomes a final ground of justification under positivism. Brest,
supra note 101, at 1297. The justification may in turn make reference to some value be-
yond the power of law, such as the shared value attributed to survival. H.LA. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 186-89 (1961). Such a value might be described in terms of welfare.
However, state conferral, rather than welfare, is the salient value underlying this model,
since the state decision validates both the object, what counts as welfare, and the means,
allocation of parental rights.
176. The value of individual autonomy tends to be the guiding value of political lib-
eralism, and, thus, it appears especially plausible as a basis for legal reform to those whose
thinking has been shaped by liberal premises. For the classic defense of the liberal position,
see J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 66-83 (R.B. McCallum ed. 1946). A legal proposal would not
fall within the individual autonomy model by incidentally advancing individual autonomy
in a general sense, but by consciously applying legal mechanisms for the purpose of secur-
ing individual autonomy. This is the value underlying the role of contract in Professor
Wadlington's private ordering option.
177. More particularly, natural endowment refers to the relationships that arise from
the voluntary pooling of procreative resources or from natural bonds of commitment
formed through care and nurturance. Honoring this value impedes the application of the
legal mechanism to further the choices of either the state or individuals. A philosophical
justification for this value can be found in natural law theory. See J. FINIs, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 225 (1980). However, it also can be derived as a subordinate ele-
ment in liberal theory. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972) (individual endow-
ments of intellect and other gifts may be employed to advance individual life plans, but
social institutions need only accept this arbitrary distribution to the extent it benefits all).
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recognizing rights, even in the absence of a contract. 178 Third,
natural endowment differs from biological relationship. It includes
biological ties of genetic contribution and gestation, but also sub-
sumes sexual bonding that brings together a full complement of
procreative resources, and de facto bonding between child and pri-
mary adult caretaker. Parties with such a bond do not require re-
distribution of procreative resources through the compulsion of
contract or state decree.
D. A Taxonomy of Alternatives in the Legal Ordering of the
New Reproductive Technologies
The following taxonomy classifies diverse legal approaches to
the new reproductive technologies according to consistent modes
of allocating procreational rights, parent-child relationships, and
resolution of conflicts over parental rights. The three alternative
modes comprising this taxonomy are grounded in: 1) state confer-
ral 2) individual autonomy and 3) natural endowment. Each mode
can be further subdivided into strong and moderate types. The
strong type exemplifies the guiding value in close to pure form.
The moderate type qualifies its approach under the influence of
one or both of the two remaining values. Classification is a relative
rather than absolute matter, even where the type is "strong," since
legal ordering in this area will virtually always require some
subordinate reference to one or both of the two values not chosen
as primary. A "moderate" model acknowledges a secondary value
in a consistent and principled manner.
1. The State Conferral Model
One approach to the consistent legal ordering of the new
human reproduction would be to assume that the state confers the
right to initiate procreation, form a parent-child relationship, or
assert precedence in a conflict over parental rights.1 79 In its strong
178. A system both based on individual autonomy and featuring inalienability is
imaginable. Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 707. However, when contract is given
further content in relation to individual autonomy it fosters a particular vision of social
cooperation, one which in fact coincides more closely with the classical bargain theory of
contracts.
179. Obviously, positing this development raises theoretical questions about the role
and nature of the state, which are beyond the scope of the present discussion. One point of
departure for consideration of such questions would be Nozick's defense of the minimal
state. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (the minimal state views
people as individuals with inviolate rights rather than as resources to achieve some notion
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form, this approach would lead the state to exercise the right to
initiate procreation and rear children, delegating component tasks
to individuals. By definition there could be no conflicts over paren-
tal rights. In its moderate form, the approach would lead the state
to confer these rights on private persons, according to the pattern
of regard for individual autonomy, natural endowment, or any
other value that it deemed to advance public policy.
a. Strong Type: A Reproductive Bureaucracy
In the event the state itself were to exercise the right to pro-
create and rear children, a substantial bureaucracy would necessa-
rily arise. The ensuing type of ordering for procreation could be
termed reproductive bureaucracy.18 0 The nearest analogue under
existing law would be the organization of the standing armed
forces. If the state undertook this exercise on an exclusive basis,
society would come to resemble the vision of Aldous Huxley's
Brave New World 8' or, perhaps, Plato's Republic. 82 Reproduc-
of social utility).
180. On the perils of the bureaucratizing tendencies of modern society, see P. BER-
GER, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY
(1977); P. BERGER & H. KELLNER, SOCIOLOGY REINTERPRETED: AN ESSAY ON METHOD
AND VOCATION (1981).
181. Huxley describes a society in which the central government bureaucracy "de-
cants" children. A. HUXLEY, supra note 12, at 1-32.
182. Plato prescribes state control of reproduction among the Guardian class in Book
IV of The Republic:
How are we to get the best results? You must tell me, Glaucon, because I
see you keep sporting dogs and a great many game birds at your house; and
there is something about their mating and breeding that you must have noticed.
. . . Are you not careful to breed from the best so far as you can?
It follows from what we have just said that . . . there should be as many
unions of the best of both sexes, and as few of the inferior, as possible, and that
only the offspring of the better unions should be kept ...
We must, then, institute certain festivals at which we shall bring together
the brides and the bridegrooms. ...
Moreover, young men who acquit themselves well in war and other duties,
should be given, among other rewards and privileges, more liberal opportunities
to sleep with a wife, for the further purpose that, with good excuse, as many as
possible of the children may be begotten of such fathers.
As soon as children are born, they will be taken in charge by officers ap-
pointed for the purpose. . . . The children of the better parents they will carry
to the crbehe to be reared in the care of nurses living apart in a certain quarter
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tive bureaucrats could be expected to pursue genetic engineer-
ing. 83 A paradoxical feature of the approach is that it removes
natural endowment as a basis of parental rights but is likely to
posit a form of genetic endowment as a goal of state action. Many
suppose the approach ineluctably leads to or flows from totalitari-
anism."" The darkest fears aroused by the new reproductive tech-
nologies are that they may lead society in this direction.'85 In the
present political culture, it is not likely that the state would take
direct control of the procreation and rearing of children. For now,
the question at most is whether the state might do so in the lim-
ited case of technologically assisted procreation. It might, for ex-
ample, expand the bureaucracy of adoption to encompass the initi-
ation of technologically assisted reproduction. In this limited
context, it might license individuals or couples who gain approval,
and oversee the procreative process or assign parental status to
individuals based on bureaucratic norms.'86
b. Moderate Type: State Conferred Status
In a more moderate approach, the state would not itself exer-
of the city....
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 158-60 (B. Jowett trans. 1945).
183. For more current expositions of the policies of eugenics, see EUGENICS: THEN
AND Now (C. BAJEMA ed.) (Benchmark Papers in Genetics No. 5, 1976); M. HALLER,
EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1963). Eugenics as a term
was coined in 1883 by Charles Darwin's cousin, Sir Francis Galton. See Allen, Feats to
Concoct the Flawless Being, INSIGHT, July 11, 1988, at 8.
184. See, e.g., Vatican Congregation, supra note 21, at 9 (cautionary conclusions of
the Vatican Instruction on Reproductive Technologies).
185. A strong theme in the feminist response to the new reproductive technologies
has been the apprehension that men will use the technologies to subordinate women in a
new political order in which "biology" once again defines destiny. Margaret Atwood's
novel, The Handmaid's Tale, is a fictional example. In Atwood's Republic of Gilead, after
a fertility crisis, the state assumed responsibility for procreation, a new puritanism was
introduced, and women were classified as wives, procreative concubines, and mistresses. M.
ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1985). Gena Corea's nonfiction mirrors the same con-
cern, if not against the same apocalyptical background. G. COREA. THE MOTHER MA-
CHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL
WOMBS (1985); Corea, The Reproductive Brothel, in MAN-MADE WOMEN: How NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AFFECT WOMEN 38 (1987). A recurrent fear is expressed
that the technologies may become a masculine tool harmful to women. M. WARREN,
GENDERCIDE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEX SELECTION (1985); Wikler, Society's Response to
the New Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043,
1045-46 (1986). For a discussion of overlapping bioethical concerns, see L. KASS, supra
note 12, at 61.




cise the rights of procreation and child rearing, but instead would
confer such rights on others. This type of response would be con-
cerned, most fundamentally, with positively redefining parenthood
so that it would be a state conferred status rather than the contri-
bution of natural endowment. 187 If it elected to pursue consistent
secondary recognition of individual autonomy, the state would
then delegate most of the organization of reproductive behavior to
private contract, rather than pursuing it directly by bureaucracy.
Within this framework, the state might limit and direct behavior
through licensing requirements. 88 The reproductive aspect of
marriage itself might be distinguished and redefined in these
terms. The state might intervene to supervise and enforce the per-
formance of the appropriate private agreements. 89
Under the moderate form, parental status would be conferred
upon meeting formal, state-promulgated criteria. Through these
criteria, the state might give significant secondary weight to ele-
ments of natural endowment reinterpreted as a eugenics or social
engineering goal or as individual intention expressed in con-
tract. 90 The primary object of such criteria, however, would be
bureaucratic certainty and predictability with respect to state en-
forcement of property rights, bureaucratic entitlements, and pa-
rental duties. 19' The application of the moderate state conferral
model would represent further progress in an existing trend
whereby the law absorbs even the ordering of the "private" sphere
into a master calculus of public purposes. If an analytically consis-
tent ordering were to be distilled from the state regulation model
proposed by the Ontario Law Reform Commission and Professor
Wadlington, it would likely fit here. As the subsequent discussion
of current law suggests, this second type of state conferral, after
187. In a given case, it would have to be carefully discerned whether the law or legal
proposal actually rests on the value of state conferral, as opposed to those of individual
autonomy or natural endowment, with state regulation as a constraint to protect the wel-
fare of children parens patriae. Mangel, supra note 156; see also infra notes 604-10 and
accompanying text.
188. LaFollette, Licensing Parents, 9 PHiL & PuB. AFF. 182 (1980); see infra text
accompanying notes 533-77 (discussing Uniform Children of Assisted Conception Act).
Contract in this context, would be valued for its usefulness in advancing goals elected by
the state.
189. This is proposed in recent model legislation. See, e.g., UNIF. STATUS ACT, supra
note 6, § 5; see also infra text accompanying notes 533-77.
190. See infra text accompanying notes 599-602.
191. Cf. UNIF. STATUS Acr, supra note 6, at 87-88 (emphasizing the urgent need for
a legal framework defining the rights and status of children of technologically assisted
conception).
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removing evasions and subterfuge, is receiving serious considera-
tion in reforming the law of human procreation. 92
2. The Individual Autonomy Model
An alternative ordering of technologically assisted reproduc-
tion would consistently base legal rights to procreate, to assert a
parent-child relationship, and to successfully assert parental rights
on the value of the autonomous intention of the individual. 193 An-
yone capable of forming the intent to procreate would have the
prima facie right to initiate procreation. 94 Any necessary redistri-
bution of procreative resources would occur through contract. The
intentions of the contracting parties would Se used to justify the
enforcement of this redistribution, as well as to justify the alloca-
tion of parental status, rights, and duties. In its strong type, the
autonomy model would be given a laissez faire formulation, per-
mitting the rise of industry and commerce in human procreation.
In its moderate type, the autonomy model would be given a con-
sumer rights formulation, restricting the redistribution of procrea-
tive resources in ways beneficial to consumers.
a. Strong Type: Laissez Faire
In its strong form, the individual autonomy model would en-
force all contractual redistributions of procreative resources. The
contractual rights of the party with the original procreative intent
would override any claims to parental rights by those contributing
192. Respecting AID, see infra text accompanying notes 272-411; regarding hired
maternity, see infra text accompanying notes 412-532.
193. This concept of intention only superficially resembles that of "private ordering"
in the Ontario Law Reform Commission's framework. Here, individual intention represents
a value justifying a given legal ordering. In the Law Reform Commission framework, it is
no more than one goal, among others, of state action. See supra notes 70-86 and accompa-
nying text. As the concept is used here, it is closer to Wadlington's idea of "private order-
ing," since in most applications the vindication of the value would be pursued through the
enforcement of contract.
194. For a discussion of the need for a minimum level of mental capacity in order to
qualify for procreative rights, see Robertson, supra note 9, at 411-13.
It has been argued that individual choices in reproduction should be independent of
any claim or consent of other adult procreative contributors. In this view, parental responsi-
bility would flow strictly from an abstract choice to assume a parental role. The advent of
reproductive technology will force a larger reform within family law along these lines and
pursuant to values which are thought to have their own appeal independent of the exigen-




gametes or gestational capacity, even where the intending party
had made no biological contribution to the child. In order to bring
this strong type of individual autonomy into existence, the law
would have to reject the notion of parental rights as a function of
natural endowment, and reconstrue them as arising from the ap-
propriation of procreative resources. Rights flowing from both an
original procreative intent and from natural endowment with pro-
creative resources would be fully alienable. All relevant exchanges
would be permitted on a commercial basis.'19 Market forces would
tend to give rise to a procreation industry allocating differentiated
functions to the most efficient provider. The same forces would
organize a commercial marketplace for resources and products, al-
lowing roles for brokers and middlemen. 19 6 Eugenic engineering
would be employed to create more desireable babies at lower
cost. 97 Within this framework, commercial eugenic services would
also eventually be sought by couples having a full natural endow-
ment of procreative resources, as well as by those seeking realloca-
tions of basic procreative resources. 198 The procreative process
195. Organizing the discussion around the incidence of infertility implies that the
framework for analysis is identifying, fostering, and regulating a market. Individual auton-
omy in choosing whether and how to satisfy private preferences is the implicit coordinating
value. Some commentators make this value explicit. E.g., Landes & Posner, The Econom-
ics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
196. Posner, supra note 7, at 23-30 (using a free market analysis to support the
enforceability of hired maternity contracts).
197. "Baby selling may seem logically and inevitably to lead to baby breeding, for
any market will generate incentives to improve the product as well as to optimize the price
and quantity of the current quality level of the product." Landes & Posner, supra note
195, at 345 (footnote omitted). The market that would take hold under this scheme could
be used for private concerted efforts aimed at the eugenic transformation of society, such
as the Repository for Germinal Choice in Escondido, California. See The Sperm-Bank
Scandal, NEWSWEEK, July 26, 1982, at 24 (reporting on a sperm bank where donors are
Nobel prize winners). Arguments have been made that the culling of embryos in the quest
for the "perfect" child may be justified as a fundamental constitutional right. See Robert-
son, supra note 9, at 431-32.
198. Eventually, reproductive technologies will be developed which allow "genetic
diagnosis and manipulation techniques that could be applied to the general population as
well as big business for those involved in banking or storage techniques and, furthermore,
big business for those doing research on human genetic material in the absence of the
implementation of . . .proposed reforms ...." Knoppers and Sloss, supra note 99, at
718; see also Powledge, Commerce and the Future of Gene Transfer, in GENETICS AND
THE LAW III, supra note 5, at 75, 79 (noting the Seed brothers' ambitions to genetically
engineer embryos for profit); Allen, supra note 183, at 8. (describing the practice of Dr.
Mark Geier who strains spermatozoa to ensure female offspring at a ratio of 24/25). Fur-
ther commercial involvement in non-reallocative human reproduction can be expected when
embryo biopsy, the analysis of particular genes within individual embryos, is transferred to
the medical establishment, an event which is likely to occur "within the next decade
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also might be exploited commercially in order to produce and dis-
tribute human organs, tissues, and other products, rather than to
bring children to term.199
A structural premise of the model is that once a child is born
into a commercially arranged relationship, it would no longer be
subject to commercial exchange. 00 Whether this premise would
remain in place in a society actually implementing the values im-
plicit in the laissez faire approach is a valid question. As long as
the premise is observed, however, the rearing parents would have
no right of rejection on delivery, but would perhaps be allowed
damages for breach of warranty. Some assume that general reli-
ance on money damages, rather than specific performance, would
follow the option's commercial logic. 201 The party-in-possession,
typically the gestational mother, could refuse to deliver the child
or to waive parental rights, but at the cost of paying money dam-
ages. Money damages, when added to the intrinsic cost of raising
a child, would render breach a rare occurrence. In addition, the
right to breach in order to convey the child to someone willing to
pay more money is logically implied, but practically courts would
seem unlikely to go so far. It is more probable that, even in the
.... " Embryo Biopsy May Be Standard Procedure Within Next Decade, DRUG RE-
SEARCH REP., THE BLUE SHEET, July 20, 1988, at 8, 8 [hereinafter Embryo Biopsy].
199. This use is currently forbidden. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. §
274e.(1988). But, one theme of academic discussion appears to support it. See Robertson,
Fetal Tissue Transplants, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 443 (1988) (arguing that conceptions planned
to obtain fetal tissue for transplants are defensible ethically and legally); Terry, Politics
and Privacy: Refining the Ethical and Legal Issues in Fetal Tissue Transplantation, 66
WASH. U.L.Q. 523 (1988) (arguing that fetal tissue transplant issues have been subsumed
unnecessarily under the abortion debate); Note, Retailing Human Organs under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 393 (1983) (proposing that the shortage
of organs available for transplant could be alleviated by a U.C.C.-governed market). Par-
tial ectogenesis might even be undertaken for body parts. See C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 2,
at 46-48. It has already been reported, for instance, that a couple conceived a child for use
for sibling bone marrow transplant. A Healthy "Bone Marrow Baby" Is Born to Ayalas,
L.A. Times, April 6, 1990, at BI, col. 2. Taking another step, such a project would entail
the abortion of the child and the harvesting of its marrow for the use of another. If the
implicated transactions were permitted, a market for human organs would follow. E.g.,
Man Desperate for Funds: Eye for Sale at $35,000, L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 1975, § 2, at 1,
col. 3; 100 Answer Man's Ad for New Kidney, L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1974, at 4, col. 2.
200. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U.L. REv. 59 (1987).
201. See, e.g., id. Compare Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a
Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 365 (1984) (arguing that
specific performance can be an effective remedy if the parties know it will be used) with
Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365,
1385-86 (1982) (arguing that money damages are a better remedy than specific perform-
ance because they are more flexible and efficient).
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laissez faire approach, courts would premise any "right" to breach
and pay money damages in lieu of delivery upon the party's con-
tinuing intention to retain a relationship with the child. Thus, the
advantage of the party-in-possession would not be alienable.
In practice, then, under the strong type of the individual au-
tonomy model an original intention to procreate would override
rights grounded in natural endowment by operation of the en-
forcement of contract. However, custody of the child at birth
might prevail over either claim, as long as the party-in-possession
is willing to pay money damages, and this latter option is non-
alienable. But, this balance would seem unstable. Courts are more
apt to respond by eliminating the right of the party-in-possession
to resist specific performance. Alternatively, they might respond
by strengthening the right of the party-in-possession to resist de-
livery by making the party's obligation voidable, thus removing
the penalty of money damages. The latter would represent a sub-
stantial moderation of and departure from the strong form of the
individual autonomy model. The adoption of this laissez faire ap-
proach in the United States is conceivable.20 2
b. Moderate Type: Consumer Rights
In its moderate form, the individual autonomy model would
restrict the redistribution of a complete complement of procreative
resources and a fortiori the redistribution of parental rights to per-
sons who intend to rear the child themselves; that is, to consum-
ers.20 3 It might place a ceiling on the price of procreative re-
sources to prevent full commercial competition.20 4 Or, it might
restrict the ability to contract to individuals who possess at least a
partial complement of procreative resources, or to married individ-
uals.20 5 All of these restrictions would be designed to prevent the
202. Feminist literature expresses concern that the generally superior economic
power possessed by men will cause the free operation of market forces in the area of repro-
ductive exchanges to lead to the subordination of women. See G. COREA, supra note 185,
at 2; Wikler, supra note 185, at 1044.
203. This was the thrust of the ABA Section on Family Law's proposed Model Sur-
rogacy Act. Model Surrogacy Act, supra note 5. The Model Act was rejected by the ABA
House of Delegates. Infra note 533.
204. There is generally "a strong tendency to disallow payment for profit," but profit
is often distinguished from expenses, lost income, and lost opportunities, and even compen-
sation for pain and suffering. See Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 715.
205. Extracorporeal embryos generate their own unique problems of legal ordering,
quite apart from any attempt at their reallocation. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Em-
bryo, 32 Loy. L. REv. 357, 396 (1986); Willis, Quickening Debate over Life on Ice: Do
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emergence of a full-fledged industry and commerce of procreation.
They would reduce the incidence of commercialized procreative
exchanges and restrict the ability of the parties to those exchanges
that did occur to achieve goals and control outcomes. Individual
autonomy would remain the leading value in this moderate type,
as in the strong type of the model, but state conferral aimed at
distributing advantages in conformity with a particular vision of
society would be given consistent effect as a moderating value. 06
Some degree of moderation also might be exercised by consistent
respect for the informal social cooperation and, perhaps, even the
biological relationships which have a primary role in the third
model.201 However, "intention" to procreate would be given more
or less of a priority over contribution out of natural endowment in
establishing priorities to parental rights. At the outer limit of the
individual autonomy model, the right of contractual exchange
might be eliminated altogether, and original procreative intention
alone might be vindicated by means of a system of public notice
filing, leaving redistribution to informal cooperation. 08
The consumer approach to individual autonomy ordering
would also emulate the various consumer protections that have de-
veloped in twentieth century contract law generally. The law
would dictate the terms of contracts, impose disclosure require-
ments, and strike down onerous terms.20 9 Parties selling procrea-
tive resources would be protected by labor protection legisla-
tion. 0 Professional classes of doctors, psychologists, and lawyers,
bound by fiduciary standards, would be brought in as in-
Orphaned Embryos Have Legal Rights, TIME, July 2, 1984, at 68.
206. Such a vision might be feminist if women's consumer preferences are made the
norm. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 16 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 72, 77 (1988). But, Wikler would seem to be correct in noting that although
the feminist and consumer approaches "voice similar concerns," each ultimately "has a
different, though overlapping, constituency, and ultimately supports a different set of poli-
cies." Wikler, supra note 185, at 1054.
207. Voidability would further rely on informal dispute resolution, rather than judi-
cial enforcement. Restrictions might be placed on initiation of procreation except where at
least one of the intending rearing parents is also a biological parent.
208. "[F]iliation, the establishment of a parent-child relationship as recognized
under law, could in all births be voluntary, intentional and consensual and legally sanc-
tioned rather than legally imposed or presumed. Parents could then, in the context of re-
productive technologies, be those individuals who together or singly choose to contribute
gametes for the creation of an embryo so as to conceive and raise a child." Knoppers &
Sloss, supra note 99, at 707 (emphasis in original).




termediaries 11 Couples and, perhaps, even individuals procreat-
ing through reallocative exchanges would be given public affirma-
tion. The validity of assent by parties alienating procreative
resources and parental rights would be the focus of concern.11 2
State regulation to safeguard at least the minimal interests of the
child would be admitted. The consumer rights type of approach
joins state conferred status as one of the primary contenders for
present enactment in the United States.
3. The Natural Endowment Model
The third basis on which the law might recognize procreation
rights, parent-child relationship, and precedence in conflicts over
parental rights is status derived from natural endowment of ge-
netic or gestational relationship, or de facto relationship of nur-
turance. No enforced redistribution of procreative resources by
contract or government decree would be permitted. 1 In its strong
type, this model would take further steps to channel procreation
into normative social forms based on the natural configuration of
the couple in possession of a complete complement of procreative
resources. In its moderate type, the model would validate infor-
mal, noncommercial redistributions of procreative resources, for
the sake of allowing, if not encouraging, a more polymorphous
form of social organization.
a. Strong Type: The Traditional Family
The recognition of rights related to procreation, parent-child
relationship, and precedence in conflicts over parental rights under
the strong type of the natural endowment model is based on "nat-
ural endowment." Natural endowment means both the disposition
of procreative resources, which can be commanded without viola-
tion of tort and criminal law and without resort to governmental
power, and the de facto bond an adult has with a child by virtue
211. A bureaucratizing trend towards the "medicalization of reproduction" has been
noted. All committee and agency reports on hired maternity call for psychological testing
and counselling of applicants. Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 679.
212. See infra notes 789-804 and accompanying text.
213. Contracts with the technological facilitators of conception and gestation must
be distinguished from those attempting to reallocate parental rights or procreative re-
sources. See Shapiro, supra note 3, at 44 n.43 (describing terms of agreement between
patron and world's largest sperm bank).
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of a nurturing relationship. 14 Under this approach, the law would
refrain from lending state power to the reallocation of procreative
resources, either through state conferral or contract enforcement.
The law might also actively choose to discourage partners from
resorting to an informal redistribution of procreative resources.215
At a minimum, the law would actively encourage the exclusive
pursuit of procreation within the confines of the marital relation-
ship. Entry into such a relationship by marital consent is the dis-
tinguishing application of contract within the natural endowment
model. This continuing linkage between procreation and marriage
would reduce both the numbers and kinds of diverse claimants to
parental status. Mechanisms for the resolution of conflicting
claims would favor the social form of the family over biological
relationship. 1
This model generally starts from the assumption that lineage
or de facto nurturance is the appropriate basis for the recognition
of parental rights. In its strong form, it adds an assumption that
the cooperative relationship leading to procreation ought to serve
simultaneously the rearing of the child conceived. The strong type
of the model also posits the importance of a stable rearing rela-
tionship to the welfare of the child, and gives priority to rights
that flow from formal marriage over those which flow from biolog-
ical parenthood. In this form of ordering, dyadic and triadic per-
sonal relationships, as basic building blocks of community and
214. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 168, at 5-26 (1973) (discussing
child placement based on a biological and psychological relationship). The recognition of
rights may be contingent on the prior termination of the natural parents' rights. Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (reversing
a lower court holding that foster parents have a right to a hearing before a child is placed
with its natural parents or in another foster home). Under the traditional family model,
only legally sanctioned expectations about relationships with natural offspring are en-
couraged. See Hafen, supra note 132, at 504 (kinship and marriage create a "justifiable
expectation" of performance that gives them a unique place in laws relating to social
relationships).
215. See Rice, A.LD.- An Heir of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510
(1959) (recommending the criminalization of AID).
216. The family groupings arising from reallocations of procreative resources and
parental rights under the new reproductive technologies are distinguishable from "blended"
families arising after divorce or death. The latter are adaptations to unplanned and un-
wished challenges. The former are created as an intended and desired effect. Krimmel,
supra note 157, at 35-37. The Oregon AID law, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, 109.243
(1989), provides, for example, that the donor has no legal right, obligation, or interest with
respect to the child. Consequently, a contract to acknowledge paternity and permit the
biological father to adopt in the context of hired maternity is not enforceable. Oregon At-
torney General's Opinion, 1989 Ore. AG LEXIS 26 (April 19, 1989).
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personal identity, enjoy a priority over the autonomy of the indi-
vidual.2 1 7 The value of state conferral enters to the limited extent
of justifying the enforcement of marital prerogatives over rights
based in biological relationship based on a policy preference for
securing the adequate rearing of children.
This type of approach corresponds to the traditional law of
the family and, to a certain extent, continues to define the law's
treatment of attempted reallocations of procreative and parental
rights.218 The new reproductive technologies complicate the facts
of human procreation to such an extent that the continued validity
of this approach requires a renewal of the theoretical justification
of its goals and a practical rethinking of the appropriate juiridical
means for achieving them. Proponents would see the value of al-
ternative models mainly for the perspective they lend in this pro-
cess of renewal and rethinking.
b. Moderate Type: Informal Social Cooperation
When moderated by the secondary concern for the value of
individual autonomy, the natural endowment model might en-
courage, or at least might not discourage, informal redistributions
of procreative resources, as long as they occur without the benefit
of legal enforcement and are not unambiguously meretricious. 19
217. The existing structure of American family law has been said to be built around
ties of "blood, marriage and adoption." Hafen, supra note 132, at 493. The fact that state
regulation is heavily implicated in the strong type of natural endowment should not be
mistaken for similarity to the state conferral model. The state merely encourages the for-
mation and public validation of "natural" reproductive and rearing units and discourages
any sort of alienation of procreative resources. This action preserves the significance of
public validation as decisive in resolving conflicts with third parties. To that extent,
schemes for solemnization of marriage and legitimization of births can be compared to
schemes for the "perfection" of contingent property interests. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9 (1989).
218. See M. GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 85-110 (1989); W. WEYRAUCH &
S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION (1983).
219. See generally Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family': A Pro-
posed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 GEo. L. REv. 1283 (1985) (discussing obsta-
cles to enforcement). The boundary between this moderate form of the natural endowment
model and that of individual autonomy is defined by the scope given to state coercionin the
form of enforcement. However, the absence of some control on unenforceable monetary
exchanges would move society implicitly towards the alternative individual autonomy
model. Quite apart from legal enforcement of contract promises, de presenti monetary ex-
changes in the area of procreation, themselves, are widely seen as generating moral issues.
Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 681. "Sperm donors have [typically] received from
twenty to seventy dollars for each donation. Payment has been deemed compensation for
lost time, transportation, costs, and inconvenience. It has not been seen as a direct payment
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Donors presumably would be motivated by nonmonetary benefits
or altruism.22 In this type of approach, a policy encouraging or at
least allowing donations would be in delicate equipoise with one
not allowing monetary exchanges. 21 Individuals would make gifts
or barters that they might try to revoke, but which the law might
treat as irrevocable for reasons other than respect for the expecta-
tions generated by the transaction. Parties cooperating informally
to share procreative resources would give contractual appearance
to ancillary exchanges. At times, they would attempt to dircum-
vent the ban on commercial bargains for procreative resources by
various forms of subterfuge. Faced with reliance, the courts would
feel pressure, in equity, to give limited enforcement to certain
bargains.
By encouraging redistributions while not recognizing either
contract, governmental decree, or social form as a basis for resolv-
ing conflicts among claimants to parental rights, the law would
make conflict resolution more complex. In this moderate type of
the model, the value of individual autonomy among adult partici-
pants is given priority over the value of stability and uniformity in
the rearing of children.222 At the same time, lineage and de facto
for the gametes." Id. at 683 (footnote omitted). The payment of fees, as opposed to ex-
penses, is prohibited in adoption. E.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 109.311(2) (1989).
According to some, the law has moved "toward a definition of the family which is not
necessarily related to genetic ancestry." Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 690. Even if
this trend is true, one alternative to genetic contribution exists as a basis for parental rights
within a "natural endowment" model: "nurturance." Under existing law, even where provi-
sion is made for waiver of parental rights by biological parents the continuing recognition
of a residual parental relationship arising from genetic contribution remains a separate
issue for some. The frequently proposed requirement that permanent records of genetic
parentage be maintained is just one example. At present, this requirement has been en-
acted in Sweden. Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 696.
220. See Smith, Wombs For Rent, Selves for Sale?, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 23, 26 (1988) (arguing altruistic motives in some hired maternity arrangements suf-
ficient to preclude a ban on such arrangements altogether).
221. This "middle-ground alternative" requires proving paternity and showing by
clear and convincing evidence that custody is in the child's best interest. See generally
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS
& RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 137 (1988) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE
TASK FORCE] (proposing an evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence in addi-
tion to the substantive standard of the child's best interests); Clark, New Wine in Old
Skins: Using Paternity Settlements to Facilitate Surrogate Motherhood, 25 J. FAM. L. 483
(1986-87) (proposing paternity suit settlements in which the child's best interests are equal
to those of the parents);
222. Existing rules defining paternity and step-parent adoptions provide an adequate
basis for ordering conflicts that may arise. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note
221, at 42-44, 234. Certain recent trends in American social organization and American
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bonds of nurturance remain the base of parental rights. As a con-
sequence, the law would need to adjudicate among diverse claim-
ants with conflicting demands to a parent-child relationship.
To direct the resolution of these conflicts, the law would
probably adopt several standing adjudicatory rules. For instance,
it might distinguish between custody, visitation rights, and paren-
tal status, being the most cautious about granting the first, and
quite liberal in recognizing the last. It would tend to favor the
gestational mother, as the party in a de facto nurturing bond with
the baby at birth, in allocating custody. It would develop rules for
deciding what kinds of informal custody allocations on birth re-
quired the state's parens patriae supervision to protect the best
interests of the child. It would tend to require records of genetic
parentage and ensure at least qualified access to children born as
a result of informal redistributions of procreative resources.22 The
informal social cooperation type of the natural endowment model
would tend to provide a middle ground between the traditional
family and the alternatives available under the other models. As
such, it may have appeal to those who find the traditional model
law appear to sacrifice stability of child rearing for the sake of greater autonomy for the
individual adult. It is generally recognized, however, that at some point, rules of static
ordering must enter for the sake of securing the best interests of children. See, e.g., Hafen,
supra note 132, at 544. One argument is that, in conflicts generated by the new reproduc-
tive technologies, the mother's bond with the child at birth should prevail in determining
rearing rights, with her husband being legally entitled to step-parent adoption, terminating
the sperm donor's rights. Another argument is that the consummation of voluntary contem-
poraneous exchanges can be given legal validation through paternity suit settlements. See
generally Clark, supra note 221. If new arrangements for reproduction are recognized on
this de facto basis, without requiring the intervention of legally-enforced expectations
grounded in individual autonomy or state conferral, it is, perhaps, not unfair to treat them
as variants on the "blended family." See Erickson, The Feminist Dilemma over Unwed
Parents' Custody Rights: The Mother's Rights Must Take Priority, 2 LAW & INEQUAL-
ITY: J. THEORY & PRAC. 447 (1984) (arguing that mothers' rights should be paramount in
custody decisions); Robertson, Surrogate Motherhood: Not So Novel After All, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. Oct. 1983, at 3, 4, reprinted in BIO-ETH[CS, supra note 157, at 645-57 (stat-
ing that "what matters is not whether but how" custody matters are settled); Bartlett,
Custody Preference Should Go to Mother, N.J.L.J., Feb. 18, 1988, at 29, col. 3 (advocat-
ing custody rules similar to those for step-parent adoption); Palmer, No Rights for Sperm
Donors, N.J.L.J., Feb. 18, 1988, at 29, col. 1 (advocating basing custody decisions on the
nurturing bond).
223. Because it entails positing a legal right in open conflict with an existing nurtur-
ing relationship, gestation, hired maternity is a less ambiguous departure from the natural
endowment model than is AID. For this reason, most studies simply "dismiss . . . [hired
maternity contracts] outright as contrary to public policy." Knoppers & Sloss, supra note
99, at 708. On the waiver of constitutional rights, see Rubin, Toward a General Theory of
Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REv. 478, 487 (1981).
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too rigid and alternative models objectionable because of per-
ceived statist or commodifying tendencies.
E. Summary: The Diverse Roles for Contract in the Legal
Ordering of the New Reproductive Technologies
In the context of this article, the primary reason for develop-
ing the foregoing taxonomy is to disclose the analytically distinct
roles contract might assume in the legal ordering of the new re-
productive technologies. Insofar as the issue is one of individual-
ized contractual allocation of procreative resources and parental
rights, the taxonomy yields four diverse roles assignable to con-
tract. Contract, for example, would have a subordinate role in the
moderate type of state conferral. Under this approach, party ex-
changes would require state validation at the time of formation
and would be subject to government supervision in their perform-
ance. The private bargain, properly validated, would trigger the
conferral by the state of parental status. By contrast, contract
would have its most central role in the strong type of the individ-
ual autonomy model, reorganizing human procreation into a form
virtually indistinguishable from existing commercial markets.
Here, enforcement of bargains reallocating natural or purchased
endowments of procreative resources and parental rights would be
justified categorically. A third role that could be assigned contract
is seen in the moderate type of the same model. There, contract's
commercial character would be moderated by respect for the
value of state conferral, bestowing protections and benefits accord-
ing to a particular, liberal vision of society. State regulation would
probably give rise to professional agencies that channel and social-
ize bargains. A fourth, "shadow" role would be found within the
moderate type of the natural endowment model. In that setting,
contract would assume some role on the periphery of informal ex-
changes aimed at redistributing procreative resources, whether
through ancillary agreement, subterfuge, or equitable enforcement
of de facto bargains. In contrast to these four types of individual-
ized contractual reallocations, the strong type of the natural en-
dowment model applies contract as a means of introducing an ele-
ment of public accountability to voluntary arrangements for the
pooling of procreative resources.
Concrete legal proposals are likely to be ambiguous, and sub-
ject to differing interpretations. A given proposal may contain ele-
ments of more than one type. Furthermore, within the scheme it-
self, each moderate type, with a reversal of emphasis, can be
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transmuted into an instance of the moderate type of an altogether
different model. The moderate type of state conferral can shift
into the moderate form of individual autonomy and vice versa, de-
pending on the relative weight given to the element of state vali-
dated contract. The moderate form of individual autonomy and
the moderate form of natural endowment also might be trans-
muted by altering the extent to which the state permits equitable
enforcement of reliance interest in the context of exchanges of
procreative resources. Thus, the taxonomy is not intended as much
for definitively classifying particular legal proposals, as it is for
mapping the broad generic alternatives against which particular
legal proposals may be evaluated.
II. THE ROLE OF CONTRACT IN ORDERING REPRODUCTION
UNDER EXISTING LAW AND PROPOSALS FOR LEGAL REFORM
In evaluating a legal proposal, relevant points of reference in-
clude hypothetical alternatives, legal status quo, and normative
arguments in favor of the proposal as the basis for change. The
previous section laid out hypothetical alternatives; the final section
will consider normative arguments. This section explores the role
of contract in the ordering of human reproduction under current
law. To attain clarity without obscuring the complexity of this in-
quiry, this section develops the relevant legal role of contract in
three parts. As a baseline, it depicts the role of contract in the law
of marriage. It then shows the contract dimension of the legal re-
sponse to practices of artificial insemination by donor and hired
maternity. Finally, it portrays the operation of contract in a sig-
nificant recent statutory proposal for reform of law on procreation:
the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act. 24
From this basis, the status of contract under current law and in
existing proposals for law reform can be analyzed to discern its
place within this article's taxonomy of hypothetical legal
alternatives.
A. The Role of Contract in the Existing Law of Marriage
Notwithstanding substantial changes in law and society, the
law of marriage so far remains central in the law's ordering of
human procreation.225 Marriage is a complex reality, variously in-
224. UNIF. STATUS Acr, supra note 6.
225. One far-reaching social change is the extent to which human reproduction has
1990]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
terpreted and valued. Depending on the observer and the question
raised, marriage may be understood in anthropological, sociologi-
cal, psychological, religious, or legal terms. 26 In legal terms, mar-
riage is usually defined as a type of contract.227 At the same time,
the law treats marriage as more than, or other than, contract, in
that it sharply limits the scope of enforcement of contracts that
would modify, compete with, or substitute for marriage; channels
benefits to the marital unit; and otherwise organizes society
around marital status.228 For the purposes of the present inquiry,
this seeming paradox must be resolved to yield a unified statement
of contract's role under the law of marriage and procreation. This
section sets forth the content and limits of the legal notion of mar-
riage as contract and the role of the marriage contract in the es-
tablishment of rights to initiate procreation, assert a parent-child
relationship, and claim priority in conflicts over parental rights.
1. Marriage as Contract: Content and Limits of the Idea
Marriage is defined as contract at common law and, in many
come to occur outside the marital relationship. See U.S. Study Finds One in Five Births
Out of Wedlock, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1985, at 65, col. 1.
226. See S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 84, at 97 (discussing the evolution of the
definition of marriage as society evolved); Reiss, The Universality of the Family: A Con-
ceptual Analysis, in MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 53 (1969) (cross-cultural comparison of
the functions of family). The present legal ordering of marriage has been called "anachro-
nistic and inappropriate." L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 135 (1981). Legal
concepts emerge from the "linguistic and imaginative characterization of behavior which is
to a large extent unconscious" engaged in by legislators. M. GLENDON, supra note 218, at
5. Social scientists view the world more realistically. As a result, common words like "fam-
ily" and "marriage" have very different subtexts, depending on who is using them. See id.
227. Legally, marriage can be viewed as status, form of property, type of trust, juris-
dictional entity, or microsovereignty, as well as contract. W. O'DONNELL & D. JONES,
supra note 169, at 1.
228. Traditionally, inalienability rules have prohibited contracts which would limit
freedom of marital consent as with contracts in restraint of marriage or marriage broker-
age agreements; encourage divorce, as in certain kinds of antenuptial agreements; make
enforceable agreements between parties to a sexual relationship; or make special enforcea-
ble commitments between marriage partners. See J. LAWSON, supra note 37, §§ 318-20,
366-68. Marital relations were viewed as a species of public trust beyond the "legal" scope
of contract. See 15 S. WILLISTON, supra note*38, § 1741 (explaining that contract law does
not control marriage). More recently, the tendency is to view marriage as one public policy
limitation among others, for example, the policy against restrictions on restraint of trade.
See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 5.4. Notwithstanding the voidness of marriage bro-
kerage contracts, unenforceable marriage brokerage apparently flourishes, at least in one
context. Would You Order a Mate Through The Mail? Wash. Post Parade Mag., Aug. 7,




states, by statute.229 The shifting sociological content of marriage
creates uncertainty about exactly what the legal concept means
and how it should function. 230 Nevertheless, the concept of mar-
riage as contract remains embedded in the law of domestic rela-
tions. A common obstacle to understanding contract's nature and
role in this shifting context is the mistaken apprehension that the
contract of marriage should be intelligible as a species of contract
in the general or ordinary sense embodied in the enforceable com-
mercial bargain.3 In legal history, the concept of the marital
contract antedates the emergence of contract in its general or or-
dinary form by several centuries, and has never been assimilated
into the latter framework.3 2 Historically, the contract of marriage
is not a subset of contract as an enforceable commercial bargain,
229. For case law stressing this conception, see United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S.
341, 359 (1966); Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 268-69 (Fla. 1973); Ponder v. Graham, 4
Fla. 23, 44-46 (1851); accord Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1888). Under
American law, marriage has been acknowledged to be "a civil contract, an institution, a
domestic relation and a sacrament." 1 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 45 (1931).
230. See Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETrE L.J. 441, 450-51 (1976) (dis-
cussing the evolution and recent judicial treatment of marriage); Weisbrod, Family,
Church and State: An Essay On Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J. FAM. L.
741 (1987-88) (analyzing church-state interactions on family issues). Weitzman criticizes
the received law of marriage as inappropriately grounded in the "Judeo-Christian ideal." L.
WEITZMAN, supra note 226, at 204. There can be no question that the institution has lost
some of its operative significance as a matter of sociology. See S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra
note 84, at 99 (discussing the erosion of traditional views of marriage).
231. Weber distinguished "status contracts," which, through "straightforward magi-
cal acts or at least acts having a magical significance," brought about a political, personal,
or familial relation between parties and a "purposive contract" of the market type. M.
WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra
note 43, at 105-06.
The status, as opposed to contractual, aspect of marriage has been stressed since the
nineteenth century. See Engdahl, Proposal for a Benign Revolution In Marriage Law and
Marriage Conflicts Law, 55 IOWA L. REV. 56, 57 (1969). Among the characteristics of a
"status contracts" are the absence of a right of rescission or a right to change fundamental
terms by subsequent agreement, the change such contracts effect on societal status, and the
common law merger of legal identity. The status contract of marriage is not a contract for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment prohibition of the impairment of contract. 1 C.
VERNIER, supra note 229, at 51. Incapacity under such contracts is also measured differ-
ently than it is under the regime of ordinary contract. See id. (comparing marriage under
common law to the law of ordinary contract).
232. See, e.g., J. JACKSON, THE FOUNDATION AND ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE 275
(1969) (lack of consent will be "sufficient to rescind an ordinary commercial contract," it is
not necessarily sufficient to annul a marriage). Long before the modern period, however,
the marriage contract coexisted with commercial exchanges that were given legal recogni-
tion in some form and was compared to them by contemporaries. But see W. WEYRAUCH
& S. KATZ, supra note 218, at 1-2 (noting that the marriage contract is similar to other
"long-term contracts" such as employment, partnership, cotenancy, or business for profit).
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but a distinct branch on the phylogenic tree. Marriage, of course,
is a contract within the formal definition developed earlier in this
article.3a The issue is the degree to which it is valid to equate the
implicit acquisition of the right to initiate procreation and claim a
parental relationship through the marriage contract with the ac-
quisition of the same rights through ordinary contract.
Legal history is the most helpful guide for reaching a precise
understanding of marriage as contract. In the medieval canon law,
from which English law on the subject derives, marriage acquired
its legal definition as contract in a period of reform and develop-
ment that lasted from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries.234
This movement was the outgrowth of the trend within the West-
ern Church towards a unitary system of law that began with the
Gregorian Reform of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.235 By the
mid-fourteenth century, a fully developed juridical notion of mar-
riage in the form of contract was firmly in place in the canon law
of England.36
By conceiving of marriage as a contractual bond or vinculum,
the canonists made juridical assessment of the. existence of a mar-
riage more certain and more uniform.3 7 Medieval canon lawyers
desired certainty and economy in such determinations for three
233. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
234. The reform movement involved developing new laws and legal institutions, but
also normalizing and channelling social practice so that it began more consistently to re-
flect Christian ideals. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 85-119, 530 (1983). George
Duby traces the setting of social practice, during this same period, into a consensus that
monogamy was-proper. G. DuBY, THE KNIGHT THE LADY AND THE PRIEST: THE MAKING
OF MODERN MARRIAGE IN MEDIEVAL FRANCE (1983).
235. G. DUBY, supra note 234, at 227-31.
236. "During the twelfth century ecclesiastical courts acquired complete jurisdiction
over [marriage]." H. POTTER, supra note 42, at 218. For the significance of canon law to
the development of English legal institutions, see C. DUGGAN, The Reception of Canon
Law in England in the Later-Twelfth Century, in CANON LAW IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND XI
(1982).
237. H. BERMAN, supra note 234, at 230. A looser concept of an exchange of consent
giving rise to a union of lives gave way to a more highly juridicized notion of an exchange
of consent resulting in a continuing bond of contractual obligation. See generally T.
MACKIN, WHAT IS MARRIAGE? 186-89 (1982) (outlining the history of this trend through
the writings of theologians). Within the canon law of the Roman Church, the conceptual-
ization of marriage as a juridical contractual bond became more exclusive and pronounced
in the centuries following the Council of Trent. The Church attempted to gain firmer disci-
pline in its practice following the Reformation. As a consequence, the contractual bond was
increasingly treated as the essence of marriage. Discussion of marriage during and after
the Second Vatican Council has centered on finding substitutes for the conceptualization of
marriage as contract. See Basset, The Marriage of Christians - Valid Contract, Valid
Sacrament?, in THE BOND OF MARRIAGE 117, 133-45 (W. Bassett ed. 1968).
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reasons. Marriage had become more important, being expressly
understood as a sacrament. 3 8 Church lawyers felt the need to be
able to say, with precision, whether or not the sacrament in a
given case had been effectuated. The exchange of consent by the
spouses had come to be understood by theologians as the external
sign of the sacrament's invisible working through grace in their
souls.2"9 By formulating the exchange of consent in the formal ju-
ridical terms of contract, the canonists were in a better position to
justify a judgment that the sacrament had actually been conferred
in a particular case.
In addition, the incorporation of the doctrine of marital indis-
solubility into the law of the period made it critical that canon
lawyers be able to decide whether a valid existing marriage was
an impediment to the recognition of a subsequent union.24 The
earlier codification of Roman law by Justinian, for example, had
not made indissolubility a feature of the law, even though it was
an important feature of Christian belief.24' During the middle
ages, betrothals formalizing future, arranged marriages sometimes
came into conflict with clandestine marriages entered against the
will of families.242 The idea of marriage as a contractual bond fa-
cilitated judgments regarding the indissoluble nature of either the
betrothal or the clandestine marriage.243 Finally, property rights
and social rank hinged on the categorization of resulting births as
legitimate or illegitimate. Concern with assigning status based on
legitimacy was longstanding.244 Confusion wrought by clandestine
238. H. BERMAN, supra note 234, at 174, 201, 530; T. MACKIN, supra note 237, at
20-22.
239. T. MACKIN, supra note 237, at 20-22.
240. Basset, supra note 237. Similarly, canonists were concerned by marriages oc-
curring within prohibited degrees of consanguinity. See G. DUBY, supra note 234 at 189-91
(citing the annulment of the marriage of Louis VII of France and Eleanor of Aquitaine
who were related within the fourth degree of consanguinity).
241. Divorce was not prohibited in either the Code or a code on divorce designated
Novel 22. M. GLENDON, supra note 218, at 17; Noonan, Novel 22, in THE BOND OF MAR-
RIAGE, supra note 237.
242. See Kelly, Clandestine Marriage and Chaucer's "Troilus," 4 VIATOR 435, 437-
43 (1973).
243. H. BERMAN, supra note 234, at 230.
244. On concern with preservation of familial property interests, see G. DUBY, MEDI-
EVAL MARRIAGE (1978). Twelfth-century canon law was more liberal than civil law in
recognizing legitimacy, acknowledging as legitimate children whose parents married subse-
quent to their birth. Although the ecclesiastical courts generally had jurisdiction over ques-
tions of legitimacy, the civil courts, under the Statute of Merton, refused to recognize the
retroactive legitimating force of marriage, because of its effect on property rights. 1 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I
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marriages aggravated the task of ascertaining a child's status.
Ease and certainty in assessing the existence of a marriage meant
equal ease and certainty in assigning rights based on the legiti-
macy of offspring.240
The notion of the marital contract adopted by canonists be-
tween the twelfth and fourteenth centuries was founded on the
existing notion that consent was the distinctive element bringing
marriage into being. From at least the time of Justinian, the
Western Church had made consent the legal basis of marriage,
although prior to the fourteenth century consent was not contrac-
tual, but rather a more loosely defined "union" or "sharing of
life. ' 46 In basing marriage on consent, the Church was implicitly
rejecting other available alternatives. In the medieval period, the
customs of more recently Christianized northern and central Eu-
ropean tribes made marriage derive not from consent, but from
public acknowledgement of the bride's transfer from the protec-
tion of her father to that of her husband.247 The form of public
acknowledgement prescribed generally related to the beginning of
cohabitation. In keeping with this tradition, Gratian suggested
that sexual consummation, and not consent, brings the marriage
127 (2d ed. 1923).
245. It is commonly held that the medieval position on illegitimacy led to the denial
of parental support to the child born out of wedlock, and that parental support was only
statutorily mandated under the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1576. This perception appears to
be incorrect. The common law doctrine of filius nullius appears originally to have meant
only that the common law courts had no jurisdiction to enforce parental support as a mat-
ter of law. Jurisdiction belonged to ecclesiastical courts which enforced such support as a
matter of natural equity with the contempt sanction of excommunication. Helmholz, Sup-
port Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nullius: A Reassessment of the Com-
mon Law, 63 VA. L. REv. 431 (1977). Bastardy, the practical consequence of which was
disqualification from inheritance, was primarily litigated in the common law courts. Helm-
holz, Bastardy Litigation in Medieval England, 13 AM. J. LEG. HIsT. 360, 367-82 (1969).
246. This view of marriage is illustrated by the phrase: Nuptiae autem sive ma-
trimonium est viri et mulieris conjunctio, individuam consuetudinem vitae continens.
(Marriage, or matrimony, is a joining together of a man and woman, carrying with it a
mode of life in which they are inseparable.). J. INST. 1.9.29 (T. Sandars trans. 1941). The
model of Roman marriage incorporated by Justinian was the matrimonium liberum based
on the free consent of the spouses and which had come to prevail in the Roman society of
late antiquity. Earlier forms of Roman marriage had been conceived in terms of the pass-
ing of the wife from the hand (manus) of her father to that of her husband. These included
conferreatio, based in a patrician religious ritual; coemptio, a fictitious sale of the bride;
and usus, a kind of chattel right in the bride arising from uninterrupted possession for one
year. Johnston, The Roman Family, in MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY, supra note 226, 78-
80.
247. H. BERMAN, supra note 234, at 75, 168; 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 87-89 (1903); T. MACKIN, supra note 237, at 147-48.
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into being.2 8 Peter Lombard opposed Gratian's view, arguing that
marriage begins with the exchange of consent.249 Canon law set-
tled the issue in favor of Lombard and the tradition of marriage
as consent descending from Justinian. 5 °
It should be evident that legal choices dating to the medieval
and ancient treatment of marriage continue to give content to the
law's use of the concept of contract to define marriage. This con-
cept still ensures that marital status arises through the consent of
the partners, rather than by the transfer of the bride as ward or
chattel, by family alliance, or by consummation. 51 Conceptualiz-
ing marriage as contract also continues to aim at placing the mar-
ital relationship within society's juridical control. While the im-
portance of classification as either legitimate or illegitimate is
decreasing, the concept of the marriage contract still furthers ju-
dicial economy in enforcing child support obligations against
fathers.252
One prominent feature that today distinguishes marriage con-
tracts from commercial bargains is the requirement in most juris-
dictions that the formation of the marriage contract be solem-
nized.25 3 Legal history of the postmedieval period discloses the
requirement's significance. In England the requirement goes back
to Lord Hardwicke's Act, also known as the Marriage Act, en-
acted by Parliament in 1753.254 The Act ended common law mar-
riages in England by providing that marital consent could be le-
gally given only according to public ceremonial norms prescribed
by the Church of England. An ancillary purpose seems to have
been to marginalize religious nonconformists, but its primary pur-
pose was the elimination of abuses associated with clandestine
248. T. MACKIN, supra note 237, at 161-64.
249. Id. at 164-67.
250. Although Pope Alexander III (1159-81) took the first definitive step in resolving
the dispute, he sided with Lombard only after a period of indecision. Alexander's judgment
was subsequently reaffirmed by Pope Urban II (1185-87) and Pope Innocent III (1189-
1216). T. MACKIN, supra note 237, at 168-70.
251. See W. GOODSELL, A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 221-31 (1934);
S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 84, at 193. Even today, a finding of consent is essential to
determining that a common law marriage exists. See Boswell v. Boswell, 497 So. 2d 479
(Ala. 1986).
252. See H. CLARK, supra note 23, § 6.2. California, for example, only allows a
husband to challenge his paternity of his wife's child within two years of the date of birth.,
After that period, the state enforces child support based on an irrebuttable presumption of
paternity. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 621 (West Supp. 1989).
253. Id. § 2.3.
254. Id. § 2.1.
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marriages. 255 To achieve this purpose, the Roman Catholic
Church promulgated similar legislation at the conclusion of the
Council of Trent.25
The requirement of solemnization according to a public cere-
mony conducted after the announcement of banns was intended to
bring the marriage contract more fully within the juridical control
of ecclesiastical and civil authorities. Goals included giving notice
of marital status to potential victims of bigamy and ensuring sta-
bility in the transfer of property and assignment of status to chil-
dren.257 Solemnization advanced both goals by reducing public
confusion regarding the existence and validity of marriages.' 8
States making no allowance for common law marriages, in effect,
follow the policy established by Lord Hardwicke's Act.259 States
which, in the tradition of the original American colonies, allow
common law marriages, follow the notion that simple mutual con-
sent, rather than solemnization, brings a marriage into being.260
The requirement of solemnization, where it exists, does not alter
the consensual nature of marital obligation, but reflects the special
interest the state takes in the publication of such consent.
With the secularization of Europe following the Protestant
Reformation and, later, the French Revolution, the concept of
marriage as contract acquired a new meaning. Originally used to
distinguish the external sign from the inner sacramental reality of
marriage in Christian theology, the concept was adapted by some
Northern European states to justify civil jurisdiction over mar-
riage without regard to its "inner" religious significance for
some.261 In England, the contractual character of marriage was
used to justify removing the solemnization of marriage from the
255. See S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 84, at 85 ("[T]hese laws marked the end
of valid marriages by simple contract.").
256. Luther and others had criticized the Catholic Church for tolerating the abuse of
clandestine marriages. The Council of Trent in the decree Tametsi (Decretum de Refor-
mation Matrimonii) (1563) established that thereafter marital consent could be validly
expressed only in the presence of a priest and two or three witnesses. T. MACKIN, supra
note 237, at 196-97. Parallel regulations were adopted within a relatively short time by
continental Protestants. See M. GLENDON, supra note 218, at 29.
257. See H. CLARK, supra note 23, § 2.1.
258. Id. § 2.3.
259. Thirty-seven states have decided, either by statute or case law, to cease recog-
nizing common law marriage. Id. § 2.4.
260. See Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78-79 (1878) (unless expressly barred by
statute, common law marriages are valid).
261. See W. GOODSELL, supra note 251, at 266-70.
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generally exclusive authority of the Church of England.262 In the
American context, the idea of marriage as a civil contract contin-
ues to support state jurisdiction over marriage, notwithstanding
the religious significance of the relationship for many groups.283
In sum, legal history discloses that conceptualizing marriage
as contract subjects the marital relationship to juridical control,
grounds legal recognition of the marital relationship and the sta-
tus that flows from it in the consent of the parties, and places such
regulation in the hands of the state, independent of the church.
History shows that the consensual nature of marriage is intended
to give form to a distinctively private reality. The private nature
of the marital agreement is expressed by the special religious sig-
nificance assigned to marital consent, in one form or another,
through much of its history. At the same time, the contractual
nature of marriage and the requirement of solemnization arose to
take the relationship from the realm of strictly private ordering
into that of public regulation. The choice of contract, as a concep-
tualization suitable for making marriage amenable to public regu-
lation, was an alternative to legal forms treating the bride as chat-
tel and the marriage as an exchange or transfer of status between
extended family groups. The concept of marriage as contract both
furthers individual freedom to choose a partner and allows society
to hold the individual publicly accountable in relation to both
partner and offspring.
Contract is now generally understood in the ordinary sense of
commercial bargain described earlier. 64 Contract, in this sense, is
distinguishable from the marriage contract both in content and
history. Nevertheless, the marriage contract in some sense shares
262. The first step was taken by Lord Hardwicke's Act, which required that nearly
all marriages be solemnized by the Church of England. The Marriage Act of 1876 abolish-
ing the requirement of solemnization implied that the regulation of marriage was a secular
power. See id. at 333-34, 438-39. Cf. F. POTOTSCHNIG, STAATLIcH-KIRCHLICHE
EHEGESETZGEBUNG IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT 55-61 (1974) (discussing the efforts of the
Hapsburg monarchy to assert control over marriage in place of the Catholic Church during
the nineteenth century).
263. The state acknowledges the religious significance of marriage to the extent that
solemnization by religious leaders is authorized by statute. However, while solemnization is
not a requirement for a marriage contract to be valid, a license from the state is required in
all American jurisdictions. See H. CLARK, supra note 23, § 2.3.
264. The classical border between the sphere of marriage and the scope of commer-
cial contract was formed in large part by restraints on any sort of obligation that might
have compromised the freedom of marital consent, a privileged choice. See J. LAWSON,
supra note 37, §§ 319-21.
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certain generic features with ordinary commercial contract.6 5 Re-
cent changes accentuate such common features. By turning from a
historical to a functional analysis of the way the two kinds of con-
tract are given effect under existing law, more specific conclusions
can be reached about the nature and extent of the intersection
between them. Identifying this intersection establishes the limits
to the validity of equating "marriage as contract" with the more
general contemporary usage of "contract." It also pinpoints the
relative discontinuity that proposals for reordering human procre-
ation under legally enforceable bargains would bring into the area
of family law.
As it now functions, the marriage contract, like the paradigm
case of the ordinary contract, arises from the exchange of as-
sent.266 Its formation, like that of ordinary contract, gives private
individuals the power of the mechanism of state enforcement.267
While the terms of the marriage contract are said to be largely
dictated by law, the same is true, if to a lesser degree, of other
contracts or agreements that give rise to ongoing associations. The
terms of the business partnership agreement also are prescribed,
to a certain degree, by law, and these prescribed terms flow from
the character of the association that happens to be the subject of
contract. 6 As a class, such Contracts do not attempt to provide
265. See infra text accompanying notes 33-57.
266. The standard treatise on marriage, prior to relatively recent developments in
Supreme Court jurisprudence on marriage, emphasized that marriage was not a simple
contract because: it could not be rescinded, inability to perform did not release one from it,
performance could never be completed, assent to it was based on a different age of capac-
ity, it could not be rescinded for failure of consideration, it did not give rise to a suit for
damages for nonfulfillment of duties, duties under it were not derived from terms but from
law, by legislation the state may annul it at pleasure, and all of its other elements were
derived from status not contract. KEEZER ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § I,
at 6 (J. Morland 3d ed. 1946) [hereinafter KEEZER].
Marriage is not a contract within the sense of the contract clause of the Constitution.
See Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 42, 256 N.E.2d 513, 520, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347, 356
(1970). Recent conceptual confusion in family law adds to the difficulty in distinguishing
the marriage contract from ordinary contract. Some conclude that there has been "[a]n
accelerated movement from status to contract . . . discernible in the realm of family rela-
tions," so that even making the distinction becomes less meaningful. Weyrauch, supra note
30, at 417.
267. The agreement is enforced against third party interference through actions for
adultery, alienation of affections, and loss of consortium. W. O'DONNELL & D. JONES,
supra note 169, at 3.
268. Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089
(1981). Marriage is now compared to partnerships, franchises, and servicing agreements.
See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 226, at 243-44 (arguing that the marriage relationship is
similar to a long-term business contract and, therefore, acquires the same legal characteris-
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for exchanges of cash for a disposable commodity, but rather to
provide rules for determining equity participation growing out of a
joint, for-1rofit undertaking. The freedom of the marriage part-
ners to vary the terms governing ownership of, control over, and
disposition of common property upon dissolution of the marriage
by death or divorce may not be as great as that of the partners in
an ordinary business partnership.6 9 Yet, spouses enjoy some free-
dom in this regard through antenuptial agreements, which are en-
forced with increasing latitude. While money damages, gener-
ally the mode of enforcing ordinary contracts, are not available
for a breach of the marriage contract, they are available for
breach of promise to marry, an agreement ancillary to mar-
riage.171 The division of property and award of alimony on the
dissolution of a marriage may function, at times and to a limited
extent, like compensatory damages for breach of contract. 2
If ordinary contract is generally understood as a mechanism
for freely reallocating resources to accord with changing party
preferences, the marital contract, then, differs substantially in the-
tics); W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 218, at 1-5 (comparing marriage to partner-
ship); Weyrauch, supra note 30, at 421 ("[M]arriage is beginning to acquire many of the
characteristics of a pooling of resources and becomes co-ownership in present and future
property similar to a business venture.").
269. The usual enforcement device in business is a suit for an accounting. For an
application to marriage, see In re Estate of Broadie, 208 Kan. 621, 625, 493 P.2d 289, 293
(1972); Holcroft v. Dickenson, Carter 233, 74 Eng. Rep. 933 (1672); 1 C. VERNIER, supra
note 229, at 23; W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 218, at 4. On divorce, see Posner v.
Posner, 233 So. 2d at 384 (Fla. 1970); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or.,102, 506 P.2d 719
(1973); Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash. 2d 614, 565 P.2d 94 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 192 (1979). Recently, the distinctive property implications of mari-
tal status and family relationship have become much less important. See M. GLENDON
THE NEw FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981).
270. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), aft'd, 257 So. 2d 530
(Fla. 1972). At least four states have enacted section 3 of the Uniform Premarital Agree-
ment Act, giving scope to the recognition of contract. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT
§ 3, 9B U.L.A. 373 (1986). On the trend generally, see Bruch, Of Work, Family Wealth,
and Equality, 17 FAM. L.Q. 99 (1983); W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 218, at 43-
44. The practice seems to be to uphold contractual resolution of property and inheritance
rights as long as certain standards of fairness and disclosure are met. S. GREEN & J. LONG,
supra note 84, § 1.27, at 68, § 2.01, at 102.
271. Such suits have been excluded in twenty-two jurisdictions under so-called Heart
Balm Acts. E.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 43.5(d) (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 to
-203 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 1987).
272. This is especially true where fault is taken into account in dividing property to
assigning post-dissolution support obligations. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-705 (1983)
(right to maintenance premised on showing of fault). To some degree, the risk of unfavora-
ble discretionary awards relating to property division and alimony can be controlled by
antenuptial agreement. W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 218, at 99.
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ory from ordinary contract, since the marital contract gives rise to
a status which in principle is not intended for reallocation.2 73 With
the universal enactment of no-fault divorce, the two kinds of con-
tract, however, move considerably closer, even in this fundamental
respect.27 4 Under the no-fault system of divorce, parties may bilat-
erally or unilaterally rescind marriages at will and may shift their
resources into other marriage arrangements. 27 5 Although the
terms between the parties may be dictated in part by state policy
while marriages last, and although the relationship places various
ancillary limitations on the partners' freedom of contract in the
interim, the ability to dissolve the arrangement at will aligns the
marital contract more closely with ordinary contract.76
Along with no-fault divorce, other recent legal developments
diminish the distinction between marital and ordinary con-
tracts.2  One of these developments is a trend towards enforcing
domestic agreements, entered into in lieu of marriage . 7  Gener-
ally, marriage contracts assign rights and duties with respect to
support on the basis of spousal status. Entitlement to the marital
res is assigned by the same means either as community property
or under equitable distribution. Attempts by the marriage part-
ners to reassign, as between themselves, such rights, duties, and
entitlements by contract are, at least to some extent, unenforce-
273. Even in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, marriage is described as "hope-
fully enduring." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
274. By 1985 every state provided for no-fault divorce. See W. O'DONNELL & D.
JONES, supra note 169, at 133 (noting that South Dakota became the last state to adopt
no-fault divorce).
275. See Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62
VA. L. REv. 663, 704-06 (1976). This practice also has been called "successive polygamy,"
Id. at 672-73, and "serial monogamy," L. WEITZMAN, supra note 226, at 104-204.
276. See M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 63-111. If the obligation were strictly "at
will," it would be illusory and not technically contractual. However, even the notice and
waiting requirements of no-fault divorce statutes lend a sufficient future orientation to mar-
riage to satisfy the criteria of contract. A right to the no-fault dissolution of marriage is
analogous not only to commercial contracts subject to termination clauses but also to the
right to "efficient breach" which is implicitly countenanced by the law of commercial con-
tract. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U.
COLO. L. REV. 683, 692-95 (1986) (discussing the concept of efficient breach).
277. See Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective 28
UCLA L. REV. 1125 (1981) (discussing claims of unmarried cohabitants to benefits and
rights normally considered incidents of marriage); Weyrauch, supra note 30 (examining
the contractual implications of formal and informal family relationships).
278. Weyrauch, supra note 30, at 428 ("[A]greements are more likely to be honored
if they use the language of property.").
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able. 9 In the event that a couple foregoes marriage and lives to-
gether in a substitute relationship, the court now may enforce con-
tractual arrangements the couple implicitly, or even expressly,
makes regarding support and entitlement to property, at least in
the context of property settlement on dissolution of the relation-
ship. s° Previously, courts uniformly refused to enforce any claim
to a property entitlement or service obligation growing out of un-
married cohabitation.28"
The result of this development is that contractual redistribu-
tions are now enforced within a sphere previously closed to ordi-
nary contract, on the sole condition that the parties refrain from
publicly solemnizing their relationship as marital. In recognizing
such "anuptial" agreements, courts create pressure to expand the
recognition given to antenuptial and nuptial agreements entered
into by parties who formally marry. 82 Additional pressure comes
from a gradual evacuation of specific, sex-linked content in the
roles the law prescribes for spouses. 83 Spouses, increasingly, are
left to give shape to their relationship, according to their own in-
formal agreements, bargains, and exchanges. A movement exists
to make these informal agreements, bargains, and exchanges le-
gally enforceable through individualized antenuptial or nuptial
contracts.284 Its acceptance might serve as a point of departure for
279. See Merritt, Changing Marital Rights and Duties by Contract: Legal Obstacles
in North Carolina, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 85 (1977).
280. E.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684-85, 557 P.2d 106, 122-23, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 831-32 (1976); Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976). Contra
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 11. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979) (holding that the property of
unmarried cohabitants may not be contractually devised). In addition to contractual obli-
gations, courts have used the rules of property to enforce the reasonable expectations of the
parties. E.g., Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115,
577 P.2d 507 (1978). One commentator has concluded that "[s]ince common law judges
are traditionally property oriented, sexual cohabitation becomes less objectionable if it is
presented in terms borrowed from the law of property rather than from the law of personal
service contracts." Weyrauch, supra note 30, at 428; see Note, Domestic Partnership: A
Proposal for Dividing the Property of Unmarried Friends, 12 WILLAMETrE L.J. 453, 475
(1976).
281. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Il1. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979) (retaining
the traditional approach).
282. H. CLARK, supra note 23, §§ 1.1, 1.2.
283. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 226, at 168; see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979) (striking down gender-based alimony); Carlson v. Carlson, 75 Ariz. 308, 256 P.2d
249 (1953) (allowing wife to refuse husband's choice of domicile).
284. The best known advocate of this movement is Lenore Weitzman. See L. WEITZ-
MAN, supra note 226, at 219-250 (1981); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradi-
tion and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1974). Weitzman expresses the opinion that
business contracts presuppose relations of "mutual goodwill, cooperation and even affection
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making marital or extramarital procreative exchanges a subject of
individualized nuptial contracts, as well as of contracts with third
parties.
Even allowing for the common features between marriage, es-
pecially in light of recent legal developments, and ordinary com-
mercial contract, the contemporary marriage contract continues to
function differently from ordinary contract in at least three nota-
ble ways. One such difference is the unique character of human
sexual expression as a subject matter of the marriage contract.
Apart from marriage, contract enforcement is withheld by the law
2851no enocfrom exchanges of sexual expression. Courts will not enforce
any promise supported by such consideration. Contracts to buy
and sell sex are considered prostitution and are unenforceable.2"6
For example, mention of sexual expression in an antenuptial
agreement may render the agreement unenforceable as "meretri-
cious." Courts enforce the property aspects of such domestic ar-
rangements but refuse to enforce their sexual aspects.8 7
Within the marriage contract, by contrast, sexual expression
is in some way related to the essence of the agreement. Sex was
once understood to be the consideration lending the agreement its
basic structure as a bargain.288 Although still a part of the mar-
in coping with the inevitable problems that arise in an ongoing enterprise," and concludes
"that the dichotomy between business morality and personal morality is no longer clearcut.
In fact, the developing standards for business contracts suggest the increasing appropriate-
ness of the contractual model for marriage." L. WEITZMAN, supra note 226, at 244. Farns-
worth also concludes that "[r]ecent changes in the attitude toward marriage have been
reflected in a greater willingness to grant parties the same freedom of contract in this area
that they enjoy in other areas, as long as the agreement is a fair one in the circumstances."
E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 5.4.
285. See 15 S. WILLISTON, supra note 38, § 1745.
286. This issue is distinct from whether prostitution should be criminalized. See infra
notes 518-20 and 533-40 and accompanying text. See generally J. DECKER, PROSTITUTION:
REGULATION AND CONTROL (1979) (discussing the rationales for legalizing prostitution).
287. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 831 (1976) (A contract between unmarried partners is unenforceable only to the
degree that it is expressly based upon the immoral consideration of meretricious sexual
services). One interpretation is that the law continues to consider marriage the only legally
cognizable forum for sexual expression, but that policy considerations growing out of
problems in enforceability have led to a relaxation of constraints. See Hafen, supra note
132, at 567.
288.
The Conjunction of Man and Wife, is the Law of Nature; and the Consent of
the Mind is regarded in Contracts, because the Mind only can lawfully give
Consent: But to Consummation of Marriage, Copulation is requisite, and by the
Parties being in Bed Together, the Law Presumes it. There are Signs of Consent
to Contracts of Marriage, which are effectual in Law, as the Woman thereby
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riage contract, sexual expression now plays a more loosely defined
role, with respect to both the presumed structure of the "contract"
and the rights and duties of the partners.28 9 Even when sexual ex-
pression was most explicitly decisive in defining the exchange
under the marriage contract, it was exchanged only as the focus of
an integrated personal relationship involving an obligation of undi-
vided mutual support.2 90 The policy underlying both the illegality
of ordinary contracts for the exchange of sex and the particular
structure of the marriage contract as a licit means of exchanging
sex has militated against enforcing the alienation of sexual expres-
sion as commodity.
A second major difference between marital and ordinary con-
tract is that the marriage contract gives rise to status that is a
pervasive reference in the legal ordering of American society. This
status continues to be counted as fundamental in judicial and leg-
islative allocation of benefits and burdens, and attribution of
rights and duties.29' Legal recognition of marital and related sta-
tacitly agrees to the Propositions of the Man.
G. JACOB, THE STUDENT'S COMPANION: OR THE REASON OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 123
(1725 & photo. reprint 1978).
289. Noninterference by the state in the marital relationship meant that the parties
were, effectively, entitled to the "self-help" of taking sex over the protest or resistance of
the partner. The victim, in such cases, could not obtain state assistance under either tort or
criminal law. See Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1255 (1986). Concern for the individual rights
of the partners, particularly the wife, has appropriately led to the rejection of this view. See
C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987) (noting
this trend but arguing that more progress is needed).
290. The rights and duties of the parties to the marriage are owed not in terms of
vested interests, but rather flow from a relationship of fealty, which in many ways is simi-
lar to feudal notions of personal allegiance as the source of rights and duties between mem-
bers of medieval society. See H. BERMAN, supra note 234, at 306 (discussing the reciprocal
pledges of faith or fealty between vassal and lord as "the equivalent - almost - of a
marriage"). Notwithstanding developments in the Supreme Court jurisprudence of mar-
riage, the fealty character of marriage is still recognized by the Court. See, e.g., Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (marriage deemed "a bilateral loyalty" and "a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred"). For those ideologically versed in individualism, the question is how marital
and parental fealty is to be distinguished from involuntary servitude flowing from a con-
tract of irrevocable personal employment. See Note, supra note 8, at 1938 (parent-child
and spousal relationships bear "a striking similarity to slavery").
291. The rights of consortium, support, alimony, distributive share, dower, inheri-
tance, the legitimacy of children, the benefits of workers' compensation, social security,
pension systems, exemptions, widow's allowance, and special state and federal tax treat-
ment all flow from marital status. See S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 84, at 1-10; W.
O'DONNELL & D. JONES, supra note 169, at 182. Disability and unemployment benefits,
eligibility for child custody and adoption, and access to markets in homes and apartments,
1990]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tus fosters a general societal acknowledgement of such status.292
The status consequences of marriage affect the spouses inter se,
and they affect the status of the spouses ad extra. Inter se, the
spouses relinquish their status, relative to each other, as rights-
bearing individuals, in that they lose, to some extent, the ability to
contract with one another. 93 In relation to the world ad extra,
under the old common law, the woman relinquished her status as
a bearer of rights, since her legal identity merged into her hus-
band's. 9 4 She lost the ability to contract with others, and, to a
limited degree, her accountability under the criminal law. 29 "5 At
the same time, the couple gained a corresponding immunity from
state interference. This right was understood as quasi-sovereignty,
mortgages, insurance, and credit have also been cited as advantages. L. WEITZMAN, supra
note 226, at 217-18.
Status-based regulation places the contract of marriage outside the scope of the com-
merce clause of the U.S. constitution. See supra note 277. "Without a prior judicial impri-
matur, individuals may freely enter into and rescind commercial contracts, for example,
but we are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens may covenant for or dissolve
marriages without state approval." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
As status consequences of marriage become somewhat uncertain, a substitute status
has been built on cohabitation. See Caudill, Legal Recognition of Unmarried Cohabitation:
A Proposal to Update and Reconsider Common Law Marriage, 49 TENN. L. REv. 537, 540
(1982) (arguing that the state has identical interests in legal marriage and unmarried
cohabitive relationships, so the same legal burdens and protections should apply). A contro-
versial current example is San Francisco's ordinance recognizing the status of cohabitant
lovers. See S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 84, at 166. Along the same lines, six cities
have passed ordinances recognizing homosexuals' domestic partners: Berkeley, Los Ange-
les, Santa Cruz, San Francisco and West Hollywood, California, Madison, Wisconsin, and
Takoma Park, Maryland. Gay Couples Seek Legal Recognition, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1989,
at 24, col. 4.
292. The relationship of law to conventional social norms is a controversial issue.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the ma-
jority's use of the historical condemnation of sodomy to uphold the constitutionality of
Georgia's criminalization of sodomy).
293. See, e.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 479-80, 107 So. 2d 885, 889 (1958)
(refusing to enforce agreement regarding child's religious education); Cord v. Neuhoff, 94
Nev. 21, 573 P.2d 1170 (1978) (refusing to enforce agreement limiting husband's duty to
support wife). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 190 comment a (1.981) gives two
reasons for the restriction: public interest in the marital relationship and workable stan-
dards for adjudication in the context of such an intimate relationship. For a statement of
the classic balance between the scope of family relation and contract, see W. CLARK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 164 (3d ed. 1914).
294. On coverture and estates in the entirety with rights of courtesy and dower, see 2
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 244, at 403; W. STORY. A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS NOT UNDER SEAL § 83 (2d ed. 1847).
295. A woman committing most sorts of crimes in her husband's presence had the
defense that she was acting under his constructive coercion. L. HOLCOMBE, WIVES AND
PROPERTY: REFORM OF THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY LAW IN NINETEENTH CEN-
TURY ENGLAND 30 (1983).
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which the man enjoyed over the family unit.2 98 The woman's mar-
ital incapacity, of course, was lifted long ago by statute.2 97 Mar-
ried couples continue, nonetheless, to enjoy a certain joint legal
status.9 8 In addition, both state and private employers distribute
significant economic benefits based on marital status. 9 Jurispru-
dence developed by the Supreme Court of the United States adds
a layer of constitutional protection to the couple's immunity from
state interference, where their decisions concern choices involving
the eduction and welfare of children. 300
The status consequences of the marriage contract most rele-
vant to the present inquiry are those related to the parent-child
relationship. As will be discussed more fully below, the marital
contract may form the basis for subsequent recognition of the
spouses' status as legal parents, and of the child's status as legiti-
mate offspring of the marriage.30 1 Further, the generic rights and
duties, which the state reads into a contract between spouses, are
inextricably related to presumptions about the welfare require-
ments of children who may be born of the marriage.0 2 Societal
benefits flowing to married couples are also justified by reference
to the welfare requirements of children. 3
296. H. CLARK, supra note 23, § 7.1.
297. See, e.g., Chiesa v. Rowe, 486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Mich 1980) (right to claim
loss of consortium); Vogel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (right of wrongful death claim). The trend began with the passage of a Mississippi
statute in 1839. KEEZER, supra note 266, § 14 (citing Miss. Laws of 1839, ch. 46).
298. E.g., spousal immunity from testifying. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40 (1980).
299. See supra note 291.
300. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parents' right to provide chil-
dren with religious training); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (par-
ents' right to send children to parochial school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-
400 (1923) (parents' right to have children taught in German). See generally McCarthy,
The Confused Constitutional, Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975
(1988) (noting that the parent-child relationship involves fundamental rights).
301. Contract inaugurates marriage, but what exists thereafter is a relationship.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
302. The state's interest also may extend to the welfare of the adult partners, partic-
ularly of women who are dependent. See Jacob, Another Look at No-Fault Divorce and
the Post-Divorce Finances of Women, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 113 (1989) (no-fault
divorce has not changed the economic effects of divorce on women, according to empirical
study); Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its After-
math, 56 U. CN. L. REV. 1 (1987) (traditional allocation of child-rearing duties perpetu-
ates dependence of women, even under no-fault divorce).
303. See Krause, Artificial Conception" Legislative Approaches, 19 FAM. L.Q. 185,
192 (1985) ("[Slociety [has an] undisputed interest . . and even duty to safeguard the
circumstances in which children are born and reared. That very interest is the essential
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The third major difference between the marriage contract
and ordinary contracts is the unique nature of the state's interest
in the marital relationship. The state has a substantial interest in
channelling sexual expression into relatively stable, nonpromis-
cuous unions. °4 State recognition of the marital contract as the
exclusive basis for regulating exchanges related to sexual expres-
sion as well as state licensing and solemnization requirements is
best understood by reference to this purpose. 0 5 The state also has
a substantial interest in the reproduction of the population. Its eli-
gibility and licensing requirements for marriage are more fully
understood in the context of this second aim.306 Eligibility for en-
tering the marriage contract is restricted to heterosexuals within a
monogamous relationship. 0 7 It is denied to persons too proxi-
basis of all regulation of marriage and family law.")
304. "Marriage, . . . [which has] more to do with the morals and civilization of a
people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature."
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769
(1977) (remarking on "the family unit, perhaps the most fundamental social institution of
our society"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
integrity of . . . [family] life is something so fundamental" that it is constitutionally pro-
tected.). But see People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 (1980) (constitutional right of privacy protects "indulgence in acts of
sexual intimacy by unmarried persons"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Common-
wealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980) (no rational basis for regulating volun-
tary sexual acts between unmarried persons). One explanation for this difference of opinion
is that the state is becoming less concerned with the relationship per se, and more con-
cerned with "aspects of marriage formation that affect society in general. ... Glendon,
supra note 275, at 683.
305. Allowing suits for alienation of affection and criminal conversation and the
right of "self-help" in statutes excusing the homicide of spousal paramours are indications
of state policy against adultery. See I C. VERNIER, supra note 229, at 16.
306. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (noting that, unlike a minor's right to
have an abortion, the right to marry is postponed but still preserved by age of majority
statutes). Roscoe Pound noted of marriage regulations:
These are on the one hand a social interest in the maintenance of the family as a
social institution and on the other hand a social interest in the protection of
dependent persons, in securing to all individuals a moral and social life and in
the rearing and training of sound and well-bred citizens for the future.
Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 182 (1916).
There is a traditional notion that marital partners are charged by society with an officium
to produce children. T. MACKIN, supra note 237, at 146.
307. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding laws prohibiting
polygamy are a permissible limit on religious practice); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310,
191 N.W.2d 185 (1971) (upholding constitutionality of a law prohibiting same-sex mar-
riages), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355
A.2d 204 (1976) (transsexual marriage upheld because marriage included a man and wo-
man). But see Note, Polygamy and the Right to Marry: New Life for an Old Life Style,
11 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 303, 305 (1981) (arguing that polygamy laws should be revised);
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mately related by degree of consanguinity. 08 The age of capacity
traditionally is geared not to the general age of contractual capac-
ity, but rather to sexual maturity and some more reduced level of
capacity for assent.30 9 All of these facts are explained by the
state's interest in channelling procreation by favoring the forma-
tion and preservation of select, long-term sexual and procreative
relationships, rather than short-term reallocations of sexual and
procreative resources.
Jurisprudence on sex, marriage, and family handed down by
the Supreme Court over the past twenty-five years has tended to
destabilize at least two of these three distinctive features of the
marital contract. It is no longer clear how far society may go in
making the marital contract the basis for deciding questions of
societal status, nor the extent to which the state may regulate pro-
creation and sexual expression. In a line of cases that begins with
Griswold v. Connecticut,3 10 the Court began a reconceptualization
of the marriage relationship in terms of a zone of protected pri-
vacy." This zone of privacy encompasses a limited right allowing
a marital couple to shape their relationship free from state inter-
ference.31 2 The contract of marriage itself, in this view, becomes a
Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973) [hereinafter Note,
Homosexual Marriage] (arguing that laws prohibiting homosexual marriages may be un-
constitutional in states that adopt the equal rights amendment as state law).
308. However, a state incest provision has been struck down, as applied to geneti-
cally unrelated persons related merely by adoption. Israel v. Allen, 195 Colo. 263, 577 P.2d
762 (1978).
309. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 218, at 357; see also Note, The
Right of the Mentally Disabled to Marry, 15 J. FAm. L. 463 (1976-77).
310. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
311. Id. at 486; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (hold-
ing a ban on the commercial distribution of nonmedical contraceptives an unconstitutional
invasion of family autonomy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the state
must have a compelling interest to interfere with a woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy); cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that individuals have a right
to possess obscene materials in their homes). See generally K. REDDEN, FEDERAL REGULA-
TION OF FAMILY LAW (1982) (discussing the development of the right to privacy as the
basis for the right of access to and use of contraceptives); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1337-62, 1400-09, 1414-20 (1988) (surveying and analyzing the development
of the right to privacy in the areas of contraception, abortion, association, and family);
Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 329, 391-95 (outlining the rela-
tionship between the right to privacy and family integrity claims). For a description of
state law trends in this area, see supra text accompanying notes 280-83; see also M. GLEN-
DON, supra note 218, at 2 (noting an international trend of "progressive withdrawal of
official regulation of marriage formation, dissolution, and the conduct of family life
312. See generally Hafen, supra note 132 (tracing the Court's treatment of the right
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form of personal expression, the entry upon which the state may
not broadly regulate, even for the public welfare.3 13 This line of
cases also suggests that sexual expression, both within and apart
from marriage, should be similarly protected from state interfer-
ence, 1" although the Court itself has drawn away from this
conclusion.315
The permissible role of the marriage contract in determining
rights related to procreation and parental status has also been
drawn into question by these cases. The right to initiate procrea-
tion, for example, has been held by the Court to reside, not in the
couple, but the individual. 6 The right to decide whether the life
of sexual privacy and the "formal family").
313. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (states may not prohibit persons who
are currently not meeting existing child support obligations from marrying); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that the state's power to regulate marriage is not unlim-
ited and recognizing marriage as a fundamental right). But see Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S.
47 (1977) (ineligibility for social security dependent's benefits upheld as constitutional
under application of rational basis test).
314. See, e.g., People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1980) (holding unconstitutional under the equal protectioh clause a state law prohibiting
consensual sodomy), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). See generally Wilkinson & White,
Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 569 (1977)
(discussing the need to balance protection of personal lifestyle rights and maintenance of
sufficient conformity to encourage responsibility and respect for the law); Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-the Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980) (dis-
cussing rights associated with marriage, procreation, and the family).
315. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a state law forbid-
ding homosexual sodomy); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.) (upholding a Virginia
law prohibiting consensual sodomy as applied to married couples who permit others to
watch or engage in the proscribed conduct), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976); Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (upholding Virginia's law
prohibiting sodomy as it applies to homosexuals), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). More surpris-
ing is the decision in Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa
1977), affid, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978), wherein
the plaintiffs, employees of the defendant library, were fired for openly cohabitating while
one of them was married. The district court held that the library's actions violated neither
the plaintiffs' right to equal protection nor to privacy. Id. at 1332-1334. Even the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade eschews a broad right "to do with one's body as one pleases." 410
U.S. at 154. See generally Katz, Majoritarian Morality and Parental Rights, 52 ALB. L.
REV. 405 (1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court has followed divergent paths in recog-
nizing privacy rights in the area of reproduction and parenting, while refusing to similarly
recognize sexual privacy rights); Schneider, State Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amend-
ment "Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, 51 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRoBs. 79 (1988) (criticizing the Supreme Court's treatment of sexual expres-
sion issues and advocating that such issues are not amenable to constitutionalization at all).
316. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). American law more than any in Western Europe
has come to embody the idea that the termination of marriage and pregnancy is a matter
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of a fetus should be terminated in abortion resides exclusively in
the mother. 17 The same may be true of the right to decide the life
or death of the extracorporeal embryo.318 The loosening of the re-
lationship between the marital contract, on the one hand, and pro-
creative rights and parental status, on the other, has also been
accentuated by a second line of Supreme Court cases, in which
the equal protection rights of unmarried fathers and children born
out of wedlock are held to restrict the state's right to take illegiti-
macy or marital status into account in making laws.319 The state
generally may not claim a rational basis for defining any class of
beneficiaries under law to include legitimate, but exclude illegiti-
mate children.320 This rule does away with a significant induce-
ment to limit procreation to marital relationships. 2'
In addition, the state is now limited in its ability to require
that a natural father enter a marital contract with the child's
of individual right. M. GLENDON, supra note I, at 113.
317. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). The state does have
an interest in ensuring that appropriate information is conveyed to the mother. Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1982). At some point, the
mother's right is eclipsed by the state's compelling interest in protecting potential life.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057 (1989).
318. The federal courts have not addressed this issue. In the most publicized state
case dealing with the disposition of extracorporeal embryos, the court rejected this conten-
tion. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn App LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 21,
1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 642 (Ct. App. filed Sept. 13, 1990). In
Davis a Tennessee lower court held that seven in vitro embryos were human beings and
that a dispute between their divorcing parents over whether the wife should be allowed to
pursue implantation should be based on the best interests of the embryos, rejecting argu-
ments that the embryos should be treated as property. The court also rejected an argument
that contract law or the principle of equitable disposition of property should govern.
319. See infra note 356 and accompanying text. See generally Comment, Equal
Protection for Illegitimate Children: A Consistent Rule Emerges, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 142
(concluding that Supreme Court jurisprudence on equal protection of illegitimate children
distinguishes between regulations that serve administrative purposes and those that merely
express moral conditions of promiscuity).
320. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769
(1977); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). But
see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (upholding differential treatment of an illegiti-
mate child in providing social security death benefits); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 184 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (classification not impermissible per
se).
321. There is a "world-wide pattern of approximating the status of the child born
outside marriage to that of the child born within marriage. . . . The legal institution [of
marriage] is being drained of some of its content by the increasing number and social
acceptance of births outside legal marriage." Glendon, supra note 275, at 714-15 (foot-
notes omitted).
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mother before recognizing the father's paternal rights. 22 States
may, however, condition their recognition of paternal rights on the
prior establishment of a relationship of care and support between
the biological father and the child.323 Several issues contribute to
the Court's discounting of the traditional legitimating function of
the marital contract. 24 The development of scientific tools, mak-
ing direct proof of paternity feasible, may be one such contribut-
ing cause, since, historically, one function of the marriage contract
has been to establish an irrebuttable presumption of paternity, di-
rect proof of paternity having been unavailable.325
According to some interpretations, the reasoning of these Su-
preme Court cases compels the virtual abandonment of the law of
the marriage contract. In this view, the strictly individual rights of
sexual and procreative expression give rise to a zone of privacy
protecting these social activities from government intrusion; gov-
ernmental attempts to shape conduct through the terms and con-
ditions of the marriage contract would violate individual rights.326
Distinguishing among children according to legitimacy would be a
322. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (state violated procedural due pro-
cess by terminating unwed father's parental rights without a hearing where father lived
with children and supported them).
323. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (where "unwed father
may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of the mother," statute
granting unwed mother, but not father, a veto over adoption yiolates the equal protection
clause); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (where unwed father had not
established any familial relationship with child, state not obligated to extend him the right
to veto adoption); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (where unwed father has
never exercised actual or legal custody of child, his interests are distinguishable from a
separated or divorced father's).
324. See supra note 332.
325. The human leukocyte alloantigen (HLA) test is highly reliable. S. GREEN & J.
LONG, supra note 84, at 278. Contrast the maxim, Mater est quam gestatio demonstrat
(She who is the mother shows this by carrying the child).
326. For a discussion of legal claims on behalf of unwed mothers who seek exclusive
parental rights, see Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 306-15 (1988);
see also Ikemoto, Providing Protection for Collaborative, Noncoital Reproduction" Surro-
gate Motherhood and Other New Procreative Technologies, and the Right of Intimate
Association, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1273, 1286-90 (1988); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (suggesting the outlines and constitutional origins of
these rights). See generally L. TRIE, supra note 311, at 1337-62 (analyzing the Griswold
line of cases); Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Le-
gal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv.
879, 912-27 (1984) (discussing the rights of unwed fathers); Hafen, supra note 132 (argu-
ing that modern Supreme Court cases uphold the family in spite of their individualistic
rhetoric); Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried,




If the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the marriage contract
eventually draws the implications of past cases to this far-reaching
conclusion, it will encourage more diverse modes of sexual and
procreative activity and, thereby, a greater array of conflicts. At
the same time, it will redraw the traditional rules for resolving
conflicts in the area.328 One solution would be to rank individual
claims constitutionally. Then, no doubt could arise as to which
claim would take precedence in a conflict, as, for example, the
claim of the pregnant woman to abort the fetus now trumps the
father's claim to preserve the fetus.3 29 The other solution would be
to allow the parties to order their relationships according to the
ordinary form of contract and then resolve conflicts according to
the terms that the parties had agreed upon in advance.33 0
To summarize, the contract of marriage differs from ordinary
contract in that it provides an exclusive, noncommodifying chan-
nel for the exchange of sexual expression; it establishes marital
and parental status which are allowed wide-ranging societal effect;
and, in both these and other respects, it fulfills basic state inter-
ests. Recent trends in the law blur these distinctive characteristics.
One trend has moved the marital relationship further away from
contract, dissolving it into privacy and natural relationships. The
result of this trend is that de facto elements of status, including
genetic relationship, informal cooperation, and emotional bond, re-
place juridical elements of status as an alternative basis for resolv-
327. However, the legal recognition of the status of illegitimacy is not unconstitu-
tional per se. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628, 632-33 (1974).
328. The critical legal studies school would view this as a positive development. See
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561 (1983) (criticizing
governmental intervention in personal relations underlying equal protection). However,
others are not as sanguine: "one can only imagine what would happen from a jurispruden-
tial perspective if marriage and minority status were to fall by the wayside in the quest for
individual fairness." Hafen, supra note 132, at 489.
329. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (giving greater
weight to the wife's interest in deciding whether to terminate pregnancy because she is
more directly affected). An alternative solution would be to dictate that whichever individ-
ual had played the most multifaceted role in reproduction would prevail in any conflict. W.
O'DONNELL & D. JONES, supra note 169, at 236.
330. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital
Cohabitation, 1981 WIs. L. REv. 275 (urging the adoption of liberal laws regarding
cohabitative arrangements). But see Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1593, 1593 (1987) (arguing that
people usually do not contemplate the legal repercussions of intimate relationships).
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ing disputes. A second countervailing trend has blurred the mari-
tal contract's distinctive characteristics by moving it closer to
ordinary contract. In particular, divorce and remarriage, as well
as the broader application of prenuptial and anuptial agreements,
have made the marriage contract function more like an ordinary
contract. Arguments have been made to accelerate this trend, to
allow parties to enforce bargains within the confines of marriage
itself. According to this reasoning, the vacuum created by the ero-
sion of sex-related roles prescribed by laws and by the privacy
immunity created by the Supreme Court around marital procrea-
tion should be filled by structures growing out of contract-based
obligation.
2. The Role of the Marriage Contract in Defining Rights to
Initiate Procreation, Establish a Parent-Child Relationship, and
Assert Precedence in Disputes over Parental Rights
The marriage contract has been the focus of discussion be-
cause of its importance for ordering human procreation under ex-
isting law. A brief return to and expansion on the foregoing gen-
eral discussion, with a narrower analytical focus on the question of
procreation, allows a summary statement of the role of the mar-
riage contract in ordering human procreation. As the new repro-
ductive technologies underscore, the legal ordering of procreation
requires an analysis of three fundamental considerations: the initi-
ation of the procreation of a new human being and the acquisition
of biological resources necessary therefor, the formation and
maintenance of a parent-child relationship, and the resolution of
conflicts among rival claims to a particular parental relationship.
Ascertaining the role of the marriage contract for the ordering of
human procreation is a matter of describing its role in each of
these areas.
Historically, the right to initiate procreation was recognized
by law only for couples within a contract of marriage. The only
way to initiate procreation was sexual intercourse and, in jurisdic-
tions forbidding fornication and adultery, sexual intercourse was
technically reserved to marriage.3 ' Restrictions on the right of
marriage have been clearly aimed at regulating procreation.33 2
331. See 1 C. VERNIER, supra note 229, at 170-72 (state regulation of marriage "has
a fundamental physiological basis, the propagation of the human family.
332. Id.; Hafen, supra note 132, at 465 n.6 ("No state would knowingly issue a
marriage license to a homosexual couple.").
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The law, however, has never seriously attempted to enforce the
restriction of procreation to marriage directly. Rather, it has pro-
vided a positive inducement to parents to reproduce only within
the marital boundaries, by characterizing offspring born outside
these borders as illegitimate. The disadvantages of illegitimacy
weigh more heavily on the mother, but also affect the parental
rights of the father. 3  Through the marriage contract, individuals
acquire a joint status that ensures a positive legal and social re-
sponse to their procreating. The right to procreate is not acquired
as an incident to the contract itself. Rather, it arises from the
public acknowledgement of a relational status between a man and
a woman.
With the gradual demise of status based on legitimacy, this
system of inducement has disappeared.334 Prohibitions on extra-
marital intercourse are also being withdrawn.3 5 The Supreme
Court has identified the right of procreation as belonging to the
individual. 338 In a very real sense, the law can no longer be said to
premise the right to initiate procreation on the status flowing from
the existence of a marriage contract.337 It seems more accurate to
say that the right to initiate procreation now belongs to individu-
als without regard to marital status, while the law generally aims
to encourage the exercise of the right within a marital relation-
ship. Some interpretations of Supreme Court jurisprudence would
see a pattern of evolution tending towards the abandonment of
even this qualified linkage between marital status and a right of
333. See 4 C. VERNIER, supra note 229, at 149 (discussing differences in parental
rights between mothers and fathers of illegitimate children).
334. Because of the punitive impact of this system of inducement on children, the
Supreme Court of the United States has found it unconstitutional. See Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973); see 1 C. VERNIER, supra note 229, at 149. Illegitimate children are
deemed legitimate as a matter of law in several states. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
8-601 "(1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1.2 (1981 & Supp. 1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.060
(1989).
335. Hafen, supra note 132.
336. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding minors have
a right of access to contraceptives); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(holding husband cannot be given a veto over wife's decision to terminate pregnancy); Ei-
senstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding access to contraceptives must be the same
for married and unmarried individuals).
337. See W. O'DONNELL & D. JONES, supra note 169, at 213 (arguing test for eligi-
bility to have children should be stability rather than marriage). Even a preference for
marriage as a measure of stability conceivably could be deemed impermissible. See Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (marriage is a strong example of a relation-
ship protected by freedom of association, but not the only one); supra note 304 and accom-
panying text. '
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procreation.
Even under the more traditional approach, the marriage con-
tract did no more than guarantee the recognition of a personal
relationship within which procreation could occur. Thus, the mar-
riage agreement was functionally equivalent to a legally sanc-
tioned means of obtaining the procreative resources necessary to
produce a baby."8 The marriage contract itself contains only the
implicit expectations that go along with the exchange of sexual
intercourse. In certain limited circumstances, the failure to meet
these expectations might be grounds for annulling a marriage.339
Immunity from legal liability for forceable intercourse was a kind
of implicit, albeit morally offensive, remedy of "self-help," where
the failure of procreative expectation grew out of the partner's
withholding of intercourse. 4 ° Even under the expanding effect al-
lowed nuptial and antenuptial agreements, more directly com-
modified expectations regarding procreative resources are not en-
forceable.3 41 Generally, the enforcement of expectations
concerning procreation under the marriage contract has been indi-
rect. Barriers to divorce and remarriage, and duties of postmarital
support, while they existed, served as inducements to make pro-
creative resources available to the present marriage partner.342
In the limited case of paternity, the contract of marriage was,
and to some extent still is, at times a condition to the legal recog-
nition of a right to a parent-child relationship. The natural fa-
ther's claim was subject to being legally terminated if the child
was assumed into another legitimate family unit either by adop-
tion by a stepfather3 43 or by the prior entry of the mother into a
marriage contract with another man.3 44 The absence of a mar-
338. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
339. For example, impotence is-a recognized ground for annulment. S. GREEN & J.
LONG, supra note 84, at 44-46.
340. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
341. H. CLARK, supra note 23, § 2.12.
342. See 4 C. VERNIER, supra note 229, at 149 (viewing rules on illegitimacy as an
attempt to discourage illicit intercourse).
343. In one view, the natural father's rights to relate to his child are contingent on
his willingness to marry the child's mother. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 664 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The traditional English common law rule, never fully adopted in
America, gave the "father an almost unlimited right to the custody, control and earnings"
of his natural children. 4 C. VERNIER, supra note 229, at 4.
344. E.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989) (not a constitutional
violation to prefer the legal husband over the natural father in assigning parental rights);
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.070(1) (1989) (creating a presumption that husband is the father of
children born to wife during marriage).
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riage contract with the child's mother continues to have some
residual power to prejudice a natural father's ability to establish a
parent-child relationship with his offspring. In general, however,
his right is now guaranteed against the most arbitrary forms of
invalidation. 3 5 The mother's right to assert a parent-child rela-
tionship with her offspring has never been contingent on the exis-
tence of the marriage contract, although her right to establish the
relationship has not always been upheld against a challenge by the
father.3 46
The marriage contract cannot be understood as a means for
acquiring a right to a parent-child relationship with a biologically
unrelated child. 47 At most, the marriage contract may give a
party an advantage in obtaining state recognition of step-parent
status under the liberalized step-parent adoption laws existing in
many states.3 48 Assignments of custody, visitation, or parental sta-
tus are not enforceable as such under a separation or divorce
agreement, 49 much less through any other kind of agreement. 350
345. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (state must demonstrate parental
unfitness to terminate custody); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (father's mari-
tal status insufficient to deny parent-child relationship). The Family Support Act premises
parent-child duties less on the parental marriage relationship, and more directly on biologi-
cal relationship. The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343
(1989).
346. In English common law, the father was the sole guardian. See W. WEYRAUCH
& S. KATZ, supra note 218, at 496; 4 C. VERNIER, supra note 229, at 4. This principle was
gradually replaced in American courts by the "tender years" doctrine, which gives primary
custody of small children to the mother. See, e.g., Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d
581, 122 P.2d 96 (1942) (all other matters being equal, the mother gains custody). Now,
three-fourths of the American states give equal recognition to both parents in granting
custody. W. O'DONNELL & D. JONES, supra note 169, at 160. Unwed mothers ordinarily
have the right of custody. See, e.g., Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974).
347. When a child is born within a relationship formalized by marriage, the state
presumes the paternity of the mother's husband. Thus, in an indirect sense, his marital
contract may be a basis for acquiring parental rights over a biologically unrelated child.
However, the state makes that decision for public policy reasons; the couple does not decide
the question. See notes 301-09 and accompanying text.
348. Along the same lines, English and Australian committee reports stipulate that
married couples or couples in long-term relationships should have priority in obtaining in-
fertility services. Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 678 (citing the WARNOCK REP.,
supra note 21, and the WALLER REP., supra note 21).
349. Such assignments are not enforceable even with respect to claims pertaining to
the children of the marriage. See Hess v. Hess, 115 Or. 595, 599, 239 P. 124, 125 (1925)
(A divorce decree does not affect "the rights of the child and the duties of the parents
toward the child. This proposition is so elementary that it hardly requires the citation of
authorities in its support."); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 comment a,
illustration 1 (1979) (separation agreements providing for custody of child enforceable only
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In sum, far from being a device that allows the acquisition of the
right to a parent-child relationship as though property, the mar-
riage contract places acquisition in a triad of status-based per-
sonal relations.
Establishing precedence in disputes over parental rights is
generally outside the scope of the marriage contract. Where two
or more adults contend for precedence in asserting a parental rela-
tionship, a litigant may seek visitation privileges, custody rights,
or exclusive parental rights through the termination of such rights
in another."" With the possible exception of the family compact
doctrine, none of these goals may be attained by advance provision
appended to the marital contract.352 Courts generally resolve such
questions at the time the child's custody is cast into doubt.35  At
most, the marital status of a party may be deemed indirectly rele-
vant to the child's best interest, and so may result in precedence in
a conflict over parental rights.3 54
if in child's best interest); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 958 (1979) (arguing that courts may and should
enforce parental custody agreements and only intervene if the best interests of the child are
not reflected in the agreement).
350. The court may treat the transfer of custody under a contract as final, if so doing
is in the child's best interest. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 comment a,
illustration 2 (1979) (stating that custody contracts are "unenforceable," except where out-
come happens to further the best interests of the child). The "parental rights doctrine"
creates a presumption in favor of returning custody to the natural parent if that will fur-
ther the child's best interests and the parent so desires. Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 245
S.E.2d 612 (1978). For a critique of the doctrine, see McGough & Shindell, Coming of
Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes,
27 EMORY L.J. 209 (1978).
351. See generally Hershkowitz, Due Process and the Termination of Parental
Rights, 19 FAM. L.Q. 245 (1985) (discussing limits to the state's ability to terminate paren-
tal rights).
352. The rule is nothing other than an application of the "best interests of the child"
doctrine. It ratifies the contract allocation of custody, where doing so reinforces what has
become the child's primary bond of stability. See Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank, 512 F.2d
187 (9th Cir. 1975) (adoption by natural father through agreement valid); In re Shirk's
Estate, 186 Kan. 311, 350 P.2d 1 (1960) (contract not illegal where parent allowed grand-
parent to adopt her child in exchange for a promise to leave her property); Clark v. Clark,
122 Md. 114, 89 A. 405 (1913) (mother held to have entered binding agreement with
child's grandfather); Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 30 A. 129 (1894) (grandfather held to
have binding contract with son's wife). The question, in the present context, is whether the
rule should be different where the conflict emerges while the child is still in the embryonic
or fetal stage. Some propose that property concepts be interposed in this context. See infra
note 835 and accompanying text.
353. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 23, § 20.4 (describing consent require-
ments for voluntary termination of parental rights through adoption).
354. See, e.g., Jenks v. Brown, 250 Ala. 534, 35 So. 2d 359 (1948) (recognizing that
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The existing law of adoption is premised on the proposition
that neither parental rights nor precedence in conflicts over paren-
tal rights may be obtained by contract. 55 Some states do permit
private adoptions, thereby allowing the assignment of parental
rights with court approval.35  However, such an assignment is not
properly considered contractual. The court may terminate the pa-
rental rights of the child's natural parents after a finding of volun-
tary waiver, unfitness, or abandonment. 57 The reallocation of pa-
rental status, in this context, is grounded in the or express waiver
of the natural parent together with the needs of the child. It is
undertaken by the state in its parens patriae power, on a case-by-
case basis. 58
Private adoption, sometimes called gray market adoption, in
effect permits an informal exchange between the natural mother
and the adoptive parents, consisting of payment of the mother's
expenses during pregnancy and child birth for the waiver of the
mother's parental rights.359 Neither side of the exchange is en-
forceable without court consent to the exchange.3 60 Enforcement
of gray market adoption agreements is not justified by reference
to party expectation but rather by most effectively advancing the
child's interests.
Black market adoptions yield the mother a profit in addition
to costs and expenses.3"1 Often much of this profit is captured by
an intermediary.8 2 Such arrangements are properly viewed as
the child's welfare is the primary consideration in custody disputes and considering the
marital status of each parent as one factor in the decision).
355. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody,
Adoptions, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1038 (1979).
356. See H. WITMER, E. HERZOG, E. WEINSTEIN & M. SULLIVAN, INDEPENDENT
ADOPTIONS (1963).
357. See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
358. H. CLARK, supra note 23, § 20.4.
359. Private adoption, like all forms of adoption, is not provided for under common
law. 4 C. VERNIER, supra note 229, at 10-12. Adoption has been used to obtain legally
enforceable status rights in lieu of contract. E.g., In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 106
Misc. 2d 792, 800, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (1981). However, adoption does not entail the
termination of parental rights by contract. Sge UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 7, 9 U.L.A. 39
(1971).
360. See Note, The Constitutional Rights of Natural Parents Under New York's
Adoption Statutes, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 617, 619 (1983-84) ("[O]nce the
natural parent executes the consent to adoption, the parental rights may be terminated
immediately and irrevocably.").
361. N. BAKER, BABY SELLING: THE SCANDAL OF BLACK MARKET ADOPTION
(1978); Note, Black-Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 48, 50 (1976).
362. Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 338.
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contractual and therefore are void as against public policy.36 3
They also subject the parties to criminal penalties in some juris-
dictions, under so-called "baby-selling" statutes. 64 Many jurisdic-
tions forbid even gray market adoptions, requiring that all adop-
tions of minors be conducted through agencies licensed by the
state. In these jurisdictions, the state takes an active parens pa-
triae role in identifying the best available placement for
adoptees3s 5
In sum, the marriage contract is traditionally the only legally
sanctioned and enforceable method of completing the complement
of resources necessary for procreation. As such, it does not permit
the commodification of procreative resources, but allows their
transfer only within an integrated relationship of fealty that has
the form of mutual personal support.366 Historically, a couple's
mutual decision to enter a relationship of fealty has been con-
strued as a contractual bond, for the sake of grounding state rec-
ognition of rights and duties arising from it in the free consent of
the parties and otherwise making the relationship amenable to
some degree of juridical control. In this vein, the marriage con-
tract was once a prerequisite for initiating procreation without in-
curring the disability of illegitimacy. It continues to be legally
preferred, but is no longer the only rightful basis for undertaking
human procreation. The marriage contract alone does not serve to
permit the acquisition of either a parent-child relationship or even
rights per se to precedence in obtaining parental rights. While
both the marriage contract and ordinary commercial contract fall
within the broad outlines of the generic definition of contract of-
fered at the outset, the relationship of the marriage contract to
human procreation stands in sharp opposition to any form of com-
modified procreative exchanges under commercial contract. The
marriage contract places procreation within an enduring personal
relationship. Commercial contract, by contrast, would make pro-
creation subject to the vagaries of autonomous bargain.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 355-60.
364. See Note, supra note 20, at 9.
365. But cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 823-28 (1976) (foster care placement not rigorously scrutinized by state).
366. According to Ronald Dworkin, associational relationships generate obligations
"through a series of charities and events," not one act of commitment. R. DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 197 (1986).
[Vol. 41:1
NATURAL ENDOWMENT CRITIQUE
3. The Place of Marriage in this Article's Taxonomy
In order to relate the existing law of the marriage contract
explicitly to the categories of the taxonomy developed in the arti-
cle's first section, it is necessary to identify the primary value un-
derlying the recognition of each relevant right. Despite the consid-
erable state regulation currently imposed on the marriage
contract, state conferral, at least formally, does not supply this
value. Even though the right to initiate procreation was once lim-
ited to marriages recognized by the state, the marriages in ques-
tion came into being by consent of the parties. Despite the con-
tractual form of marriage, neither is individual autonomy, as
expressed in ordinary contract, able to be considered the underly-
ing value. Partners to a marriage contract are limited to the
choice of whether or not to enter a status relationship, at least
with respect to the procreative aspect of marriage. In all three
contexts under consideration - initiation of procreation, estab-
lishment of the parent-child relationship, and priority in conflicts
over parental rights - the primary value embodied in the law of
the marriage contract is natural endowment. In each context, le-
gally recognized rights are based on genetic relationships which
come into being through the pooling of procreative resources
within relationships possessed of the full complement of necessary
resources, or in marital relationships which give rise to a presump-
tion that such pooling has occurred. Within the limits of this value
choice, the law of the marriage contract generally favors the sta-
bility of such family units over an unwavering deference to biol-
ogy. In this article's taxonomy, the traditional law of the marriage
contract falls within the natural endowment model, under the type
of the traditional family."'
Evolution of the law of the family over the past twenty-five
years complicates this picture. One trend has been the dissolution
of the law of the marriage contract into an individual privacy
right. This has left the law of human procreation under the model
of natural endowment, but moved it towards informal social coop-
eration. A second trend has begun to replace the law of the mar-
riage contract with ordinary contractual obligations tailored to the
individual preferences of the parties. To the extent that this latter
trend gains juridical acceptance, it will move the legal treatment
367. Supreme Court jurisprudence can still be understood as resting on respect for
natural endowment. See Hafen, supra note 132, at 491-92.
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of procreation from the model of natural endowment to that of
individual autonomy.368 Current marriage contract law suggests
three divergent paths of evolution: the law might seek to restore
the formal order provided by the traditional family, it might allow
further relaxation in the direction of informal social cooperation,
or it might move to a new formal order based on the model of
individual autonomy. If individual autonomy were allowed to
serve as the vector of new development in family law, it might
ultimately yield a deeper reliance on the value of state conferral.
Charting the adjustments which the law has already made or
which have already been proposed in an emerging response to the
new reproductive technologies will allow an exploration of these
evolutionary paths.
B. Existing Legal Adaptations to the New Reproductive
Technologies
As a legal ordering principle for sex and procreation, the law
of the marriage contract in recent decades has come to coexist, in
tension, with privacy rights beyond restriction by the marital con-
tract and autonomy rights enforced through ordinary contract. All
sides of this equation are evident in adaptations to the law in re-
sponse to the new reproductive technologies. The first and most
widely enacted adaptation relates to artificial insemination by do-
nor.3 69 Significant adaptations in the law relating to hired mater-
nity, or surrogate motherhood, have been undertaken recently.31 0
Both practices separate genetic parenthood from the marital rela-
tionship as well as the rearing function. Hired maternity also sev-
ers ties between genetic and gestational motherhood. Both prac-
tices entail a redistribution of procreative resources to which the
law must respond.37 1 In principle, such redistribution could be le-
368. "The experience with AID should be instructive for those interested in legal
regulation of the other new reproductive technologies." Healy, supra note 5, at 139-40.
369. See Annas & Elias, supra note 12, at 149.
370. The donation of gametes through AID has become a residual basis of parental
rights. The gestational role of the "surrogate" becomes such a basis. See supra notes 167-
74 and accompanying text.
371. AID was first performed by a physician without the knowledge or consent of his
anesthetized patients. Gena Corea argues that this practice constituted a form of procrea-
tive "rape". G. COREA, supra note 185; see also Robertson, Technology and Motherhood:
Legal and Ethical Issues in Human Egg Donation, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988-
89) (discussing egg donation, a less accepted, more difficult method of treating infertility
than AID); Note, The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial Insemination by Donors, 46
OHIO ST. L.J. 1055, 1057 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Need for Statutes] (asserting that the
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gally prohibited; if permitted, its pursuit might be grounded in
several values, including informal social cooperation, government
decree, or contract. The direction the law has actually taken with
respect to these options serves to further define the role of contract
in the current legal ordering of human procreation.
1. The Law of Artificial Insemination by Donor
The first recorded instance of artificial insemination by donor
in America took place in the 1880s.3 72 Estimates of AID births
vary due to the confidentiality of the procedure, although most
acknowledge that the number is generally acknowledged to be
growing.373 In the ordinary case, AID involves one or more ex-
changes that are implicitly contractual,37 4 but the law of contract
has not generally shaped the current legal status of AID. That
status is provided by domestic relations law. Litigation, for the
most part, has been between divorcing marriage partners, rather
than between the ultimate parties to the AID exchange: the sperm
donor and the conceiving woman. Most commonly, divorcing hus-
bands have argued that in submitting to AID the wife committed
adultery, 375 or that, as a product of AID, a child is illegitimate
widespread and growing use of AID has given rise to the need for regulation of the legal
problems facing AID-conceived children, donors, doctors and patients); Note, Artificial
Insemination" A Legislative Remedy, 3 W. ST. U.L. REV. 48, 50 (1975) [hereinafter Note,
Artificial Insemination] (discussing the need for comprehensive legislation to regulate the
performance and administration of AID).
372. Note, Need for Statutes, supra note 371, at 1056. See generally W. FINEGOLD,
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 5-7 (1964) (giving a brief history of the use of artificial insemi-
nation); Special Project, Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding Conception, Pregnancy, and
Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 673-78 (1986) (discussing the background and legal author-
ity behind AID).
373. See, e.g., Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial In-
semination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 585, 588 (1979); Vetri,
supra note 155, at 507 (noting that a 1984 estimate put the number of births resulting
from AID at 20,000).
374. See Beck, A Critical Look at the Legal, Ethical, and Technical Aspects of
Artificial Insemination, 27 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1 (1976) (discussing the contract-like
procedures involved prior to AID insemination that serve as the basis for asserting pater-
nity rights). See generally Comment, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1982 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 935, 950-52 (AID contracts implicate various constitutional interests, such as privacy,
as well as the best interests of the child).
375. This argument has met with mixed success. Compare People v. Sorensen, 68
Cal. 2d 280, 284, 437 P.2d 495, 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10 (1968) (rejecting contentions that
AID is adultery and resulting child is illegitimate) and MacLennan v. MacLennan, 1958
Sess. Cas. 105, 113 (Scot.) (AID is not adultery even without the husband's consent) with
Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 545.14981 (Super. Ct. Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954), ap-
peal denied, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956) (AID is adultery when the donor
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and not entitled to paternal support.376 Although courts at first
upheld these arguments under the traditional law of the marriage
contract, they eventually refused to do so, at least in more
progressive jurisdictions. 877 Now, substantial precedent holds that
the absence of sexual intimacy in AID legally removes the prac-
tice from the scope of adultery, and that a husband who consented
in advance to the procedure is estopped from denying paternity of
a child conceived by AID.37 '
The first legislation regarding AID in the United States was
enacted in Georgia in 1964.171 The National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws accelerated the trend when it
promulgated the Uniform Parentage Act in 1973.380 Thirty states
now have such legislation, seventeen having enacted the Uniform
Parentage Act.381 The Act provides that any child conceived by
is a third party regardless of consent); Orford v. Orford, 49 O.L.R. 15, 20 (1921) (AID is
a form of adultery and alimony can be denied on this basis).
376. See, e.g., People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 289, 437 P.2d 495, 501, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 7, 13 (1968) (father-child relationship established by taking on responsibility for
AID child); Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (1963)
(illegitimacy upheld but support ordered on the basis of implied contract to support).
377. See, e.g., People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 289, 437 P.2d 495, 501, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 7, 13 (1968); Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1948) (child held to be legitimate where husband gave his consent to the
procedure).
378. Judicial review of AID remains isolated and sporadic and has not contributed
greatly to the development of this branch of law. Healey, supra note 5, at 206.
379. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1982). This law has been criticized from the femi-
nist perspective as protecting male anonymity. It has also been argued that donor anonym-
ity ignores the real interests of the child. See Note, Artificial Insemination, supra note
371, at 59.
380. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287 (1973).
381. The following state statutes relate to artificial insemination: AI.A. CODE § 26-
17-21 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (Supp.
1989); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (Supp. 1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69f (1989); FLA. STAT. § 742.11 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 39-5405 (1985); ILL. STAT. ch.40, para. 1451-1453 (1989); MD.
EST & TRUSTS CODE § 1-206(b) (1974); MASS. GEN. L. ch.46, § 4B (1988); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 333.2824, 700.111 (1979); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (1982 as amended 1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1989); NEv. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1989); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:17-44 (West Supp. 1990); N.M. STATE ANN. § 40-11-6 (1989); N.Y. Dom. REL
LAW § 73 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1989); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
3111.37 (Baldwin 1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 552 (1981 & Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.243 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1987); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 12.03
(Vernon 1986, amended 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.26.050 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (1987-88); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986).
Calls for universal AID legislation are still heard. See Note, Artificial Insemination Donor
Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793 (1987-88); Note,
Need for Statutes, supra note 371, at 1076.
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AID shall be treated as the legitimate offspring of the mother's
husband, on condition that a licensed physician supervises the,in-
semination and the husband consents.382 To be considered valid,
the husband's consent must be signed by both husband and wife
and certified by the physician. 83 The Act provides that "[t] he do-
nor of semen . . . is treated in law as if he were not the natural
father of a child thereby conceived." 'a States with AID laws
other than the Uniform Parentage Act generally adopt the Act's
basic pattern.3 85 Where such legislation exists, AID is not treated
as adultery by the wife.388
When placed beside the law of the marriage contract, this
ordering exhibits a certain continuity. The legitimating function of
the woman's marriage agreement, for example, resembles the
traditional marital presumption of paternity. 81 On closer consid-
eration, an element of discontinuity also appears. If the marriage
agreement is understood as a contract, then the mutual consent of
husband and wife to AID, certified by the physician, has the form
of a bilateral modification changing one of the marriage contract's
essential terms.3 88 Under the Act, this modification requires sol-
emnization,.no less than does the marriage contract. The solem-
nizing agency is simply the medical establishment, rather than
civil authority or church.3 89 The discontinuity lies in the disen-
gagement of the procreative decision from the totality of common
life and relationship promised in the underlying marriage agree-
ment.3 90 In effect, the couple is permitted to dispose of the procre-
ative decision through a discrete bargain, exchanging the hus-
band's acknowledgement and support for paternal rights in the
child.
The element of discontinuity is heightened in states that do
382. UNIF. PARENTAGE Act, supra note 110.
383. Id.
384. Id. § 5(b).
385. "With respect to . ... artificial insemination with donor sperm (AID), the
search for legal answers during the past two decades has produced a substantial body of
law. Yet, . . . many gaps remain." Healey, supra note 5, at 139.
386. "Virtually all statutes acknowledge the legitimacy of a child conceived by AID
following the informed consent of the mother and her husband." Id. at 141.
387. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, supra note 110, § 4.
388. Cf. Kershner v. Kershner, 244 A.D. 34, 278 N.Y.S. 501 (1935) (husband's duty
to support his wife may not be contractually terminated), a fd, 269 N.Y. 655, 200 N.E. 43
(1936).
389. See supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
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not require the mother to be married as a precondition to the an-
nulment of the parental status of the sperm donor.391 In those ju-
risdictions, the natural father's rights are terminated, apparently
without consideration of whether the child will have an opportu-
nity to become a member of a traditional family unit.3 92 Laws
formerly permitting the mother of an illegitimate child to consent
unilaterally to its release for adoption are inapposite, since they
only denied the natural father rights in order to ensure the child's
membership in a complete family unit. 93 The termination of pa-
rental rights based on abandonment or waiver is not on point ei-
ther, since it depends on adjudication and occurs only subsequent
to the birth of the child.3 94
Case law and statutes alike generally focus on the mutual
consent of the mother and her husband as decisive in giving the
AID transaction its legal character.9 5 In the case of an unmarried
woman who conceives by AID, there is, however, no such mutual
consent within a marriage to distract attention from the more fun-
damental exchange occurring between the woman and the sperm
donor. The donor gives semen and a waiver of his parental rights
in the resulting child. The woman gives cash and immunity from
liability for child support. Such an arrangement more fully and
explicitly commodifies the procreative decision. 96
An exchange occurring outside the scope of an AID statute is
generally held unenforceable as an illegal attempt to assign cus-
tody by private agreement. 97 Neither the mother's reliance nor
her expectation interest justifies depriving a child of the paternal
relationship."a 8 The removal of sexual intimacy does not change
391. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 677.365 (1989); Vetri, supra note 155, at 512 (dis-
cussing the relationship between the mother's marital status and the requirement of
consent).
392. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(2) (Supp. 1990).
393. But see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that states must pro-
vide a natural father with a hearing and an opportunity to be heard before terminating his
parental rights). See supra notes 322-25 and accompanying text.
394. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 110.
395. See supra notes 375-86 and accompanying text.
396. Radin, supra note 28, at 1925-36.
397. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986)
(sperm donor who provides semen directly to mother rather than through physician is not
precluded from bringing a paternity action). But see In re R.C., Minor Child, 775 P.2d 27
(Colo. 1989) (the intent of the adult parties is dispositive, absent a signed release of paren-
tal rights, and the parties' agreement is admissible).
398. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986)
(known donor and unmarried recipient by all other conduct preserved donor's status as
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the general rule that rights and duties of parents cannot be altered
by ordinary contract. 399 By contrast, where there is compliance
with AID legislation, such as the Uniform Parentage Act, the in-
tentions of the parties are executed.400
In at least one respect, the woman and donor enter an ex-
change that clearly entails reciprocal future obligations. If it is
assumed that the agreement comes into existence when the donor
delivers his semen and thereby accepts the unilateral contract of-
fer of the physician or sperm bank, the recipient at that moment
assumes a binding obligation to perform by paying the proffered
cash and preserving the donor's anonymity.40 1 The donor may be
under an obligation of warranty.402 There can be no doubt that
AID occurs through a transaction in the form of a contract, or,
more precisely, through a series of two or three contracts. The
physician contracts to treat the woman for infertility, promising to
treat her with professional competence, while she promises to pay
for medical services, including the costs of the semen sample. The
physician, then, contracts with a sperm bank, which in turn con-
tracts with the sperm donor. Or, more likely, the physician con-
tracts directly with the sperm donor, promising money and confi-
dentiality in exchange for semen.40 3
The critical question for the present inquiry is whether the
parties' relinquishment of rights, particularly to parental status,
creates a contractual obligation per se. Under the Uniform Par-
entage Act, the pair is not agreeing to forbear from asserting
rights, as they might in the settlement of a legal claim;40 4 they
father of the child); C.M. v C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977) (known
donor's consent and active participation in the insemination procedure evidenced an intent
to assume the responsibilities of parenthood). See generally Shaman, Legal Aspects of Ar-
tificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331, 343 (1980-81) (discussing artificial insemination
donors as parents).
399. Shaman, supra note 398, at 344.
400. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 110. However several states have enacted
statutes which expressly provide that, pursuant to a consensual arrangement between the
woman and the donor, the donor may be recognized as the father with concomitant rights
and responsibilities. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 1990); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.26.050 (1989). New Mexico and Wisconsin also allow an AID contract to allocate
rights to the donor. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 278.
401. See generally EA. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, §5.4, at 341-47 (discussing
freedom of contract in marital and cohabitational relationships).
402. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 240.
403. See Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, supra note 373, at 586-87 (describing
routine steps involved in the artificial insemination process).
404. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1979) (in order to assert a
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separately consent to a present waiver of legal status making the
future assertion of right bootless. Their waivers are binding, be-
cause consent is given under formal circumstances prescribed by
the state.405 In fact, the Act attempts to blunt even the appear-
ance of an ordinary contractual exchange by requiring that the
transaction be channeled through a medical intermediary.406 This
procedure circumvents open conflict with the policy which would
render private AID contracts unenforceable.
Notwithstanding its external form, the Act is susceptible to
an interpretation that it validates contractual exchanges even on
the ultimate question of parental rights. In the ordinary case, the
conduct facilitated by the Act indisputably entails contractual ex-
change of semen for cash and anonymity. The Act facilitates these
exchanges by guaranteeing that party expectations regarding the
reciprocal waiver of rights related to parental status will be en-
forced.40 7 While the Act provides that the transaction must be me-
diated by a third-party, ostensibly to avoid the appearance of con-
tract, such mediation serves the goal of anonymity, which
presumably would be part of the parties' bargain in any case.40 8
The state's allocation of parental status depends on the parties'
consent. An argument can be made that enforcement of party
waiver under the Act is grounded in the contractual exchange of
consent, on the condition that it be formalized according to the
demands of the statute. The formalities of the statute may be in-
terpreted as a subterfuge to covertly relax a societal policy against
the contractual transfer of parental rights409 or as paralleling the
requirement of solemnization in the context of marriage.410 This
latter interpretation yields the paradox of a form of "solemniza-
tion" that does not publicize the relationships involved, but rather
further privatizes them under the discrete offices of the medical
establishment.
legal claim, performance or forbearance must have been bargained for and given in ex-
change of a promise).
405. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 110.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Hired maternity contracts often provide for such anonymity. See OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 275. Children born under such arrangements
may argue for the same rights to know the facts of their origin as adoptees. S. GREEN & J.
LONG, supra note 84, at 246.
409. For a discussion of how societies make choices to allocate resources, such as
children and parents, see G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
410. See supra notes 253-60 and accompanying text.
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If current AID legislation is assigned a category within the
taxonomy proposed earlier based on its superficial characteristics,
it belongs within the moderate state conferral model. Looking be-
yond the surface characteristics to the contractual reading just
propounded, however, it belongs in the moderate form of the indi-
vidual autonomy model, although this perspective would favor a
more expressly contractual approach. From the perspective of
strong form of the natural endowment model, AID statutes under-
mine the traditional family by legally sanctioning extra-marital
procreation. From the perspective of the moderate type of infor-
mal social cooperation, such laws might be viewed as improper
discrimination against unmarried women. This last view assumes
that no legally cognizable dispute can arise between the unmar-
ried natural parents, because the woman's choice to reproduce
without sexual intimacy eliminates the possibility of paternal
status.41'
2. The Current Legal Status of Hired Maternity
The decline in the number of babies eligible for adoption in
the mid-1970s led to the formation of arrangements whereby
women agreed to be artificially inseminated and to transfer cus-
tody of the child to the sperm donor and his" wife at birth.4 12
411. Some feminists have claimed a right of "self-insemination." Hanmer, Trans-
forming Consciousness: Women and the New Reproductive Technologies, in MAN-MADE
WOMEN. supra note 185, at 95; Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial
Insemination: A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 1, 18-
19 (1981). This argument was rejected by the court in Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal.
App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986).
412. See M. FIELD, supra note 20, at 5 (discussing the growing use of hired mater-
nity arrangements); NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 221, at 7 (hired
maternity has become an alternative to the declining number of babies available for adop-
tion). A typical contract provides for $10,000 plus expenses, $3,000 - 7,000 for brokers,
plus psychologist, and $5,000 for an attorney, with between $30,000 and $50,000 total cost.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 275-76.
An extensive literature on the subject has developed. See, e.g., Cohen, Surrogate
Mothers: Whose Baby Is It? 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 243 (1985) (discussing the increase in
hired maternity and associated legal implications while proposing that such contracts be
revocable prior to birth and that no payment other than expenses be exchanged); Coleman,
Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for Solutions, 50
TENN. L. REV. 71, 72 (1982) (discussing how the increase in hired maternity has created
constitutional, contractual, and parental legal problems and concluding that this practice
falls under the right of privacy); Eaton, supra note 21, at 689 (discussing procedures and
analyzing and comparing measures taken in United States to those in Great Britain, Aus-
tralia, and Canada); Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L.J. 1811
(1988) (suggesting a new outlook on parenthood and visitation rights for the gestational
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Couples who had been unable to achieve pregnancy because the
wife was infertile or otherwise unable or unwilling to become
pregnant comprised the participants. The practice has been called
"surrogate motherhood," "surrogation," or "motherhood for hire."
Here, it will be referred to as hired maternity.413 By 1989 approxi-
mately 1,000 children had been born through this practice and
hundreds more were expected. 414
Hired maternity received extensive publicity in litigation oc-
curring between 1986 and 1988 over the fate of the Whitehead/
mother in hired maternity cases); Krimmel, The Case Against the Commercialization of
Childbearing, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1988) (discussing the increase in hired
maternity and arguing that it exploits the mother and child and should be prohibited);
O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C.L. REV.
127, 142 (1986) (contrasting the sale of semen with the sale of infants to show that hired
maternity exploits the natural mother); Note, Surrogate Motherhood: The Outer Limits of
Protected Conduct, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1981) (discussing the increase in hired
maternity and the need for Michigan courts to reconcile the parents' right to privacy with
the state's right to control the conduct of its citizens); Note, supra note 219, at 1289 (pro-
posing a solution to the problems resulting from baby selling and adoption laws, paternity
and artificial insemination regulations, and opposition to hired maternity arrangements);
Note, supra note 8, at 1941-49 (discussing the failure of paternalism as a ground for decid-
ing whether the gestational mother's right to abort is inalienable); Note, Surrogate Moth-
erhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies Under Legislative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN LJ.
601 (1984) (showing the increase in hired maternity as reflected by new legislation ad-
dressing problems not adequately dealt with by existing statutes); Casenote, Development
in the Law: Surrogate Parenthood Contracts After Baby "M," 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
1053 (1988) (discussing hired maternity procedures and subsequent legal developments re-
sulting from these contracts).
Dr. Richard Levin of Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. claims to have "performed
what became the world's first publicly proclaimed case of contractual surrogate parenting"
in 1979. Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trans-
portation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce on H.R. 2433, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1987) (statement of Dr. Richard Levin, a
physician specializing in reproductive endocrinology and infertility) [hereinafter Hearing
on Surrogacy Arrangements Act].
413. The "surrogate" mother has also been termed "gestational hostess" or "uterine
hostess." Hollinger, supra note 6, at 873. The misleading character of the term "surro-
gacy" has been widely commented upon. See, e.g., Means, supra note 16, at 445 n.1 (more
accurately, "surrogate mother" means the adoptive, not the natural mother). The term
"surrogate mother" indicates that the "surrogate" is a substitute for the mother. In fact,
the one who gestates the child is universally considered to be its mother. See, e.g., WEB-
STER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1474 (1986) (defining mother as "a wo-
man who has given birth to a child .... "). For this reason the term "surrogate mother-
hood" is inappropriate.
414. "From 1,000 to 1,400 surrogacy arrangements have been made in the country
to date, with 800 to 1,000 babies born under them .... " Evans, Surrogate Mothers
Could Keep Babies, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1988, at B1, col. 3; NEw YORK STATE TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 221, at 25.
[Vol. 41:1
NATURAL ENDOWMENT CRITIQUE
Stern baby.41 5 Both the social acceptability and the legal status of
the practice fuel ongoing controversy.416 Initially, public opinion
failed to show a negative ethical assessment of hired maternity.417
Courts and legislatures, however, reacted strongly, making hired
maternity contracts one of the most controversial topics in family
law.418 Litigation has yielded a series of judicial holdings respect-
ing the status of hired maternity under existing law.4 9 Legislative
enactments in at least seven states have further shaped that sta-
tus. 420 Important governmental and agency reports consistently
acknowledge the troubling ethical character of hired maternity.
421
Contemporary legal developments in the status of hired maternity
establish, for now, the outer boundaries of the role of contract in
the legal ordering of human procreation.
a. The Case Law on Hired Maternity
Contracts for hired maternity have elicited judicial responses
within a variety of procedural settings. In Surrogate Parenting
Associates v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong,422 the first im-
portant hired maternity case, the Attorney General of Kentucky
challenged the legality of the business conducted by a commercial
"surrogacy" agency. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled against
the challenge, conditionally upholding the legality of the agency's
business. The court based its reasoning on an account of the status
of hired maternity contracts under the law then existing in
415. See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988); see also Annas, Baby
M: Babies (and Justice) for Sale, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1987, at 13.; Jackson,
supra note 412.
416. See Annas, The Baby Broker Boom, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1986, at 30,
31. (condemning 1986 court decisions enforcing hired maternity arrangements on the basis
that "commercial surrogacy promotes the exploitation of women and infertile couples, and
the dehumanization of infants"); Krimmel, supra note 157, at 35. (parenting should not be
separated from the decision to have a child). See generally Pollit, supra note 134 (criticiz-
ing pro-surrogacy attitudes and arguments).
417. Stark, A Womb of One's Own, 19 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 11 (1985).
418. Wadlington, United States: The Continuing Debate About Surrogate
Parenthood, 27 J. FAM. L. 321 (1988-89).
419. See infra notes 422-83 and accompanying text.
420. See infra notes 484-532 and accompanying text.
421. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 203; NEw
YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 221, at 97-106 (finding potential complicatiofis in
hired maternity arrangements); WALLER REP., supra note 21; (finding such arrangements
"completely unacceptable"); COMITt CONSULTATIF NATIONAL, supra note 21 (holding the
practice "unacceptable").
422. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
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Kentucky. 2
The Attorney General based his challenge on public policy
expressed in the Kentucky law against baby selling. The Court
understood this policy as one of ensuring valid maternal assent to
the waiver of parental rights. 24 Since the new practice did not
entail the sort of pressure associated with unwanted pregnancy or
the financial burdens of child rearing, the court held hired mater-
nity to be outside the policy's scope. It found a "fundamental dif-
ference" between contracts for hired maternity entered into prior
to conception and "baby-selling" contracts entered postnatally,
since the natural mother, in the hired maternity context, is not
pressed by such special burdens, and has the distinct purpose of
"assisting" a "desperate" couple in obtaining a baby. 25
The court rejected the Attorney General's reliance on the
Kentucky anti-baby-selling law as a static preference for "nature"
over the artifices of science and technology. 2e Instead, the court
cited an equivalent degree of "tampering with nature" in the
state's AID statute427 and refused to interpret an express exemp-
tion from the legislative prohibition against baby selling granted
to in vitro fertilization arrangements involving ova donation as
forestalling a judicially implied exemption for hired maternity.
The court reasoned that a restrictive reading ought to be given to
423. Id. at 211-12.
424. 704 S.W.2d at 212-13 (applying Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Baldwin
1985) (amended 1988)). The revised Kentucky statute prohibits contracts that "compen-
sate a woman for her artificial insemination." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Baldwin
Supp. 1989). For laws in other jurisdictions similar to the original Kentucky version, see
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-126 (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 1988); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-5-213 (Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 928 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 63.212
(1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-24 (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-1511, 18-1512, 18-
1512(A) (1987 & Supp. 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 para. 1526, 1701, 1702 (1989); IND.
CODE § 35-46-1-9 (1988 as amended 1990); IOWA CODE § 600.9(2) (1989); MD. FAN.
LAW CODE ANN. § 5-327 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 11A (1988); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 710.54 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.290 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54
(West Supp. 1990); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374 (McKinney 1983 as amended 1990); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1989); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.10 (Baldwin 1988); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.2 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-134 (1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-203 (Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.24 (West Supp. 1989). Some type
of restriction on the sale of embryos or fetuses, the intermediate case between AID and
hired maternity, exist in a number of jurisdictions. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-802
(1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-735(A)
(Supp 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-208 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-311 (1990).
425. 704 S.W.2d at 211-12.




the scope of existing law, when doing otherwise would impinge on
new possibilities generated by scientific or technological
development.""
The Kentucky court, however, approved the hired maternity
contract subject to two significant conditions. The first was to sub-
ject the contract to the provisions of Kentucky law relating to the
termination of maternal rights. 29 Under that law, consent to ter-
mination is voidable for five days after the birth of the child. The
court, therefore, held contracts for hired maternity to be unilater-
ally voidable by the natural mother for the same period. 30 In this
view, if the mother fails to disaffirm, the terms of the contract
determine the rights and duties of the parties to the contract, that
is, the biological mother and father. If she disaffirms, family law
principles governing custody disputes between unmarried biologi-
cal parents will apply.4 31 Second, the court held that even where
the natural mother does not exercise her right to disaffirm, so that
the terms of the contract retain their legal effect, the validation of
the contract does not extend to the conferral of substitute parental
rights upon the wife of the biological father. The Court implied
that such a contract term would violate the state's anti-baby-sell-
ing statute.32
In effect the Armstrong court held that, as individuals, a man
may contract with a woman for the use of her gestational capacity
and for the termination of her parental rights in the resulting
child. Implicitly, the court treated the AID exchange as a contrac-
tual equivalent covering the transfer of sperm and termination of
parental rights.4 33 The court justified extending common law con-
tract principles to cover these arrangements under an alleged pol-
icy favoring applications of science and technology but also recog-
nized a countervailing policy favoring a gestational mother's
postnatal freedom to affirm the parent-child relationship without
reference to prenatal history. The most striking novelties were the
428. Id. The state's position, however, is supported by the fact that, without compen-
sation, few such arrangements are entered. The true restriction on technological develop-
ment comes from the economy, not the law. N. KEANE & D. BREO, THE SURROGATE
MOTHER 311 (1981).
429. 704 S.W.2d at 212-13.
430. Id. The holding was followed in an opinion on the question by the Washington
Attorney General. 1989 Wash. AG LEXIS No. 4 (Feb. 17, 1989).
431. 704 S.W.2d at 212.
432. Id. at 212-13 (citing Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Baldwin Supp.
1988)).
433. Id. at 212 n.3.
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validation of an exchange of money for the use of a woman's ges-
tational capacity, the alienation of her parental rights, and the
brokerage of both aspects of the underlying exchange. The im-
plied justification for this innovation is the value of individual au-
tonomy, expressed through contract.
The court moderated its affirmation of this value, giving the
natural mother the power of avoidance through the term of the
pregnancy. This qualification is comparable to later developments
within contract doctrine stimulated by consumer protection con-
cerns.434 It serves to undercut the certainty of the biological fa-
ther's contractual expectations and, as a consequence, significantly
undermines the possibility of a market in hired maternity. This
compromise of the market, in practice, would result in confusion
between the market and informal, noncontractual social coopera-
tion characterizing the moderate type of the natural endowment
model.
Legal acknowledgement of the natural mother's right of
avoidance serves to bring the waiver of her parental rights within
a general framework of termination of parental rights established
by the state - the same framework the court acknowledges as
determining any conferral of parental rights on the wife of the
biological father. In the scheme designed by the court, the state
confers parental rights on the intended mother, presumably for
the child's best interests, and monitors the waiver of the biological
mother's rights as a matter of natural endowment.
The approach of the Kentucky Supreme Court on the narrow
question of the alienation of gestational capacity and associated
parental rights would seem to fall within the individual autonomy
model, but according to its moderate, consumer rights formula-
tion. Moderating values include both natural endowment and state
prerogative. The court, however, exaggerated any just claim of
continuity with the pre-existing law, unpersuasively arguing that
the scope of hired maternity is analogous to existing voidable cus-
tody contracts.43
In In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J.,436 New York's Nassau
County Surrogate's Court confronted an adoption petition filed by
a biological father and his spouse in connection with a hired ma-
ternity contract. The court approved the uncontested petition and
434. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 4.29.
435. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d at 213.
436. 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986).
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ordered the adoption, holding, as had the Kentucky court, that
hired maternity does not violate the state's anti-baby-selling stat-
ute.4 7 The court upheld contract provisions terminating maternal
rights, transferring custody to the biological father and his wife,
giving a $10,000 fee to the biological mother, and providing for an
attorney's fee.43 It did so based on a finding that scientific ad-
vances had outstripped the legislative intent of the anti-baby-sell-
ing statute.439 Unlike its Kentucky counterpart, the New York
court voiced "strong reservations about these arrangements both
on moral and ethical grounds . -440 It justified the enforce-
ment of the agreement, pending legislative enactment, strictly by
reference to the best interests of the child and to strictures forbid-
ding judicial legislation on matters beyond the scope of existing
statutory law.44'
The New York Surrogate's Court, like the Kentucky Su-
preme Court, qualified its approval of the contract by holding it
voidable. However, the New York court did not recognize any
power of avoidance by the biological mother. This may have been,
in part, because the biological mother in the case did not contest
the adoption.442 The court was concerned with its own avoidance
power, the exercise of which it envisioned in the course of judicial
review of any adoption petition filed by the biological father and
his wife. In this view, avoidance would hinge on the child's best
interest, and also on "any overreaching, unfair advantage, fraud,
undue influence, or excessive payments" in violation of the adop-
tion statutes. 43
The New York Surrogate's Court opinion is not really ame-
nable to taxonomic classification, because the Court provided no
more than an interim justification for its holding. Nonetheless,
practically speaking, its holding falls within the same general
437. Id. at 974, 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 815, 818. But see, In re Adoption of Paul, 146
Misc. 2d 379, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) (hired maternity contracts are void
because illegal).
438. Id. at 977-79, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817-18.
439. Id. at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817-18.
440. Id. at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
441. Id. at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818. The court forwarded copies of the decision to
the appropriate legislative committees, with a request for review and guidance.
442. Id. at 973, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
443. Id. at 977-78, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818; cf., In re R.K.S., 112 DAILY WASH. L. REP.
1117, 1120 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fain. Div. April 13, 1984) (the court required an extensive
pre-adoption investigation, focussing on the "surrogate mother service" agency and on the
legal sufficiency of the gestational mother's consent to the adoption).
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scope as Armstrong. It upholds the commercial exchange of
money for custody and the termination of parental rights on at
least a voidable basis. By noting that the enforcement of the con-
tract is contingent on the best interests of the affected child, the
New York court calls attention to a glaring omission in the analy-
sis of the Kentucky Supreme Court in Armstrong, and anticipates
some of the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby
M.
The most unqualified judicial validation of hired maternity to
date occurred in the trial court's holding in In re Baby M.444 In
that case the biological mother resisted the transfer of custody, as
well as termination of her parental rights. The biological father
initiated the case with an ex parte application seeking enforce-
ment of the hired maternity contract.445 Stressing that early com-
mon law subjected the power of the parent to the power of the
king, the trial judge, J.S.C. Sorkow, held the natural mother's pa-
rental rights subject to judicial termination on the ground that her
contractual promise to waive them was binding. 446 According to
the court, the biological father's promissory commitment to pay
entitled him to the enforcement of the biological mother's recipro-
cal promise to terminate her rights and transfer custody of the
child.447 For the sake of ensuring the biological father the benefit
of his bargain, her promise was held subject to specific enforce-
ment from the moment of conception.448 Prior to conception, the
biological father presumably had a right to money damages upon
breach, but no right to specifically enforce the act of
insemination.449
Notwithstanding its sweeping validation of contract princi-
ples, the trial court conceded that the enforceability of the hired
maternity contracts is qualified. First, the Court recognized that
the biological mother's constitutional right of abortion could not
be abridged by contract. 450 The court also acknowledged that spe-
cific enforcement of the contract, terminating the biological
mother's rights and transferring custody, was subject to a court
444. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in
part & rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
445. Id. at 326, 525 A.2d at 1134.
446. Id. at 325, 400-01, 525 A.2d at 1133, 1171-72.
447. Id. at 388-89, 525 A.2d at 1166.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 375, 525 A.2d at 1159.
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determination of the child's best interests. 51 In terms of this arti-
cle's taxonomy the latter qualification is the sole factor that distin-
guishes Judge Sorkow's holding from the strong, laissez faire, in-
dividual autonomy model. The court provided no clue as to how
such a determination of best interests could be made within the
general laissez faire contractual framework it created. The only
imaginable means by which Judge Sorkow's framework could op-
erate would be to posit a strong presumption that specific per-
formance is in the child's best interest. In sum, Judge Sorkow's
opinion leans heavily towards individual autonomy and relies on
basic contract principles.
In Doe v. Kelley, 52 a Michigan couple wished to contract
with a woman for the purpose of impregnating her with the hus-
band's semen. The three brought joint suit for a declaratory judg-
ment that the Michigan law prohibiting "baby-selling" was un-
constitutional, as applied to their proposed arrangement.453 They
argued that the anti-baby-selling law constituted unwarranted
governmental interference with the constitutionally recognized
right of privacy in matters of reproductive choice. 4 The Michi-
gan Court of Appeals noted that the law in question did not pro-
hibit the extramarital conception the parties had in mind, but only
from pursuing it on a contractual basis.455 The court held that the
fundamental interests protected by the Constitution under the
right of privacy do not extend to the contractual pursuit of a
change in a child's legal status.456 While conceding that constitu-
tional protection may extend to informal social reallocations of
procreative resources outside the traditional family, the court held
that no constitutionally protected right exists to enter either com-
mercial or legally binding exchanges for the purpose of obtaining
procreative resources.
In a second Michigan case, Syrkowski v. Appleyard,457 the
biological father of a child born pursuant to a hired maternity
contract sued the child's biological mother for a filiation order
451. Id.
452. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183
(1983).
453. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.54 (1979).
454. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. at 172-73, 307 N.W.2d at 440.
455. Id. at 174, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
456. Id.
457. 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983), rev'd, 420 Mich. 367, 362
N.W.2d 211 (1985).
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under the state's paternity act.4"' The biological mother admitted
the allegations of the complaint and joined in the father's request
for relief.4 59 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals held
that there was an absence of subject matter jurisdiction, on the
ground that the legislative intent of the Act did not extend to le-
gally validating paternity in the context of hired maternity."60 The
court of appeals distinguished the Act's intent to provide support
for children fortuitously born out of wedlock from the "monetary
transaction" it had before it.461
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded, based
on a finding that the purpose of the Paternity Act was to provide
support for children born out-of-wedlock from biological fa-
thers.462 Since children conceived extramaritally to a woman with-
out the consent of her husband are, within the meaning of the
Act, born out-of-wedlock, the court held that the plaintiff had
stated cause for relief under the statute, observing that "[a]ny
other conclusion requires an impossibly restrictive and unneces-
sary interpretation of the statutory language. '46 3 The court lim-
ited itself to a technical interpretation of the statute's scope and
refrained from taking a position on other remedies to which the
plaintiff might be entitled.464
Kelley and Syrkowski are carefully circumscribed, technical
opinions that do not attempt to elaborate a general framework.
However, against the backdrop of the law interpreted, each oper-
ates within a framework fitting within the natural endowment
model. Kelley rejects the individual autonomy model by upholding
the right of the state to prohibit the commercial exchange of
money for the custody of a child.46 5 By recognizing noncommer-
cial exchanges of procreative resources as falling within the possi-
ble scope of constitutional protection, it tends toward the moder-
ate, informal social cooperation type of natural endowment. In
Syrkowski the Michigan Supreme Court found that the natural
endowment aspect of biological paternity is distinguishable on the
458. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2824 (1979).
459. Syrkowski, 122 Mich App. at 506, 507, 333 N.W.2d at 90, 91.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 506, 509-10, 333 N.W.2d at 90, 93-94.
462. Syrkowski, 420 Mich. at 375, 362 N.W.2d at 214.
463. Id. at 375, 362 N.W.2d at 214.
464. Id. at 374-75, 362 N.W.2d at 213.




basis of natural endowment from other features of hired maternity
context and granted biological paternity recognition under the
state's paternity act.466 The court's resolution of the issue accords
with the natural endowment model in its moderate, informal so-
cial cooperation type.
The weightiest holding on these issues was offered by the
New Jersey Supreme Court, when it reversed the Baby M decision
of Judge Sorkow.4 67 In its opinion in the case, the court held the
hired maternity contract in question to be void as contrary to New
Jersey's laws on baby selling and termination of parental rights.4 18
The court found the essence of the contract to be the transfer of
the custody of the child and the termination of its natural
mother's parental rights .46  Any appearance to the contrary was
held to be subterfuge.4 70 Together with the Michigan opinions just
discussed, the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion tipped the
balance of authority against even the conditional approval'of com-
mercial hired maternity contracts found in Armstrong and Baby
Girl L.J.
Departing from the interpretation in Armstrong, the Baby M
court held that the New Jersey anti-baby-selling statute not only
guaranteed the validity of the natural mother's termination of her
rights but assured that custody would conform to the child's best
interest.4 7 1 The New Jersey court found that hired maternity con-
tracts violate both purposes. The Kentucky court's reading of the
law allowed it to affirm the exchange of money for custody and
termination of parental rights on condition that the contract was
voidable by the gestational mother. The New Jersey court's read-
ing of the policy behind the statute did not permit this resolution.
It held hired maternity contracts void, and not merely voidable,
466. 420 Mich. 367, 375, 362 N.W.2d 211, 214 (1985).
467. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). The holding was followed
by the Oregon Attorney General. 1989 Ore. AG LEXIS 26 (April 19, 1989). In general,
the scholarly response to the opinion has been favorable. "A majority of I I law professors
across the country surveyed by the [New Jersey Law Journal] believe that the state su-,
preme court's decision in the Baby M case follows sound legal tenets." Baby M Decision
Wins Solid Marks, N.J.L.J., Feb. 18, 1988, at 1, col. 4. But see Posner, supra note 7, at 29
(terming opinion "nothing short of an intellectual disaster").
468. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 442-44, 537 A.2d 1227, 1250-51 (1988). This
decision is supported by the weight of governmental opinion world-wide. See supra note
421. But see Katz, supra note 20, at 24 ("fears that justify the baby-broker legislatibn do
not justify the prohibition of money changing hands in a surrogate transaction").
469. 109 N.J. at 422, 537 A.2d at 1240.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 425, 537 A.2d at 1242.
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based on the finding that the anti-baby-selling law prohibits the
commercial exchange of money for custody as contrary to the
principle that a child's custody should be determined on the basis
of the child's best interest. 72 It also held the contract void be-
cause the New Jersey law regarding the termination of parental
rights excluded any purely private disposition of the matter.4 73
In addition to the cited statutes, the court made reference to
five other public policies justifying its holding. These included a
policy against even natural parents privately assigning the custody
of their children; a policy against enforcing a contract that sepa-
rates a child from its natural parent; a policy against elevating the
rights of the natural father over those of the natural mother; a
policy against enforcing an arrangement in which truly informed
consent could not have existed; and a policy against transfering
child custody without regard to the best interests of the child.47 4
The court distinguished adoption from hired maternity by
reference to the profit motive driving the hired maternity transac-
tion "7 5 It expressed concern that the dynamics of the transaction
necessarily will draw in commercial middlemen, and consequently
that market forces will subject the supply of children to fluctua-
tions determined by monetary incentives.4 76 The court concluded
that enforcing short-term market allocations of procreative re-
sources would jeopardize the long-term well-being of all the par-
ties, since profound personal consequences might not become ap-
parent for years, even to the parties themselves.
Against the backdrop of existing New Jersey statutes and
policies, the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion in Baby M falls
within the ambit of the natural endowment model. It acknowl-
edges that the legislature could opt to change New Jersey law to
follow the individual autonomy model. In dictum, the court im-
plies, however, that constitutional rights flowing from natural en-
dowment would moderate, at least to some degree, any legislative
election of individual autonomy.478
Several general conclusions emerge from a synthesis of these
judicial decisions. In interpreting hired maternity in relation to ex-
472. Id. at 441-44, 537 A.2d at 1250.
473. Id. at 444, 537 A.2d at 1251.
474. Id. at 434-38, 537 A.2d at 1246-48.
475. Id. at 438-39, 537 A.2d at 1248-49.
476. Id. at 439, 537 A.2d at 1249.
477. Id. at 438-41, 537 A.2d at 1248-50.
478. Id. at 441-42, 537 A.2d at 1250.
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isting statutory law, the courts generally find that the practice im-
plicates adoption laws regulating the transfer of custody in a child
and the termination of parental rights. A minority interpretation
sees this existing law as applying only obliquely to hired maternity
arrangements. This interpretation does not hold such arrange-
ments barred but merely voidable under the relevant laws. In one
variant, the enforcement of the contract is conditional on the post-
natal consent of the biological mother. In another, it is conditional
on a postnatal judicial finding that the transfer of custody accords
with the best interests of the child. No case appears to extend the
scope of contract beyond termination of the biological mother's
parental rights or the transfer of custody to the biological father,
to substitute conferral of parental rights on the biological father's
wife. The most significant innovation, under this minority inter-
pretation that hired maternity contracts are at least conditionally
enforceable, is the validation of the exchange of monetary consid-
eration for parental rights. This innovation extends to the valida-
tion of monetary compensation for secondary brokering and chan-
nelling functions.
The second and weightier interpretive line of cases holds that
existing adoption laws prohibit the legal enforcement of hired ma-
ternity transactions. The scope of this latter interpretation does
not include hired maternity on a nonbinding and noncommercial
basis. It tends to grant the natural ties of the two biological par-
ents precedence, not only over contract but over presumptions of
paternity arising from the biological mother's marriage.
In the aggregate, the foregoing judicial decisions on hired
maternity trigger questions regarding potential development in the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States on sex,
marriage, and the family. The decisions have been cautious about
developing constitutional doctrine, but several have framed the
constitutional issues. The minority line of opinions takes the Su-
preme Court's privacy jurisprudence as a basis for extending the
right of privacy in reproductive decisions to the protection of
third-party reallocation of reproductive resources. 47 9 The scope of
479. See M. FIELD, supra note 20, at 46-74 (concluding that given the uncertain
social climate surrounding hired maternity, constitutional approach to the issue will provide
little benefit); S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 84, at 251-52 (discussing cases asserting a
right to privacy in regard to hired maternity contracts); Robertson, supra note 8, at 957-67
(arguing that procreative liberty protects the freedom to contract for collaborative repro-
ductive transactions with gestational mothers); Stark, Constitutional Analysis of the Baby
M Decision, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 19 (1988) (arguing that hired maternity contracts are
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such protected reallocation might be held to extend only to infor-
mal exchanges or to commercial exchanges, if these were deemed
a necessary means to a protected end. If such commercial ex-
changes are not protected as an aspect of privacy, an argument
can be made that they are constitutionally mandated by the equal
protection clause wherever a legislature approves AID arrange-
ments involving pay to sperm vendors.4 80 This latter argument
turns on whether the fact of maternal gestation is viewed as a
valid distinction supporting separate legal classification.
By contrast the better-reasoned, majority line of cases shows
that a separate constitutional argument is available to support the
conclusion that the termination of parental consent in hired ma-
ternity cannot be final as a matter of contract, but only as a mat-
ter of formal waiver registered by the state. This second argument
rests on Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing the right of
natural parents to rear, educate, and have the companionship of
their children.481' To succeed, the enforcement of a contract termi-
nating parental rights would have to be viewed as state action, as
in Shelley v. Kraemer.4 82 Extending recognition to either repro-
constitutional); Note, supra note 21 (asserting that the right of privacy protects a married
couple's decision to have children through hired maternity). See generally Attanasio, The
Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty
and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274 (1986) (exploring the constitu-
tional and public policy concerns regarding regulation of "positive genetic engineering").
480. S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 84, at 253.
481. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (parents'
interest in preserving the parent-child relationship is "an extremely important one"); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (states do not have the authority to require
instruction in public school only); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (parents
have a right and natural duty to educate their children); see also McCarthy, supra note
300 (identifying complications that arise when parents are in conflict with the state over
children); Stark, supra note 479 (discussing the trial court's opinion in Baby M).
On waiver of constitutional rights, see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970) (waiver must be a voluntary and informed act reflecting the circumstances and
likely consequences); Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519,
572-75 (1988) (flat prohibition on the waiver of personal rights is improperly paternalistic).
Regarding waiver of parental rights, see Note, supra note 326 (discussing out-of-court
waivers of parental rights in adoptions). A more fundamental constitutional attack views
hired maternity arrangements as a violation of the thirteenth amendment. See Means,
supra note 16, at 478 (arguing that the agreement entails the sale of a child and, where
specifically enforced, the rental of a woman).
482. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). This decision represents the culmination of a series of suc-
cessful attacks on the public-private distinction. See Horwitz, The History of the Public!
Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1982) (discussing the evolution of
attacks on the public-private distinction culminating in Shelley); see also In re Baby M,




ductive rights of privacy or to parental rights of rearing and com-
panionship in this context would be tempered by a respect for a
competiig state interest in the welfare of the children conceived,
as well as by some compelling state interest in the institutions of
marriage and family life more generally. 83
b. Existing Statutory Enactments on Hired Maternity
Judicial opinions on hired maternity uniformly demonstrate
the need for a legislative response in the area; neither common
law principles nor existing legislative frameworks adequately
guide adjudication of hired maternity disputes.484 By 1989 at least
seven states had enacted relevant legislation.485 Their approaches
range from a fairly unrestricted validation to a complete ban on
binding hired maternity agreements. A closer examination of
these enactments clarifies contract's role in the most current law
governing human procreation.
The Arkansas hired maternity law represents the high-water'
mark in legal recognition of hired maternity contracts. 48 Arkan-
sas provides that
a child born by means of artificial insemination to . . . a
surrogate mother . . . shall be that of: (1) the biological
father and the woman intended to be the mother if the
biological father is married; or (2) the biological father
only if unmarried; or (3) the woman intended to be the
mother . . . when an anonymous donor's sperm was uti-
lized for artificial insemination.87
This statute broadly allows contractual intent to decide the right
483. Even if autonomy is given full recognition, at some point its recognition must be
balanced against a countervailing concern for community. See Minow, We, the Family:
Constitutional Rights and American Families, 74 J. AM. HIsT. 959 (1987) (discussing lim-
its in the use of "family" rhetoric to resolve disputes).
484. See Andrews, The Aftermath of Baby M: Proposed State Laws on Surrogate
Motherhood, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct./Nov. 1987, at 31 (discussing state legislative
reaction to hired maternity arrangements); Dunne & Serio, Surrogate Parenting After
Baby M: The Ball Moves to the Legislature's Court, 4 ToURo L. REv. 161 (1988) (argu-
ing that legislative regulation of hired maternity would provide an otherwise unavailable
benefit to infertile couples); Note, supra note 219, at 1284 n.5 (calling for a comprehensive
statute governing hired maternity arrangements); Comment, Womb For Rent: A Call for
Pennsylvania Legislation Legalizing and Regulating Surrogate Parenting Agreements, 90
DICK. L. REV. 227, 246 (1985) (urging enactment of comprehensive legislation focusing on
the best interests of the child).
485. See infra notes 486-530.
486. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (Supp. 1989).
487. Id. § 9-10-201(c)(1).
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to the parent-child relationship and to validate the acquisition by
contract of procreative resources. It also permits binding contrac-
tual reallocations of the procreative resources of ova and gesta-
tional capacity; confirms the allocation of maternal status chosen
by the parties; and by implication allows the direct exchange of
money for the termination of parental rights and custody of a
child. In these respects, the Arkansas law extends the force of
contract beyond that of any, adjudicated hired maternity case.
Even the most liberal jurisdictions have not extended the scope of
contract to termination of the biological mother's maternal rights.
Arkansas's statute allows the affirmative contractual conferral of
parental rights on a genetically unrelated "intended" mother. The
statute also goes beyond the typical AID framework in its valida-
tion of the contractual ordering of human procreation since AID
statutes generally avoid openly suggesting that 15arental status is
conferred by contract, even as they implicitly rely on contractual
exchanges.
The statute's validation of contract is not unqualified. For ex-
ample, it limits the operation of its conferral of legal maternity on
the intended mother under the first clause to settings in which the
natural father is married, 8 reflecting an acknowledgement by the
statute of continuing force of the marriage contract. Further, the
statute integrates its validation of contractual intention with state
AID provisions which are founded implicitly on state conferral.
Since the statute validates the contractual assignment of legal
maternity to an intended mother only where she is named at a
time prior to conception, the statute does not validate making the
baby disposable for further trade at birth.489 The statute provides
at least this much protection against commodifying babies. The
underlying premise of state conferral suggests the state's right to
continue enforcing parens patriae policy restrictions on the partic-
ular provisions of the hired maternity contract.
The statute is largely redundant with respect to the conferral
of legal paternity on the biological father. Existing law recognizes
the paternity of the biological father according to the traditional
norm of biological fatherhood plus action to establish a de facto
488. Id. Whether technology is liberating or not is an appropriate question. Shu-
lamith Firestone apparently saw test-tube reproduction as a way to liberate women. S.
FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX (1970).
489. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(1) (Supp. 1989).
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parent-child relationship.4 90 Thus, the effect of the law is merely
to validate exchanges permitted to assemble the adjunct procrea-
tive resources necessary to attain biological fatherhood. The stat-
ute is silent as to the status of "intended" fathers under hired ma-
ternity arrangements who are not also biological fathers.491 If
intended fathers are entitled to legal paternity in Arkansas, it may
be rationalized by analogy to the grant of legal maternity to the
intended mother under the contract. It more likely would be justi-
fied by separate analogy to the existing legal presumption of pa-
ternity governing a man's relation to his wife's natural children;
his parental status then would depend on contract to no greater
extent than would that of the biological father." 2
While it expressly employs contract in determining maternal
rights, the Arkansas law acknowledges a continuing, though
subordinate, importance of natural endowment by requiring regis-
tration of the birth to the natural mother. The law provides for
issuance of a court order before a birth certificate may be substi-
tuted to reflect the legal maternity of the intended mother.9 '
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the Arkansas law gives
unparalleled scope to contract in the legal ordering of human re-
production. While only the operation of the statute formally ef-
fects the contractual assignment of parental rights, the underlying
contract ordinarily is enforceable with respect to all particular
rights and duties involved in pregnancy management and transfer
of child custody. Even the conferral of parental rights, which for-
mally takes places through operation of statute, occurs automati-
cally and without state certification of the parents as fit or as in
the child's best interest. By validating a contract assigning paren-
tal rights and custody, the law undermines any clear basis for
making cognizable public policy objections to particular details of
the transaction.
In addition to its implicit endorsement of the exchange of pa-
rental rights for money, the statute's most notable innovation is
the finality it imposes on the mother's obligation to yield custody
and other rights in advance of any de facto abandonment of the
child. The termination of the sperm donor's rights under Arkan-
sas' AID provision may be interpreted as a present waiver ex-
490. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S, 645, 657-58 (1972).
491. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201.
492. Id. § 9-10-201(a).
493. Id. § 9-10-201(c)(2).
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pressed in conduct appearing as per se abandonment. By contrast,
under the hired maternity contract, legally binding waiver occurs
months before the actual relationship of nurturance concludes.
Thus, contract is allowed to preempt a claim having a double ba-
sis in natural endowment, both genetic relationship and gesta-
tional nurturance. Depending on the interpretation, the Arkansas
statute can be seen as an instance of either the state conferral or
individual autonomy model. Within the latter model, its practical
application, like the trial level holding in Baby M, tends toward
the strong, laissez faire type.
An alternative legislative response is to make hired maternity
contracts enforceable but subject to avoidance by the natural
mother. This approach was in effect under Kentucky law on an
interim basis after Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Com-
monwealth ex rel. Armstrong4 94 but before legislative revision
rendered hired maternity contracts void and unenforceable.4 95 In
this approach, the contractual exchange of money for parental
rights is sanctioned, as it is in Arkansas, but the parties must as-
sume the risk that the natural mother will change her mind.
Under such a scheme, parties undoubtedly would structure agree-
ments to minimize reliance. For example, they might postpone
payment until transfer of custody. They would also attempt to
supply the natural mother with every legal and extralegal induce-
ment not to exercise her right of rescission. Maternity brokers pre-
sumably would develop human management techniques to reduce
this risk. 6 Even so, the parties would incur some irreducible risk,
since, for the term of the pregnancy, the ultimate allocation of
custody and parental rights would remain uncertain. If the natural
mother avoids the contract, the parties face an unpleasant custody
battle. As in the Baby M case, the intended parents and the natu-
ral mother may be left in a lifelong relationship rather than the
sharply limited, finite business transaction originally sought.497
The "enforceable, but voidable" option would impede the op-
eration of contract, making it contingent on the natural mother's
choice not to rescind. Both her right of rescission and the rules
494. 704 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Ky. 1986).
495. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(3) (Baldwin 1989).
496. Compare N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 428 (suggesting a facilitating pro-
cedure in which the surrogate mother and adopting parents are provided the information to
make independent decisions).
497. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 463-68, 537 A.2d 1227, 1261-64 (1988).
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governing rights and duties in the event of its exercise are
grounded in the value of natural endowment. However, the parties
could probably control the risk of rescission sufficiently to ensure a
market and subordinate the importance of natural endowment in
the typical case. Therefore, the approach belongs taxonomically
within the individual autonomy model. Market forces would re-
main sufficiently dampened to place the approach within the mod-
erate consumer rights, rather than laissez faire form.
As has been seen, cases such as Doe v. Kelley498 and Syrkow-
ski v. Appleyard49 9 interpret existing state laws on private adop-
tion and AID as defeating contractual intentions in hired mater-
nity arrangements. A third legislative approach, facilitating the
hired maternity contract on a more tentative basis than either Ar-
kansas or Kentucky during the interim after Armstrong, is to re-
move hired maternity formally from the scope of existing laws.
This is the approach taken in Nevada5 00 where the hired mater-
nity law merely provides that the effect of the state's AID statute,
denying paternity to sperm donors, does not extend to the alloca-
tion of parental rights to the biological father in hired mater-
nity.501 The provision prevents the AID statute from disrupting
hired maternity contracts, and simultaneously establishes that
hired maternity contracts are not necessarily against the public
policy of Nevada.
The Nevada law qualifies its validation of hired maternity by
specifying that only "lawful" hired maternity agreements are to
be exempt from the effect of the AID provision.50 2 This qualifica-
tion allows Nevada courts to exercise their judgment over the pre-
cise scope of the state's public policy regarding the enforcement of
hired maternity contracts. Some limitations on enforcement could
be based either on the requirements of valid assent by the natural
mother or the best interests of the child. Without more, agree-
ments that provide for the exchange of money for the conception,
gestation, and transfer of children no longer seem to violate the
public policy of the state.
The justification of some AID statutes as integrated into fam-
498. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183
(1983) (statute precludes payment of consideration in conjunction with use of the state's
adoption procedures).
499. 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985).
500. Nav. REv. STAT. § 127.287 (1989).
501. Id. § 127.287(5).
502. Id. § 127.287(5) (1987).
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ily law is the traditional marital presumption that a woman's hus-
band is the father of her natural children. Some states have re-
moved their AID statutes from this traditional framework by
providing for the termination of the natural father's paternal
rights automatically even where the mother is unmarried. The
Nevada law on hired maternity introduces a second element of
discontinuity with the traditional law of the marital contract. It
provides that the presumption of a husband's paternity of his
wife's child does not apply where she plans, in advance, to give
away the child. 0 3 Taxonomically, Nevada's approach falls within
the individual autonomy model. The uncertainty that the statute
leaves respecting the scope of contract enforcement is a reflection
both of its provisional and unstable character and its placement in
the model's moderate form.
Remaining legislative approaches have invalidated contract in
the sphere of hired maternity. While these uniformly exclude the
contractual aspects of hired maternity, that is, the exchange of
money for a child or for termination of parental rights, none pro-
hibit the informal, uncompensated reallocation of procreative re-
sources. Differences among nonvalidating responses to hired ma-
ternity contracts revolve around the choice of modes for
channeling informal, reallocative exchanges. The simplest ap-
proach has been adopted in Louisiana and Nebraska. These states
declare hired maternity contracts void and unenforceable 0 4 Un-
like the interim approach in Kentucky, whiich gave social approval
to hired maternity arrangements by declaring them enforceable
even if voidable, the approach in Louisiana and Nebraska with-
draws social sanction by declaring the subject matter of the con-
tract void as against public policy505
The law discourages hired maternity arrangements by com-
municating a negative societal assessment and by exposing both
sides of the transaction to the heightened risk of uncompensated
reliance. Under Kentucky's interim approach, only the intending
couple assumed a risk. Whereas here, both sides assume the risk
that, after performing, they will face nonperformance without le-
503. Id. §§ 127.287(1), .287(5); see also S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 84, at
247 (arguing that it is inconsistent to permit the wife-mother to contract away her rights,
but let her husband keep his rights).
504. LA. CIV. CODE § 9:2713(A) (West 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1988).
505. LA. CIV. CODE § 9:2713(A) (West 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1988)




Some kinds of void transactions may be arranged without
much abatement, at prices discounted to reflect the probability of
nonperformance, since reliance costs can be minimized during the
period prior to notice of performance or nonperformance by the
other party. In a hired maternity transaction, unprotected reliance
cannot be avoided by either side, whether in the form of the emo-
tional investment in a child on both sides, or the burdens and risks
of a pregnancy on the side of the mother. Therefore, a substantial
curtailment of hired maternity arrangements can be expected in
Nebraska and Louisiana. Still, some exchanges of money for the
reallocation of procreative resources and parental rights will con-
tinue to be arranged. Where the arrangement goes forward, the
parties are likely to create every inducement for voluntary per-
formance. In addition, they may resort to extralegal means of co-
ercion.5 °0 The status of the transaction as legally void and unen-
forceable places the parties in a gray zone where such means are
more readily used and more effective.
Where hired maternity transactions are attempted, but per-
formance on one side is withheld, party expectations are disap-
pointed and significant uncompensated reliance costs accrue. The
nonperforming party may be unjustly enriched, and yet, restitutio-
nary relief would ordinarily not be available. °7 Fraud may even
have induced the uncompensated performance. The familial status
of the participants in relation to any resulting child are ill-defined
and must be determined according to traditional rules. On an ad
hoc basis, Nebraska limits this last problem by specifying that the
intended father has parental rights by reason of his biological re-
lationship with the child, the voidness of the arrangement notwith-
standing. 08 The costs of the Louisiana-Nebraska approach in-
clude party uncertainty; residual, uncompensated emotional
reliance; unpoliced fraud; and the consummation of some number
506. For example, Alejandra Munoz was induced to come to the United States ille-
gally and enter a hired maternity arrangement through the misrepresentations of the in-
tending couple. She was involuntarily confined to their home for the duration of her preg-
nancy. Hearing on Surrogacy Arrangements Act, supra note 412, at 37 (statement of
Alejandra Munoz). The majority of hired maternity arrangements proceed without judicial
involvement. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 268.
507. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 5.9. Uncertainty regarding outcomes, to-
gether with the potential for loss of reliance serves as a deterrent to the arrangement.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 268 ("The absence of governmen-
tal guidelines becomes an active barrier to the successful conclusion of the arrangement.").
508. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21.200(1) (1988).
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of exchanges contravening an express public policy. These costs
are incurred not just by the parties, but by society. In selecting
this approach, Nebraska and Louisiana concluded that they had a
reasonable basis for finding these costs lower than the societal
costs attending an outright prohibition or, for that matter, result-
ing from the enforcement of hired maternity contracts?0 9 Taxo-
nomically, their approach falls within the natural endowment
model. It merely discourages without prohibiting informal ex-
changes, even on a monetary basis. Therefore, it falls within the
model's moderate, informal social cooperation type, although the
statutes seem to signal that this is a second-best alternative to the
strong form of the traditional family model.
The incidental societal costs associated with the Nebraska-
Louisiana approach have led other states seeking to reject hired
maternity contract to choose between two remaining alternatives.
Both forbid monetary compensation for the acquisition of parental
rights and back the prohibition with sanctions. To this extent, they
are stricter than Louisiana and Nebraska. One alternative seeks to
affirm and bureaucratize the informal, altruistic social cooperation
that can be expected to fill some of the gap left by the prohibition
of contract. The other simply emphasizes the criminal nature of
formal, compensated maternity for hire agreements and holds it-
self remote from any private uncompensated or altruistic "donated
maternity" arrangements that may ensue. Florida has adopted the
first of these approaches. 10 Michigan and Kentucky have adopted
the second.511
Beyond prohibiting commercial hired maternity exchanges,
Florida's legislative response sanctions and channels informal,
donative exchanges. The Florida approach essentially absorbs its
treatment of hired maternity into the existing framework of pri-
vate adoption, terming the hired maternity arrangement "preplan-
ned adoption."5 2 It validates private cooperation aimed at the re-
509. The primary cost involved is the violation of the principle of respect for persons
that underlies the rule of law generally. As such, it would be a principled ground for refus-
ing the legal enforcement of such arrangements, without regard for further consequences.
At the same time, outright prohibition or criminalization might generate unacceptable indi-
rect costs to the general welfare.
510. FLA. STAT. § 63.212(l)(d) (1989).
511. Mich. Comp. LAWS § 710.69 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.590,
199.590(2) (Baldwin 1988).
512. FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(i) (1989). This solution also has been proposed by com-
mentators. E.g., Cohen, supra note 412, .at 247-48.
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allocation of procreative resources and provides a framework
within which reciprocal expectations can be structured.513 At the
same time, the private arrangement permitted under this statute
cannot be considered a contract. The law provides that any at-
tempt to make a binding contract for hired maternity is void.514
Consideration for the transfer of parental rights is prohibited. 5 5
The gestational mother's fees and expenses may be paid, but they
are not refundable and in no way may be conditioned on the
transfer of parental rights or the birth of a healthy baby. 516 Each
side has a statutory right to terminate the agreement at will.511
The statute excludes commercial involvement by third-party find-
ers or brokers.51 8
The transfer of parental rights, the expected consummation
of the agreement, depends on nonavoidance by both sides and
court approval. A primary concern of the statute is to allocate
rights and duties among the parties, in the event that the arrange-
ment is not consummated. If the intended parents terminate their
involvement in the arrangement, the statute specifies that the
mother is responsible for the child and is its legal mother.519 Re-
gardless of whether the biological mother rescinds, the biological
father has the duty to support the child financially. 2 ° If the bio-
logical mother does rescind within seven days of the child's birth,
the intended couple is deprived of any right to an ongoing rela-
tionship with the child. 521
Essentially, the Florida statute validates noncommercial ar-
rangements for obtaining a reallocation of procreative resources,
but treats the transfer of rights from natural mother to intended
mother as the arrangement's salient feature. The biological fa-
ther's parental right of relationship with the child is strictly con-
tingent on the postnatal waiver by the biological mother of what
is, presumptively, an exclusive right to relate to the child. In this
respect, the father's position is analogous to that of a sperm donor
513. This solution seeks to avoid the costs of the approach taken by Louisiana and
Nebraska. See supra text accompanying note 509. It also affirms altruistic arrangements as
a positive societal good.
514. FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(i)(1989).
515. Id. § 63.212(2)(f.
516. Id. § 63.212(2)(g), 3(a).
517. Id. § 63.212(2)(i).
518. Id. § 63.212(5).
519. Id. § 63.212(2)(c).
520. Id. § 63.212(2)(d).
521. Id. § 63.212(2)(e).
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under the state AID statute. Under the statute, he is in the same
position as the intended mother, since the statute does not treat
his relationship with the child through natural endowment as a
basis of parental rights. Unlike the sperm donor in AID, the bio-
logical father in this setting, nonetheless, is liable for support dur-
ing the child's minority without regard to whether parental rights
are actually conferred upon him.
The Florida law falls within the natural endowment model.
The law restricts reallocations of procreative resources to a non-
commercial context, making the relationship of the biological
mother to the child, as a matter of natural endowment, the deci-
sive basis of legal ordering. To cope with conflict between the
partners in the exchange, it gives strict priority to the biological
mother's rights. The state's primary concern appears to be estab-
lishing clear and definite boundaries between family units and
guaranteeing the security and status of the children conceived. Al-
though this statute makes a concession to alternative forms of
family, on balance it nonetheless must be viewed as part of the
strong type of the model.
An alternative means of legally invalidating the contractual
dimension of hired maternity is found in Michigan and Kentucky.
In both states, hired maternity contracts are void, and penalties
are assessed against parties who attempt to exchange monetary
consideration for parental rights. 522 Donative, noncommercial
reallocations of procreative resources are not prohibited. Unlike
Florida, however, neither state formally validates donative reallo-
cations by supplying a mechanism for channeling them or for allo-
cating parental rights and duties within relationships that flow
from them. Where the Florida statute gives a measure of social
approval to donative arrangements, the Michigan and Kentucky
laws communicate neutrality towards donative arrangements
while emphasizing strong societal disapproval of monetary
exchanges. 23
The Michigan law is the more developed of the two statutes.
Its stated objective is the eradication of twin social evils. One is
manipulation of women suffering from special disability or inca-
pacity for obtaining the use of gestational capacity.524 The other is
522. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(3) (Baldwin 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
722.855, 722.859 (1979).
523. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(3); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.851.
524. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.857(l). This statute was sustained in the face of a
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the exchange of money for gestational capacity and parental
rights. 25 The Michigan law imposes substantial criminal penalties
for attempting either. 26 Penalties under the law are calibrated to
punish simple involvement in a commercial reallocation of procre-
ative resources less severely than commercial involvement as bro-
ker or facilitator, or participation in an exploitation of unemanci-
pated minors and retarded, mentally ill and developmentally
disabled women. 27
Where parties attempt to complete a commercial exchange of
procreative resources in violation of the statute, the law, and not
the contract, establishes parental rights and status. Under the
statute, the "best interests" of the child determine assignment of
rights and status . 28 The gestational mother is given the proce-
dural advantage of being allowed to "retain physical custody of
the child" pending an adjudication to the contrary.5 29 Legal ma-
ternity belongs to the gestational mother, regardless of whether
she is the source of the ovum. Thus the intended mother's status is
like that of a sperm donor.53 0 The provision promotes the tradi-
tional family by guaranteeing clear boundaries of separation be-
tween family units.
The Michigan law has been clarified judicially as not pertain-
ing to donative or noncommercial exchanges of procreative re-
sources. a5 3  Clearly the resolute societal judgment the law com-
municates against commercial hired maternity will not create a
climate in which even donative exchanges are likely to flourish.
Michigan's, law restricts hired maternity as far as it can, short of
prohibiting it outright, an alternative difficult to enforce and vul-
nerable to constitutional attack.5 2 Taxonomically, the Michigan
court challenge. See Holusha, Michigan Surrogacy Law Upheld, Chicago Daily Bull.,
Sept. 20, 1988, at 3, col. 5.
525. MICH. ComP. LAWS § 722.859(1), 3(a).
526. Id. §§ 722.857(2), .859(2), .859(3) (brokers subject to felony conviction with a
sentence of up to five years in prison and $50,000 in fines).
527. Id. §'722.859(2)-(3).
528. Id. § 722.861.
529. Id. § 700.111.
530. Id. § 700.861.
531. See Holusha, supra note 524. As such, even this strict law does not amount to
more than what Margaret Radin refers to as "market-inalienability." Alienation has not
been prohibited; a form of mercantile exchange has been deemed "commodified." Radin,
supra note 28, at 1853-55.
532. The New Jersey Supreme Court has been criticized for taking a similar tack
and implying that surrogate arrangements are more than unenforceable, and in fact crimi-
nal under the baby-selling laws. Burt, Court Stumbles by Raising Specter of Criminality
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hired maternity act belongs within the model of natural endow-
ment in its strong form, favoring the traditional family.
In order to capture the significance of these legislative devel-
opments when viewed together, it will be helpful to ascertain how
they may alter or advance trends in the existing judicial treatment
of hired maternity. At the end of the spectrum most favorable to
contract obligation, the Arkansas law extends the trend seen in
the trial court's holding in Baby M. The statute goes further than
that opinion by making the conferral of rights on the intended
mother, and not just termination of the biological mother's paren-
tal rights, flow from contractual intention, thereby removing a ju-
dicial check still recognized in the opinion. On its face, the statute
may appear to give contract less untrammelled scope, since it
makes the allocation of parental rights technically dependent on
state conferral. Still, the restrictions that are recognized by the
statute in practice would impose little 'estraint on the effective
range of contractual exchanges that may be entered into and le-
gally enforced in the area. The statute, more so than even the
opinion, almost certainly commercializes human procreation. The
contract principle, if it takes hold, can be expected to gradually
transform the framework of law onto which it has been grafted.
Other jurisdictions generally do not look to Arkansas to set
trends in family law, and there is reason to characterize the state's
law as hastily enacted. Consequently, there is no reason to expect
the Arkansas option to exercise particular influence. The other
legislative option favoring contract in the area of hired maternity
is the "enforceable but voidable" option found in judicial decisions
in Kentucky and New York. This approach facilitates the com-
mercial reallocation of procreative resources, and the reallocation
of parental rights, as between the biological parents. It incorpo-
rates a double check on any resultant commercialization of human
reproduction, by cancelling the contractual allocation of parental
rights upon postnatal avoidance by the biological mother and by
requiring adjudication of any claim by the biological father's wife
to assume a substituted parental role under law. Each check is
based in natural endowment. Whether, in practice, the courts
could find ways to enforce these checks, over and against the mo-
- Barren Couples to Resort to "Back Alleys," N.J.L.J., Feb. 18, 1988, at 27, col. 1. In
assessing the wisdom of criminalizing hired maternity contracts, the costs associated with




mentum of commercial allocations, is an open question. The ap-
proach would enable at least a moderate commercialization of
procreation.
If a jurisdiction validates hired maternity, contracts on either
basis, it must cope with the problem of integrating its validation
into a framework of law recognizing parental rights in other con-
texts. One approach would be to preserve the traditional marital
presumption of paternity by simply making married women ineli-
gible for serving as a "producer" under a hired maternity arrange-
ment. This strategy plainly compromises the value of individual
autonomy. A less ambitious strategy exempts the intended rearing
father, or "sperm donor," from the operation of the state AID
law, as Nevada does. This further undermines the regime of the
formal marriage contract. In either case, provision for legitimating
hired maternity contracts is bound to lead to fragmentation and
disintegration in the state's existing law governing conjugal and
procreative relations.
The majority of jurisdictions enacting substantive legislation
on hired maternity have followed the trend of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in Baby M. These jurisdictions make contract obli-
gation void and unenforceable, both with regard to allocation of
procreative resources and assignment of parental rights. A review
of these enactments indicates that where contract is excluded in
this fashion, further questions remain. The legislature must decide
how, if at all, to channel exchanges that proceed despite the ab-
sence of legal enforceability. An initial question is whether to pro-
hibit the commercial exchange of procreative resources and paren-
tal rights. Such prohibition may be adopted to prevent substantial,
uncompensated reliance costs and protect against extralegal forms
of coercion and the harmful symbolism of transactions that offend
basic societal notions of human dignity.
A second question is how parental rights are to be harmoni-
ously allocated when parties proceed with commercial hired ma-
ternity transactions, notwithstanding their unenforceability and, in
some jurisdictions, criminalization. One possible legislative solu-
tion is to assign rights based on the parties' biological contribution
to the conception, without regard to the existence of a contract.
This biological basis for resolving disputes may accompany a pref-
erence for maternity, with a corresponding termination of the bio-
logical father's parental rights, as in the AID regime. It also
might accompany an assignment of paternal rights, based on the
marital status of the mother. The addition of such rules would
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assign rights according to concern for the formal integrity of af-
fected family units.
C. The Role of Contract within the Leading Proposal for
Reform of the Law of Procreation
In 1988 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws promulgated the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act.533 Previous promulgations by the Con-
ference of Commissioners affecting the family, such as the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Acts34 and Uniform Parentage Act,53 5
have been widely adopted, and the present effort can be expected
to receive careful consideration. The Act attempts to supply a uni-
fied framework, allowing consistent attribution of parental rights
regaidless of reproductive technology or arrangement. The last
step in the present analysis of contract's role under the contempo-
rary law of procreation is an examination of the place of contract
within this uniform legislative proposal. It is the final necessary
condition for a definitive statement of the question before
lawmakers as they address the role of contract in ordering
procreation.
The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
purports to clarify the status of children born through technologi-
cally assisted conception. 5 "8 However, a closer reading of the stat-
ute discloses that the Act does not include the status of children
whose conception has been artificially assisted, but that of chil-
dren whose conception has resulted from the reallocation of pro-
creative resources. The Act distinguishes the regulation of activity
associated with reproductive technology and excludes it from its
coverage. 537 The status of children conceived with technological
assistance within a marital relationship, such as through homolo-
gous artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization, do not fall
within the scope of the Act.538 At the same time, the definition of
533. UNIF. STATUS ACT, supra note 6; For alternative proposals, see Model Surro-
gacy Act, supra note 5; NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 221, at A-1 - A-5.
The former proposal was considered and rejected by the ABA House of Delegates in Feb-
ruary 1989. The House of Delegates voted instead to endorse the Uniform Status Act.
Wrestling with Surrogate Motherhood, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1989, at A3, col. 3-6.
534. 9A U.L.A. 147 (1973).
535. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 110, at 287.
536. UNIF. STATUS ACT, supra note 6, § 1 prefatory notes and comments.
537. Id. § 1 comment.
538. Id. § l(i)(ii), § 1 comment.
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technological assistance includes simple, manual techniques such
as self-administered artificial insemination by donor. 3 The Act
encompasses only conceptions which rely on third-party contribu-
tions of procreative resources and occur by means other than
coitus.
Although it builds on the statutory scheme already devised
for AID, the Act goes beyond the typical AID framework in sev-
eral ways. First, it includes both ovum and sperm donation.54
Second, it eliminates the requirement of supervision by a physi-
cian.5 41 Third, it applies to unmarried as well as married
women. 54 2 Fourth, it more clearly validates the idea that the rela-
tionship of the parties will be vendor and buyer.5' 3 Finally, the act
deems the seller of the gamete a nonparent. 4 This last effect un-
derscores the Act's radical reformation of the AID framework,
which treats the parties "as if" they were parent and not parent
respectively. Under the statute, to acquire gametes is to acquire
parental rights.545 This approach creates certainty regarding legal
parenthood. The Act empowers individual autonomy and contract,
but only as incidents to state conferral, and, in doing so, resolves
the remaining ambiguity under AID law and the Arkansas hired
maternity provision.
Under the Act, the transfer of gametes for monetary consid-
eration necessarily becomes a subject of contract in the ordinary
sense of a commercial bargain. The vendor may sue the recipient
for payment if it is not voluntarily tendered. The fee for ova would
be expected to be higher than for sperm, given the greater invest-
ment of time and the invasiveness of the donation procedure. 546
Fees for both sperm and eggs would vary with the marketability
of the genotype and health of the vendor. It remains to be deter-
mined whether liability for warranty under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code would apply.547
539. Id. § l(l)(i)-(ii).
540. Id. § 1(2).
541. Id. § I comment.
542. Id. § 3.
543. Id. § 9(a).
544. "A donor is not the parent of a child conceived through assisted conception."
Id. § 4(a).
545. "A child whose status as a child is declared or negated by this [Act] is the child
only of his or her parents as determined under this [Act]." Id. § 10.
546. See C. GROBSrEIN, supra note 2, at 21-23 (explaining the practical difficulties
of ova retrieval).
547. U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -315 (1989).
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The sole restriction the Act imposes on the contractual trans-
fer of procreative resources concerns gestational capacity. 548 The
Act does not provide for a transfer of parental rights pursuant to
contracts for gestational capacity, except under controlled condi-
tions. Enforceable exchanges involving such transfers are allowed
only under the Act's proposed Alternative A. This alternative re-
stricts enforcement to contracts supervised, both in formation and
performance, by the state.5 49 This provision is evidence that the
wide range given to contract under the Act is actually subordinate
to state conferral.
Alternative A, the real centerpiece of the Act as originally
drafted, conditionally validates the contractual reallocation of ges-
tational capacity. 550 As long as stated conditions are satisfied, ges-
tational capacity can be exchanged for money, and the cancella-
tion or transfer of maternal rights occurs by operation of law.
Broadly, these conditions include court approval of the contract at
formation and the lapse of a period for reconsideration by the ges-
tational mother early in the pregnancy. In order to obtain ap-
proval by the court, the intending couple must be married to each
other and meet the jurisdiction's standards of fitness for adoptive
parents;551 they must present a medically verifiable ground for not
having their own pregnancy;5 52 the gestational mother and her
548. UNIF. STATUS ACT, supra note 6, §§ 5-9 ("Alternative A" at 93-100, "Alterna-
tive B" at 100).
549. Id. § 5(b).
550. Bird, On Baby M, Uniform Law Commission Splits, N.J.L.J., Sept. 8, 1988, at
5, col. 1. Alternative B was added "over the objections of the 11-member committee that
drafted the measure." The spokesman for the Uniform Law Commissioners said that "in
his 15 years with the group, he has never seen an issue stir so much commotion among the
commissioners as surrogate-parent contracts." Id.
551. UNIF. STATUS ACT, supra note 6, § 6(b)(4), § 1(3). Under both alternatives,
parties may reallocate gestational capacity in violation of the Act. Such extrastatutory
transfers entail the same social costs resulting from uncertainty as those enumerated in
connection with the Nebraska and Louisiana statutes. Several legal consequences also fol-
low from attempts to contract with the gestational mother without state supervision. The
natural mother has no legally-enforceable right to her fee. The intending parents cannot
count on the natural mother's waiver of her maternal rights. As long as the intending
couple deal with an unmarried woman or a married woman whose husband has not con-
sented to the arrangement, they enjoy legal recognition of the intending father's natural
paternity. Id. § 5; UNIF. PARENTAGE AT, supra note 110, § 6. If the natural mother yields
custody, the intending couple acquires this also, notwithstanding the extrastatutory nature
of the arrangement. On the other hand, the intending parents apparently may formalize
their rearing rights within a step-parent adoption proceeding under other relevant state
law.
552. UNIF. STATUS ACT, supra note 6, § 6(b)(2).
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husband, if any, must give written consent;553 the gestational
mother must already have experienced a delivery, and her health
may not be unreasonably threatened by the pregnancy; 54 before
approving the proposed contract, the court must find that both the
intending couple and the gestational mother and her husband, if
any, would be fit parents;555 and, it also must determine that the
arrangement is not detrimental to the interests of any party.5 56
Various rules also are included to guarantee each party full infor-
mation and adequate representation.5 The child in prospect must
be represented by a guardian ad litem 5 s
In the scheme envisioned under Alternative A, the freedom of
contract is not conferred equally on all potential parties; the gov-
ernment decides what restrictions will apply and to whom. The
Act gives an individual woman the greatest power in contract: she
can sell her ova; 559 she can buy ova and sperm and acquire exclu-
sive parental rights to the resulting child;560 and she can sell her
gestational capacity, with a limited right of avoidance.561 If an
individual woman marries, her husband is subject to paternal du-
ties, since his consent to paternal duty is presumed, based on the
fact of the marriage .562 The. married man has the next greatest
power to engage in contractual transactions regarding the full
complement of procreative resources. He can sell his sperm, and
he can buy sperm and ova. 63 If his wife agrees to be implanted,
he acquires parental rights by virtue of the marriage, and risks
only her abortion decision.5 64 He also may "rent" the gestational
capacity of an unmarried woman, assuring himself at least shared
parental rights in her child. 65 The woman incapable of gestation,
whether single or married, has the least contractual power. She
553. Id. § 5(a).
554. Id. § 6(b)(6).
555. Id. § 6(b)(4).
556. Id. § 6(b)(10).
557. Id. § 6(b)(5), (b)(7), (b)(8), (c).
558. Id. § 6(a).
559. Id. 1 (2).
560. Id. 9 1(1), § 2.
561. Id. § 7(b).
562. The burden is on the husband to sue and prove no consent within two years of
learning of the child's birth. Id. § 3.
563. Id. § 1.
564. Id. §9 1-3; see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1975); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
565. UNIF. STATUS AcT, supra note 6, §§ 5, 8(b); UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, supra
note 110, § 6.
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cannot acquire reliable control over gestation through either mar-
riage or contract. She can sell her ova and acquire ova and sperm,
but the promised use of another woman's gestational capacity by
her is not strictly enforceable. 66 The differential power that the
Act extends to parties wishing to commercially engage procreative
resources flows from the special treatment the Act accords the ge-
stational bond. If artificial wombs became available,567 the- differ-
ential power to contract would be equalized.
Respect for natural endowment might appear to explain the
limitations on contract under Alternative A. The gestational bond
is singled out and recognized as overriding claims to parental
rights based in contract. Within the framework created by Alter-
native A, the biological mother may terminate the arrangement
within 180 days of the last insemination6 8 and, if she is married,
thereby acquire exclusive rights to rear the child in question. 56 9
The preference acceded to the gestational mother prevails over a
claim registered by the intended mother, even where the intended
mother is. also the donor of the egg and thus the child's genetic
mother.57 0 The comment to this provision justifies the disappoint-
ment of the intended parents' expectation by reference to the risk
of unfulfilled expectation generally pervading the procreative en-
terprise. The gestational mother's change of heart, in this view, is
no different than any other cause resulting in a failure to bring a
child to term.5 1
The avoidance right of the gestational mother, however,
should be understood as grounded in 'individual autonomy in a
form other than bargain, rather than in natural endowment. Al-
ternative A does not treat the bond of nurturance between the
mother and fetus as worthy of any intrinsic respect. In fact, the
law treats the reassignment of parental rights as irrevocable 180
days after conception even as the gestational bond of nurturance
between the mother and fetus is becoming increasingly intense
and socially apparent. From that point, irrevocable contract obli-
gation is placed in direct collision with any emotional and nurtur-
ing sense of obligation felt by the mother. The justification for the
566. UNIF. STATUS AcT, supra note 6, §§ 1, 2, 7(b).
567. C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 46-48.
568. UNIF. STATUS AcT, supra note 6, § 7(b).
569. Id. § 8(a)(2).
570. Id. § 2.
571. Id. prefatory note, § 7 comment.
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180 day voidability provision lies, then, for the drafters, not in the
meaning of natural endowment, but rather in an analogy to the
woman's abortion right.572 If the woman has the right to assert
her autonomy by terminating the pregnancy through the end of
the second trimester, they reason that her autonomy should also
be permitted expression through cancellation of the agreement
within the same amount of time.
The drafters' concern for individual autonomy moderates a
more fundamental reliance on state conferral as a basis for as-
signing rights and duties. The drafters justify their substitution of
state conferral for the law's current preference for natural endow-
ment on two levels. The immediate justification is the predictabil-
ity provided by a scheme based in state conferral, which the draft-
ers claim best serves the interests of children conceived through
the reallocation of procreative resources. They assume that reallo-
cations will occur and, unless a clear allocation of parental status
is dictated by the state, the interests of the resulting children will
be prejudiced.573 In fact, the concern of the drafters appears to be
at least as much with the stable ordering of property transfers,
through gift and inheritance based on relationship, as it is with
the best interests of the children "of assisted conception."5' 4
The more far-reaching justification provided by the drafters
is reminiscent of that adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Surrogate Parenting Associates v. Commonwealth ex rel. Arm-
strong.57 5 The drafters assume that the law's role, in an area such
as the new reproductive technologies, is to facilitate technological
"progress." '57 Remarkably, the drafting committee expressed this
choice in quasi-religious categories in the draft prefatory note
presented to the Conference for approval. The prefatory note
named as the law's goal the facilitation of the "miracle" of science
to solve the problems of fertility "that literally be-devil[] our soci-
ety. ' 57 7 The use of this language signals a fundamental, if poorly
reasoned, value choice on the part of the Conference.
572. See Wikler, supra note 185, at 1046.
573. UNIF. STATUS AcT, supra note 6, prefatory note and comments.
574. Id. § 11.
575. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
576. UNIF. STATus AcT, supra note 6, prefatory note.
577. First Draft of Prefatory Note and Comments, National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (July 29-Aug. 5, 1988).
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D. The Role of Contract in Ordering Procreation: The State
of the Legal Question
The regime of legal ordering centered on the marriage con-
tract has always been accompanied by alternative rules for order-
ing the parent-child relationship where birth occurs out of wed-
lock. Ordinary contract rules, however, have been prohibited from
operating either within the zone of the marital contract or within
the ambit of natural parent-child relationships. The purpose of the
barrier has been to avoid the "commodification" of children or
human sexual expression. An existing legal trend is the retreat of
the marriage contract regime before both status based in natural
endowment and individual autonomy expressed through informal
social cooperation. This trend represents movement along the
older axis of tension operative in the law. Legal developments in
the new reproductive technologies can be understood as largely
falling along this same axis of historic tension.
The general response to the new reproductive technologies
under existing law allows procreative reallocation to occur. But, it
restricts the transfer of parental rights to cases involving present
waiver or the present assumption of a nurturing and rearing role
that becomes available through genetics, marital relationship, or a
child's present need. Under this approach, the transfer of the rear-
ing role may leave room for some residual continuing exercise of
parental rights in the genetic or gestational transferor. The ap-
proach also concedes an ongoing role to the marital contract in
ordering basic family relationships, if only by operation of contin-
uing presumptions of paternity in at least some settings.
However, the law of artificial insemination by donor may
form a notable exception.57 8 If the fees involved cover the donors'
costs, and if the severance of patern al rights flows from present
waiver or abandonment, rather than sale or governmental cancel-
lation, then the legal framework corresponds to the moderate nat-
ural endowment approach. If, on the other hand, fees are seen as
a monetary exchange, the donor is seen as a vendor, and paternal
rights are viewed as transferred by implied-in-fact contract, then
the AID statutes represent a new approach, grounded in individ-
ual autonomy. Moreover, the ambiguity of artificial insemination
578. Despite the rapid evolution of legislation and case law, there remain many un-
answered questions. See Healey, supra note 5, at 141-42 (noting the extent to which AID
laws have not touched on traditional family law areas yet).
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legislation is open to another interpretation. The allocation of pa-
rental rights in the scheme may be seen as a matter of state con-
ferral. AID law can be interpreted as leading towards a substitu-
tion of state conferral for natural endowment as the grounds for
parental rights. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Con-
ception Act is based on just such an interpretation.
Even more than artificial insemination by donor, hired mater-
nity represents a decisive moment of choice confronting the law's
response to human reproduction. The weight of relevant case law
and statutory responses excludes the enforcement of contracts
and, to some degree, the exchange of money for maternal rights.
On the other hand, the prohibition of extramarital, third-party
procreation generally has not been proposed. The law's emerging
response places hired maternity within the traditional tension ex-
isting within the scope of natural endowment as a ground of pa-
rental rights. Some case law and statutory responses chart a dif-
ferent direction. Not only does this alternative response allow the
enforcement of monetary exchanges for the parental rights of ge-
netic donors, it foresees the state's application of force to sever the
mother-child bond in de facto existence at birth. The basis pro-
posed for the change is an unstable combination of individual au-
tonomy and state conferral, with eventual dominance by this latter
value.
The need for consistent principles to guide the recognition of
parental rights has been recognized by many, based on one or an-
other vision of social stability. At one end of the spectrum, propos-
als have been made to clarify and apply received principles
grounded in natural endowment. At the other end, at least one
proposal, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act, especially in the form including Alternative A, proposes a
sweeping reorientation of the law of parental rights formulated in
terms of state conferral. Some commentators have proposed the
third alternative of individual autonomy as a core principle per-
mitting the consistent ordering of parental rights. Any role ac-
corded contract in ordering the reallocation of procreative re-
sources and parental rights will take its precise form from the
option that the legal system ultimately elects.
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III. NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF THE APPLICATION OF
CONTRACT IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF PROCREATION
A. The Basic Societal Choice Posed by Current Developments
in Human Reproduction
To settle the legal ordering of human procreation, the law
eventually will opt for one or another of the alternatives arrayed
taxonomically early in this essay. Decisions about the correct reso-
lution of individual controversies regarding technologically as-
sisted reproduction, then, will depend largely, if not entirely, on
which alternative is chosen. A normative analysis of those taxo-
nomic models that apply contract to the ordering of human pro-
creation will be undertaken here.
However, an evaluation of these alternatives cannot be ade-
quately undertaken from the starting point of the several concrete
questions currently facing the legal system in the area of techno-
logically assisted human reproduction. The more general question
confronting the legal system must be synthesized and generically
stated, since the value of available alternatives is best judged in
relation to the generic question it is intended to answer. This ques-
tion forms a basic choice arising within the concrete, historical
existence of society.57 9 This societal choice provides the appropri-
ate point of departure for a normative evaluation of contractual
options for responding to developments in human reproduction.
Clifford Grobstein persuasively argues that a preoccupation
with the widening of individual reproductive projects made possi-
ble by technological developments in genetics and human repro-
ductive biology should not distract society from its responsibility
for the consequences that these developments have for human cul-
ture and even for the ultimate biological resiliency of the human
race.580 He demonstrates that science and technology open the
579. The choice is a political one, but it is so basic in its implications that it comes
close to establishing the society's basic vision of the moral meaning and value of political
life.
580. Grobstein claims:
[T]he present period may be viewed . . . as the beginning of a second great
human transition. The first transition was from a biological to a cultural mode of
human progression. ..
... This is the nature of the new great transition we are approaching. We
are moving from unconscious cultural determination of human biological pro-
gression to a degree of conscious self-determination.
C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 2, at xi, xii. The magnitude of the challenge is a cause of the
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possibility of a radical reordering of social, cultural, and biological
patterns associated with human reproduction.581 While such
changes begin with individual choices, they may end by socially,
culturally, and biologically transforming the human species.
Neither science nor technology offer guidance as to the wisdom of
the transformations they make possible. Grobstein concludes that
choices in the area require reference to values mediated by
society.582
The scale of the transformation suggested by Grobstein un-
derscores the importance of the choice posed. Technology already
allows the separation of reproduction from sexual intercourse and
the separation of genetic from gestational motherhood. Eventu-
ally, it may permit the separation of reproduction from human
gestation altogether. The transformative possibilities of technology
extend well beyond. 583 Asexual human reproduction by a single
parent may become possible as well as polysexual reproduction, by
which a child has six, seven, or eight genetic parents.584 Reproduc-
tion may take on the characteristics of engineering, seeking not
only the elimination of genetic flaws, but also the production of
lack of consensus or even a general understanding of the challenge: "[I]n an era of techno-
logical, cultural, and legal transition,. . . the setting for developing a clear comprehensive
policy. . involve[s] fundamental personal and societal values about which there remains
significant disagreement, resulting in a profound absence of consensus about what the legal
resolution ought to be." Healey, supra note 5, at 142. At issue is not just an objective
change in the human situation, but also, perhaps, a shift in the categories within which
problems are conceived. The latter shift can be termed a shift in paradigms. T. KUHN,
supra note 10; see infra note 825.
581. "Any discussion of human nature must recognize a set of basic attributes that
are strongly linked and that represent an important foundation of human culture." C.
GROBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 60. The change in view is rooted in a move from internal to
external conception and gestation. "[T]he sudden displacement of so primordial a process
[cannot] be treated as a simple translocation in space from internal to external. The
wrench is epic in human history.. . . [T]he translocation cannot fail eventually to generate
profound emotional, cultural, and social reverberations," the very magnitude of the change
serving to delay the full perception of its occurrence. Id. at 61. As Grobstein analogizes:
"The victim merely blinks and then exclaims, 'Ha, you never touched me!' 'Wait,' says the
executioner, 'until you turn your head!'" Id.
582. The fundamental issue is the nature and source of "humanness." Id. at 74.
Grobstein suggests that science may make a critical contribution to the needed discern-
ment. While science divides opinion in society, by adding "the latest in human experience,"
it can assist in resolving conflicts by creating verifiable objectivity as common basis. Id. at
xv (emphasis omitted).
583. Extracorporeal fertilization creates the "window" allowing genetic manipula-
tion. Id. at 50-57.
584. See Id. at 42-43, 125-32 (discussing existing technologies for combining genes
from several sources, cloning, and parthogenesis).
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traits previously unknown.585
At the physiological level, basic procreative functions integral
to biological and socio-behavioral definitions of masculinity and
femininity may be appropriated to the laboratory or otherwise dis-
sociated from their original anatomical settings.58 Genetic endow-
ment may be received by the offspring from a parent of just one
sex or from a variety of individuals of one or both sexes. 587 Psy-
chologically, such changes alter the pathmarks that provide per-
sonal and societal orientation and orient relationships between the
generations: all of this without yet considering changes which eu-
genic engineering might bring about in the human genome.588
To the extent they occur, these changes will have major social
and cultural consequences. They would alter shared patterns of
meaning around which personal and intergenerational relation-
ships are established. 589 As the locus of decision about reproduc-
585. Id. at 125.
586. See id. at 60-62 (arguing that internal gestation initiated via sexual intercourse
is strongly bound up with the basic human experiences of masculinity, femininity, mar-
riage, child-bearing, and parenting); L. KASS, supra note 12, at 110 (discussing the views of
alienation of procreative resources from an ethical perspective).
587. See C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 130-32 (discussing potential forms of ge-
netic manipulation and calling for consideration of the policy implications). IVF presents
conditions conducive to cloning humans. The incentive to pursue asexual reproduction is
that it permits absolute control of the offspring's genotype and avoids the tendency of off-
spring to revert towards the biological mean. One observer believes that human clonal re-
production can be expected within the next twenty to fifty years, perhaps sooner, if some
nation promotes the venture. Watson, supra note 17, at 605.
588. In the future, the gestational "surrogacy" of human embryos will be possible in
human males and apes according to Dr. Lee Silver of Princeton University. Embryo Bi-
opsy, supra note 198. Already "in high relief against the tableau of history is the rapidity
with which the roles of the sexes, the relations of the age groups, the marriage relation, and
the structure of the family are being transformed." M. GLENDON, supra note 218, at 4.
Attitudes towards children, "not to mention everyone's values about their individual uni-
queness, could be changed beyond recognition if [asexually reproduced] children became a
common occurrence." Watson, supra note 17, at 605.
589. See C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 60-62 (noting that the shift from internal to
external gestation is "epic in human history"). Some commentators have been particularly
cautionary:
The ultimate difficulties of any arbitrary, artificial, moral, or rational recon-
struction of society center around the problem of social continuity in a world
where individuals are born naked, destitute, helpless, ignorant, and untrained,
and must spend a third of their lives in acquiring the prerequisites of a free
contractual existence. The distribution of control, of personal power, position,
and opportunity, of the burden of labor and of uncertainty, and of the material
produce of social industry cannot easily be radically altered, whatever we may
think ideally ought to be done. The fundamental fact about society as a going
concern is that it is made up of individuals who are born and die and give place
to others; and the fundamental fact about modern civilization is that it is depen-
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tion shifts from a human pair under natural conditions to the indi-
vidual assisted by technology, the potential arises for the
unprecedented dominance of a minority in the establishment of
the genetic endowment of the next generation. This could occur
either if certain individuals came vastly to exceed others in the
number of their genetic offspring or if the genetic engineering pro-
tocols suggested by a few came to be followed by the many. The
result would transform basic social and political structures. More
fundamentally, it could bring about a dramatic compromise of the
resiliency of the human gene pool in ways compromising the ca-
pacity for human survival.5 90
According to Grobstein, the basic challenge confronting soci-
ety is the need for a reasoned choice based on societal values con-
cerning the direction human reproduction should take, particu-
larly given the removal by science and technology of limits once
imposed by nature.5 91 Grobstein shows that emerging technologies
will not necessarily have an impact only at the margin but will
resonate at the core of the social structure.592 He is equally per-
suasive in rebutting the assumption that an appropriate and coher-
dent upon the utilization of three great accumulating funds of inheritance from
the past, material goods and appliances, knowledge and skill, and morale. Be-
sides the torch of life itself, the material wealth of the world, a technological
system of vast and increasing intricacy and the habituations which fit men for
social life must in some manner be carried forward to new individuals born de-
void of all these things as older individuals pass out. The existing order, with the
institutions of the private family and private property (in self as well as goods),
inheritance and bequest and paternal responsibility, affords one way for securing
more or less tolerable results in grappling with this problem. They are not ideal,
nor even good; but candid consideration of the difficulties of radical transforma-
tion, especially in view of our ignorance and disagreement as to what'we want,
suggests caution and humility in dealing with reconstruction proposals.
F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 374-75 (1971).
590. Grobstein does not pursue this question. C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 131.
591. Id. at 132-35. The concern has been voiced most notably by Huxley: "[T]o use
applied science, not as the end to which human beings are to be made the means, but as
the means to producing a race of free individuals." A. HUXLEY, supra note 12, at xix.
592. According to Grobstein, "a unifying element of the tableau[] has suddenly been
snatched away." C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 61. A similar description of the moral
crisis facing modernity, of which the use of new reproductive technologies is a central con-
cern, was provided by Kierkegaard:
"It happened that a fire broke out backstage in a theater. The clown came
out to inform the public. They thought it was a jest and applauded. He repeated
his warning, they shouted even louder. So I think the world will come to an end
amid general applause from all the wits, who believe that it is a joke."
P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTERSECTIONS vii
(1978) (quoting S. KIERKEGAARD. EITHER/OR).
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ent societal direction can be achieved by considering each technol-
ogy on an ad hoc basis. 9
Scientific progress has made human reproduction a domain
within which outcomes are determined not by "chance but by pur-
pose." 594 It expands horizons of choice with respect both to repro-
ductive ends and reproductive means. 595 The control which it
makes possible begins with ever more refined knowledge concern-
ing the physiology of human reproduction and proceeds to increas-
ingly dramatic technological intervention in the natural reproduc-
tive process. The scientific process which yields this. increase in
technological possibilities, however, is not capable of resolving the
crisis in societal values and practices that such options generate. 96
The advent of technologically assisted reproduction requires a phi-
losophy and values capable of guiding societal decision-making.
If concerns related to eugenics and to the fundamental advis-
ability of fragmenting procreation into roles more diverse than
those traditionally assumed by a single reproductive pair are set
aside,51 7 one important dimension of this societal challenge ineluc-
tably remains:5 8 the legal ordering of the basic human relation-
ships implicated in the new reproductive technologies. The law
may not responsibly regulate these technologies as if they com-
prised one more discrete societal activity; they create new persons
and simultaneously generate uncertainty about who will have the
parental rights and duties with respect to those persons. They
place at issue the basic societal values that will determine the
593. C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 133-35.
594. Id. at xii-xiii. One philosophy, however crude, is eugenics. See, e.g., Miller, The
Guidance of Human Evolution, in EUGENIcS: THEN AND Now, supra note 183, at 197.
For a critique of eugenics, see P. RAMSEY, supra note 12, at 130-60 (criticizing dehumani-
zation through technological control of procreation). For' a sociobiological perspective, see
J. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW (1985) (examining interparental child cus-
tody disputes within the framework of empirical research guided by sociobiology); E.O.
WILSON. SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS (1975) (changing the gene structure ad-
vances the individual and aids the natural selection process).
595. See C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 13-58, 121-32.
596. "A number of these possibilities raise significant ethical, social, and political
issues." Id. at 57. Nobel laureate ethicist, James Watson noted that society must act deci-
sively in the matter or it may find that it has no free choice. Watson, supra note 17, at 605.
597. Contra C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 135 (analysis should "clearly unite pur-
pose, implementation, and consequence."). For a literary caution about the implications of
eugenics, see A. HUXLEY. supra note 12, at xviii.
598. The cultural reverberations to be expected are, according to more than one
commentator, "epic." See C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 61; see also Healey, supra note
5, at 139 (examining the legal ramifications of artificial insemination).
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structure of legal relationships between parents and children.
Thus, the new reproductive technologies necessitate a correspond-
ing justification of legal norms governing disputes which emerge
among adult participants and require a coherent rationale for the
values which guide the recognition of parental status.
B. A Normative Evaluation of Contract as a Principle
Governing the Basic Human Relationships Implicated by the
New Reproductive Technologies
The assessment of the contract-based responses to current de-
velopments in human reproduction requires an examination of
four separate but converging considerations. These include: 1)
state conferral, individual autonomy, and natural endowment as
grounds of parental rights; 2) the enforcement of promises to real-
locate procreative resources and parental rights; 3) restrictions on
the alienability of procreative resources and parental rights; and
4) the proper balance among politics, personal life, and the mar-
ket as spheres of societal activity. An exploration of these issues
facilitates normative evaluation of the models of legal response
that employ contract in answering developments occurring in
human reproductive technology.
1. State Conferral, Individual Autonomy, and Natural
Endowment as Grounds of Parental Rights
The taxonomy elaborated earlier in this essay distinguished
legal approaches to the new reproductive technologies according
to whether they assigned parental rights based on state conferral,
individual autonomy, or natural endowment. The normative con-
sideration here is the proper ground of parental rights. If individ-
ual autonomy is the preferred value, contract is directly validated
as a form for ordering the new technologies. If state conferral pro-
vides the preferred value, then contract receives a less absolute
validation. If the preferred value is natural endowment, contract is
essentially excluded.599
In a positivist understanding of the law, state conferral is, in
one sense, the basis of all legal rights including both parental
rights and the right generally to buy and sell resources. 00 Positiv-
599. Regarding a residual "shadow" role for contract under natural endowment, see
supra text accompanying note 219.
600. See E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 35, at 95-99 (1974) (examining John Austin's
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ism is usually joined with some secondary principle that provides
normative direction for state conferrals." 1 This principle might,
for instance, be the utilitarian idea that the greatest good should
be done for the greatest number. 0 2 It might be nothing more than
the conviction that whatever the majority happens to prefer should
be enacted as law. It might be some other ideal selected by the
state. The state conferral model described here includes any form
of positivist justification which does not directly subject state con-
ferral to a normative direction derived from individual autonomy
or natural endowment. °3
The American constitutional tradition poses a fundamental
difficulty for proposals that would make state conferral the basis
of parental rights.60 4 Within the American constitutional frame-
work, parental rights serve as a fundamental constraint on the
ability of the government to allocate benefits, burdens, rights, and
duties.605 Therefore, such rights implicitly rest on some ground
that is distinguishable from state conferral. Current Supreme
Court jurisprudence is founded on an unstable combination of nat-
ural endowment and individual autonomy. 06 Whether they are
analytical position and the "separation of jurisprudence from ethics"); Brest, supra note
101, at 1297 (discussing the Hobbesian view that "citizens entering into civil society relin-
quish all natural rights and possess only those rights granted by [civil institutions]").
601. In this view, law tends to be instrumental, and the secondary principle tends to
be teleological. E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 35, at 95-96.
602. See id. at 85-88 (examining the utilatarian philosophies of Bentham and Mill);
R. DWORKIN, supra note 366, at 432 n.6 (noting the popularity of utilitarian positivist
theories in democracies).
603. Individual autonomy and natural endowment are, by definition, mutually exclu-
sive. State conferral, on the other hand, may depend on individual autonomy or natural
endowment for normative direction, unless it is specified that the command of the state has
value as an end and not just as a means.
604. Conformity with recognized tradition is a basis of constitutional argument. See
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (recognizing as fundamental those
rights "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people"); see also Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (arguing that the Constitution lays out a "scheme of ordered
liberty" analogous to traditional notions of justice); Hafen, supra note 132, at 491 (viewing
the Supreme Court's protection of the family as based on traditional values and not explicit
constitutional provisions).
605. For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a state may not in-
fringe on the parental right to decide how children will be educated. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
606. One line of cases bases parental rights on the individual's right of privacy. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman's right of privacy includes
choosing not to become a parent by terminating pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (holding that a person's right of privacy includes choosing not to become a
parent by using contraceptives). Another set of cases finds parental rights extending from
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understood to be a function of natural endowment or individual
autonomy, constitutionally recognized rights related to parenthood
impose limits on the allocations the state may make in pursuit of
its objectives."0 7
Proposals for ordering parental rights based on state confer-
ral are accorded serious consideration despite their dissonance
with constitutional tradition. One reason is that, in individual
cases, reproductive projects introduce considerable uncertainty
concerning the fate of the children conceived.60 8 Another is the
systemic uncertainty technologically assisted reproduction in-
troduces into the static societal ordering required by property and
other elements of social life. 09 Finally, the technological character
of the new means of reproduction and the novelty of the forms of
conduct involved imply that the law should be under no greater
constraint when assigning rights and duties in this area than it is
when regulating new technology generally.610
The appeal of the state conferral option lies in the predict-
ability and order it would bring to a field cast into disarray by a
contest for direction taking place between the values of natural
endowment and individual autonomy. While traditional family
law is grounded in natural endowment, the options made available
by the new technologies seem to further the exercise of individual
autonomy. Attempts to integrate recognition of individual auton-
omy into the existing framework based on natural endowment
tend to disintegrate in the individual case and to disrupt the or-
derly assignment of status within society."" By contrast, the sub-
ordination of individual autonomy into a general framework of
state conferral allows unequivocal resolution of individual conflicts
and a consistent static ordering of society wherever static ordering
the parent-child relationship. See infra note 624.
607. The interest has to be compelling. A state's interest in prohibiting contraception
has been held subordinate to the right of married couples to choose whether to have chil-
dren. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. Likewise, a state's desire to "improve the quality of its
citizens" cannot usurp parents' decisions regarding the education of their children. Meyer,
262 U.S. at 401.
608. Proposals grounded in state conferral tend to focus on protection of the child,
even at the expense of the mother's freedom. See Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 667.
609. Hence, the Uniform Status Act explicitly applies to all rights derived from the
parent-child relationship created through assisted conception. See UNIF. STATUS AcT,
supra note 6, § 11.
610. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
611. See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (invalidating a hired
maternity contract as violative of state family law principles).
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is unavoidable.612
The new reproductive technologies themselves are viewed as a
scientific achievement which ought to be publicly facilitated. This
aspect of the state conferral option is not often noted yet tends to
mask the inconsistency between this option and American consti-
tutional tradition. The predictability of basic societal status, which
state conferral provides, serves to facilitate the more extensive ap-
plication and development of the new technologies. 1 ' In their pre-
sent form, arguments for the state conferral option are limited to
a generalized principle that technological development should be
encouraged and that the fruits of technology should be made
available to individuals. Proponents of the new reproductive tech-
nologies, however, assert the right to control the traits of one's
children in a quest for the perfect child.614 The great danger of
the state conferral model is that, while it begins by rejecting natu-
ral endowment in order to further individual use of these technolo-
gies, it may end by adopting the "quest for the perfect child" as a
normative goal of the state.1 5
If the "best interests of children" is the banner under which
this approach is generally advocated, the traditional role of the
state in caring for neglected children under its parens patriae
612. See, e.g., UNIF. STATUS AcT, supra note 6, § 11 (creating a state conferral-
based legal framework).
613. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs. Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704
S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) (urging the legislature to formulate a public policy on new repro-
ductive technologies).
614. "People want their child to be . . . perfect . . . . [P]arents . . . go to ex-
traordinary lengths through education and rearing to mold children to their image of
perfection. ... Robertson, supra note 9, at 429-30. If their desires are recognized, they
would have "the right to abort fetuses or to refuse to implant embryos with undesired
gender or genetic traits. . . . [T]hey would have the freedom to pick egg, sperm, or gesta-
tional donors to maximize. . . desirable physical features" in their children. Id. at 431; see
also Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medicolegal Aspects of
a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199, 214-16 (1983) (if frozen gametes
are commercially obtainable "[o]ne can envision catalogs of embryos, with pictures and
personal histories of the sperm and oocyte vendors, from which prospective parents can
choose their own 'dream child.' ").
615. Aldous Huxley warns
"Eugenics ... is capable of becoming the most sacred ideal of the human race,
as a race; one of the supreme religious duties. . . . Once the full implications of
evolutionary biology are grasped, eugenics will inevitably become part of the
religion of the future, or of whatever complex of sentiments may in the future
take the place of organized religion."
Huxley, Eugenics and Society, in EUGENICS: THEN AND Now, supra note 183, at 244,
reprinted from, 28 EUGENICS REV. 11, 11 (1936).
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power is ordinarily the authority advanced in its support.6 16 The
state's parens patriae power is exercised in loco parentis; that is,
only where necessary to fill a role defined by natural parenthood.
Thus, the move to redefine parenthood as a right conferred or del-
egated by the state reverses the order of justification in the ex-
isting scheme. The existing parens patriae power of the state is
not sufficient to justify use of the state conferral model to assign
parental rights.
Still, as an abstract matter, the question of whether the state
conferral of parental rights can be justified as being in the "best
interests" of children, is worth exploring. However, this question
must be distinguished from the one arising in a custody battle
under the "best interests" rule.617 The best interests involved be-
long not to some determinate group of children, but rather to un-
born generations of children.618 It is in the best interests of chil-
dren, in this abstract sense, to encourage immediate and
irrevocable bonding between every child and at least one adult.619
Any system of rules which, in assigning parental rights, disrupts
parent-child bonding in infancy is flawed significantly. The en-
forcement of a contractual allocation of custody is not a sufficient
guarantee against this flaw. 20
616. "Without the surrogacy arrangement, that particular child would never have
come into existence. Surely existence with some psychological risk is infinitely preferable to
never having been born." Eaton, supra note 21, at 709. As an example of the belief that
stressing status issues is in the best interests of children, see Krause, supra note 303, at
193. See generally Hershkovitz, supra note 351, at 249-52 (outlining the history and devel-
opment of the parens patriae power).
617. Traditionally, the rationale for the best interests rule is that "[t]he integrated
totality of family functions in a natural family appears somehow to be greater than the
sum of the individual functions." Hafen, supra note 132, at 474.
618. Posner, supra note 7, at 23 (positing that in the case of hired maternity, the
"best interest" of the child is the opportunity to exist).
619. Current psychological research indicates that early bonding creates a founda-
tion for individual development that is strongest if the parent-child relationship continues
without interruption. See Sroufe, The Coherence of Individual Development, 34 AM. PsY-
CHOLOGIsT 834 (1979). The principal goal for a more comprehensive regulatory approach
is greater protection for children who might be born with the assistance of new technolo-
gies. The law currently governing adoption is the most obvious model for a legislative re-
sponse. See Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 58, at 511. The adoption model
functions within the natural endowment model. The transfer of parental rights is justified
in terms of waiver and nurturance or a willingness to nurture, rather than state conferral.
Recent trends favoring joint custody or custody with visitation rights to the remaining par-
ent also falls within the natural endowment model with a stress on informal social
cooperation.
620. Alexander Malahoff and Judy Stiver, the parties to a hired maternity contract,
each refused to accept custody of the child born, purportedly pursuant to an agreement,
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Nonetheless, use of the "best interests" argument to validate
state conferral suffers from two major defects. First, enhancing
the chances of successful bonding is only one of several necessary
values relevant to a child's best interests. 21 The "best interests"
argument advanced in favor of state conferral fails to consider
these other relevant values. Second, alternatives exist for achiev-
ing predictability in bonding during infancy. These alternatives fo-
cus on finding an ordering principle that will permit a consistent
integration of natural endowment and individual autonomy in the
assignment of parental rights, thereby avoiding the need to resort
to state conferral as the general ordering principle.622
The plausibility of state conferral as the means of resolving
the confusion created in the legal recognition of family relation-
ships by the new reproductive technologies thus dissolves on closer
examination. The arguments advanced to support it correctly
point to problems that require resolution, but they do not justify
the proposed solution either in a general sense or in reference to
the American constitutional tradition. By eliminating natural en-
dowment for the ostensible purpose of furthering the individual
appropriation of technology, the option also eliminates natural en-
dowment as a basis for rights that constrain the state. Even ver-
sions of the option that include contract as a prominent feature
pose an unacceptable risk of statism or collectivism.623
because the infant suffered from microcephaly. Andrews, supra note 206, at 56; see also
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 221, at 120 (noting that, in hired maternity
arrangements, "[p]otentially, neither parent will have a bond with the child at birth").
621. It is important for the biological parents and the child to have some contact.
Although only intermittent contact may have occurred, biological parents, even
when inadequate, continue to be significant in a child's development. The biolog-
ical family is the source of identity for a child. Children feel part of the biologi-
cal family and its roots: they resemble their parents, possess some personality
traits of their parents, and have the family health problems. What a child knows
and imagines about the biological family helps to mold the child's self-percep-
tion. The child's self-respect derives from characteristics most likeable about the
parents. Hopes for the future are also connected to failures and successes of the
biological family. Finally the child's desire for parental love demonstrates the
continuing connection to the biological family.
Beyer & Mlyniec, supra note 137, at 237-38 (citation omitted).
622. Through the concept of "constructive donation," the gamete donor yields the
parental relationship to the birth mother and her husband. NEw YORK STATE TASK
FORCE, supra note 221, at 133-34. Nurturing and generating life are two different aspects
of the parental bond. McCormick, Reproductive Technologies: Ethical Issues, in 4 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1439, 1456 (1978).
623. The disaster of National Socialism in Germany showed progressives the dangers
of relying on the state to define public interest, and led them to adopt interest group plural-
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Individual autonomy is the alternative to state conferral pro-
posed by some to ground parental rights in the context of the new
reproductive technologies. Recent trends in American constitu-
tional law tend to reformulate reproductive and marital rights in
terms of individual autonomy. 24 John Robertson, a prolific writer
on law and the new reproductive technologies, argues in favor of
employing contract principles to order the basic human relation-
ships implicated by the new technologies from this starting
point.6 25 He asserts that progress in civil liberties generally has
been a matter of giving increasing recognition to the individual's
right to control his or her fecundity. He suggests that this negative
right be matched with a positive right to pursue the production of
a "perfect child" when, with whom, and by what means one
chooses. 26 He asserts that this is the meaning of the right of au-
tonomy in the area of human reproduction.
Robertson views the right to exchange procreative resources
and parental rights for money and the right to obtain the legal
enforcement of these exchanges, as necessary corollaries to the
positive right to procreate.127 He argues that commercial realloca-
tions ought to be legally enforced as a "fundamental right."6 28 As
ism as a counterweight to the state. Horwitz, supra note 482, at 1427; see infra note 848.
624. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right of privacy to
include the decision by and single people whether to have children); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (prohibiting states from involuntarily sterilizing individuals); see also
Shapiro, supra note 476, at 541 (arguing that the expansion of substantive process is "an
affirmation of the importance of personal autonomy.").
625. See Robertson, supra note 371; Robertson, supra note 8, at 954-57; Robertson,
supra note 9; Robertson, supra note 222; Robertson, Procreation Rights Ignored by Court,
N.J.L.J., Feb. 18, 1988, at 26-27, col. 3. ("Regulated paid, enforceable surrogacy could
bring great good to surrogates, infertile couples and their offspring, without tearing the
moral fabric of society," although he concedes that "[a]t the same time, a community
concerned about the potential for exploitation and other risks of surrogacy might reasona-
bly choose to deny infertile couples this avenue to rearing biologically related offspring.")
Others express similar reasoning. See, e.g., Note, Redefining Mother, supra note 21, at 199
(arguing that "[p]rocreation has anthropological and sociological significance supporting its
designation as a fundamental right. No other creative function ranks with the process of
procreation in its importance to individuals and to society. . . . If the right to procreate is
to be fully protected, it requires the assurance of certain derivative rights.").
626. Robertson, supra note 9, at 410, 430-31.
627. Id. at 429; Robertson, supra note 222, at 32. Robertson suggests that Supreme
Court precedents already support his contention that "the right" belongs to married people.
Id. at 962-64; see also Hafen, supra note 132, at 944, 1189; Ikemoto, supra note 326, at
1281-82.
628. Robertson, supra note 222, at 32; Robertson, supra note 8, at 966-67. "This
right will include the ability to contract with others for their sperm, ovum, uterus, or child
and the ability to forge an agreement for assigning the entitlements and duties that affect
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such, contracts for the reallocation of procreative resources and
parental rights deserve a special enforceability exceeding that
which can be claimed by other business exchanges . 29 He explains
that those who collaborate in procreation without intending to be-
come parents should be deemed to be engaged in a complemen-
tary expression of autonomy.630 He holds that they are fulfilling a
right to experience whatever limited aspect of participation in pro-
creation they desire. The market's effect in differentiating these
specialized roles is, for Robertson, an additional benefit. 31
As justification for this strong endorsement of procreative au-
tonomy expressed through contract allocation, the author cites a
progressive trend in developments over the past century. 3 2 He re-
the child." Robertson, supra note 9, at 429. Robertson concedes that the Supreme Court
might require that the contract be coordinated by those in the status of a married couple.
Id. at 432.
629. Robertson argues that contract should be given wide latitude:
[A] constitutionally coherent concept of procreative liberty protects a wide range
of decisions affecting human embryos and reproductive collaborators. Procrea-
tive liberty protects the freedom to contract for the provision, receipt, transfer,
and storage of embryos and gametes, when necessary to achieve protected repro-
ductive goals. It also protects collaborative reproductive transactions with donors
and surrogates. In most instances, the interests of embryos, offspring, the family,
and others do not justify interference with these choices.
Robertson, supra note 8, at 1040.
630. Robertson, supra note 625, at 27, col. 3; Robertson has coined the term "collab-
orative reproduction" to describe the relationship between those buying reproductive re-
sources and those selling them. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1001-03.
631. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1029-32. The specialized aspects of procreation in-
clude: child initiation, preparation, gestation, and rearing. Note, Redefining Mother, supra
note 21, at 193.
[T]he biological experience of bearing and giving birth is so important for
women that it should be recognized as an independent exercise of procreative
freedom . . . even if they never see or rear the child.
Each aspect of reproduction can thus be a separate source of fulfillment and
significance. . . . Procreative freedom includes the right to separate the genetic,
gestational, or social components of reproduction and to recombine them in col-
laboration with others.
Robertson, supra note 9, at 409-10 (footnotes omitted).
632. Robertson, supra note 9, at 405. See generally J. REED, THE BIRTH CONTROL
MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC VIRTUE
(1978)(goals of this movement include promotion of autonomy for women and the reduc-
tion of differential fertility between social classes). Robertson is influenced by a vestige of
the same nineteenth-century progressivism that inspired the Historical School of Jurispru-
dence and Sir Henry Maine. See E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 35, at 74-75. The weight of
informed opinion follows Anita Allen's opposing judgment that hired maternity arrange-
ments, for example, are "a step backward from what could be seen as post-Civil War




lies on the notion of inherent progress to justify the leap from ex-
isting precedents to a positive right to procreate, and the further
leap to a positive right to obtain state enforcement of contractual
promises in this context.6 a3 A secondary justification which Rob-
ertson raises for both extensions of existing law is the unfairness
of limiting persons to the procreative resources which natural en-
dowment alone provides. Such a limitation arbitrarily restricts the
autonomy of individuals dissatisfied with their natural procreative
endowment.""
For Robertson, the value of individual autonomy arises from
the distinctive, innate significance of individual choices to under-
take procreative projects, whether in quest of the perfect child or
of some subjective experience in the procreative process.63 5 Only
in this setting does individual autonomy rise to the level of a fun-
damental right that may not be subordinated to state interests
that are not compelling. 638
Because he views reproductive contracts as separate from and
more important than ordinary contract, Robertson advocates a va-
riation on the marriage contract rather than inclusion of procrea-
tion within ordinary contract. 37 The decisive difference for Rob-
ertson is that the privileged choice objectifies and depersonalizes
reproduction rather than placing it within a long-term personal
relationship confined to pooling natural reproductive endowments.
A significant consequence of this difference is that it lends genera-
tive arrangements two distinct legal and social forms: those per-
633. Robertson, supra note 9, at 414-20.
634. "What then about the one in eight married couples who are coitally infertile?
Surely their interest in having and rearing offspring is no less than that of the coitally
fertile." Robertson, supra note 625, at 27, col. 1.
635. Sexual privacy is fundamental enough, according to Robertson, to render the
prohibition of "tissue farming" of fetuses, at least for use by marriage partners, their off-
spring, and parents, unconstitutional. Robertson, supra note 199, at 488. Reproductive
projects are a particularly "powerful experience," with special "personal value and mean-
ing." Such projects "satisf[y] an individual's natural drive for sex and his or her continuity
with nature and future generations. [They fulfill] cultural norms and individual goals about
a good or fulfilled life, and many consider [them] the most important thing a person does
with his or her life." Robertson, supra note 9, at 408.
636. Robertson repeats this often with no convincing explanation that the concept is
an accepted component of constitutional jurisprudence; it is an incantation. See Robertson,
supra note 625, at 27, col. 3 (conceding that procreation is not explicitly protected by the
Constitution yet arguing for the application of strict scrutiny); Robertson, supra note 371,
at 8-11 (asserting strict scrutiny protection for reproductive decisions of coitally infertile
couples). He refers to "the meaning of a right of autonomy in procreation." Robertson,
supra note 9, at 414-20, 430.
637. Robertson, supra note 9, at 414.
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sons who participate as "intenders" of children (buyers of procre-
ative resources and parental rights) and those persons who
participate in a passing, depersonalized experience, usually for
money (sellers of procreative resources and parental rights)."8
Like the marriage contract, both are distinguishable from ordi-
nary market relationships. The distinction remaining between
them, however, is of great conceptual importance and presages
far-reaching changes in societal structure.
Others propose a more generalized understanding of individ-
ual autonomy as a normative basis for reallocating procreative re-
sources and parental rights through contract. Rather than empha-
sizing the distinctiveness of procreation as a sphere within which
individual autonomy is expressed, they begin with the premise of
the equality of all preferences. Individual autonomy requires that
the widest latitude be granted to exchanges which add to the ag-
gregate satisfaction of individual preferences. 39 In this view, con-
tracts for the reallocation of procreative resources and parental
rights ought to be treated as a species of ordinary contract. The
grounds that would support restricting such contracts are neither
wider nor narrower than those for ordinary contract generally. 40
Until now, the natural distribution of genes and procreative
capacity has offset the disparities in wealth attendant to a market
economy. Both kinds of individual autonomy rationales seen here
call for replacing natural allocation with market allocation. This,
in turn, tends to redistribute resources and rights, like all other
commodities available on the market, according to financial
wealth.641 Insofar as many individuals alienate resources and
rights from a natural surplus, autonomy advocates assert that
buyers gain and sellers do not lose the enjoyment of the end re-
638. Id.
639. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 139-43 (3d ed. 1986)
(considering the possible effects of a free market in babies); Posner, Wealth Maximization
Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 85, 100-05 (1985) (favoring the use
of "wealth maximization" as a legal principle in common law development).
640. See infra note 716 and accompanying text.
641. The commodification of children yields other negative consequences. Posner ad-
mits that contractual reallocation of parental rights and procreative resources will have the
effect of making it more difficult for "hard to adopt" children to find parents. Posner, supra
note 7, at 24. It has been argued elsewhere that the failure to recognize nonmonetized
variables in family relationships has helped determine what forms are socially or legally
acceptable. Goode, Comment: The Economics of Nonmonetary Variables, in THE Eco-
NOMICS OF THE FAMILY 345 (T. Schultz ed. 1974); see also infra note 822.
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suit: the acquisition of a rearing relationship with a child. 42 Al-
ternatively, individuals who alienate resources and rights which
they do not replace for themselves choose money in exchange for
parenthood. Thus, social roles are redistributed as a form of
wealth.
Both types of individual autonomy arguments advocate a re-
distribution of reproductive wealth. According to both, procreative
resources and the parental rights to which they give rise should
flow to those parties who have the intention or will to exploit
them. 43 It is curious here that a distributive justice argument
works, explicitly in some commentaries, in tandem with the value
of individual autonomy embodied in the market exchange. 44 Dis-
tributive justice is typically advanced as a reason for imposing
constraints on the market. Here, the value of the market is
thought to advance the value of distributive justice. 45 The expla-
nation readily presents itself. When a natural resource is made
alienable, alienability initially serves to greatly increase the distri-
bution of the resource. Only after the distribution reaches a mar-
ket-based equilibrium can distributive justice become a side con-
straint on market alienation. Distributive justice is defined, for
example, in the Rawlsian sense as equal distribution, except where
it can be shown that the unequal distribution is nevertheless pref-
erable even to those who receive the least; that is, the unequal
distribution makes everyone better off. 46
Both forms of the individual autonomy justification for em-
ploying contract argue that natural procreative resources ought to
be redistributed and that the enforcement of contractual ex-
changes is one method for accomplishing this redistribution.
Under the more general approach, the ideal distribution is simply
642. Wealth would be increased in terms of more and better babies born. Prichard,
A Market for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO LJ. 341, 345 (1984). Even if it meant simply
redistributing babies, law and economics would view the redistribution as an increase in
wealth since it would lead to a greater overall satisfaction of preferences.
643. "[I]f. . . a market is allowed to operate" in an area, "resources will gravitate
toward their most valuable uses." Kronman & Posner, Introduction" Economic Theory and
Contract Law, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW supra note 43, at 1-2; see also
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960); Hollinger, supra note 6, at
886-88.
644. Robertsdn, supra note 9, at 428 (referring to "the natural lottery of physical
equipment"); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982).
645. All contract law has been said to be distributive. See P. ATiYAH, ESSAYS ON
CONTRACT 86 (1986); Dresser, supra note 9, at 159-74. For example, the trial court opin-
ion in Baby M was arguably explained by class bias. Annas, supra note 415, at 15.
646. J. RAWLS, supra note 177.
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the one the market would provide. 47 The narrower approach,
which makes procreation a fundamental right, views market dis-
tribution as simply an instrument to some other ultimate redistri-
bution.6 48 Both perspectives, however, assert that natural procrea-
tive resources and parental rights ought to be appropriated and
reallocated by individual autonomy and for the ultimate disposal
of individual autonomy.649
Schemes that rest the allocation of parental rights upon the
value of individual autonomy contradict the very value they claim
to advance. The expectation that the parties seek to secure by con-
tract is a change in legal relation directly affecting the identity of
a third-party, the child. Every child has a natural concern to know
his or her origins, genetically and biologically.65 The parties, by
their agreement, deny the child the right to decide autonomously
whether and how to develop that "natural" relationship. 51 This
denial forecloses the autonomous development within a particular
horizon of intrinsic human meaning for a lifetime. Further, these
perspectives fail to comprehend that the contractual capacity of
the parties themselves has come into existence only after an exten-
sive period spent as unemancipated minors. During the period
prior to emancipation, the adult custodian must contract for the
child and is subject to a fiduciary duty to act on the child's be-
half.6 52 In the individual autonomy model, the adult contracts to
647. Posner, supra note 200, at 60.
648. See Robertson, supra note 9, at 414-20.
649. Posner and Kronman bring up the question, in general terms, of whether con-
tract should be viewed as a tool which redistributes wealth, "whether to capitalists or to
workers." Kronman & Posner, supra note 43, at 267. But they assume an equilibrium and
note that the question has been asked whether the law tends to redistribute to one or an-
other class. Id.
650. See L. KAss, supra note 12, at 112 ("Clarity about your origins is crucial for
self-identity, itself important for self-respect .... "); Krause, Reflections on Child Sup-
port, 17 Fam. L.Q. 109, 128 (1983) ("For now, knowledge of the identity of and financial
access to both parents remains a necessary and fundamental human right of each child.");
see also Hollinger, supra note 6, at 917 (identity formulation requires awareness of biologi-
cal origin) (citing E. ERIKSON, LIFE HISTORY AND THE HISTORICAL MOMENT (1975); R.
LIFTON, supra note 11; Kass, "Making Babies" Revisited, 54 PUB. INTEREST 32 (1979)).
While some discount the idea, see, e.g., Robertson, supra note 369, at 37, the international
trend, even in the context of existing AID arrangements, is otherwise. See Knoppers &
Sloss, supra note 99, at 707; see also B. LIFrON, TWICE BORN: MEMOIRS OF AN ADOPTED
DAUGHTER (1977).
651. See L. KASS, supra note 12, at 113-14 (discussing how hired maternity and
adoption destroy the natural biological bonds between children and their parents).
652. On the incapacity of minors to contract, see E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, §§
4.2-4.4; DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J.
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trade away parental rights belonging to the very child over whom
he has or, in the ordinary course of events would come to have, a
fiduciary duty based on a relationship of dependency. 53
The meaningful exercise of individual autonomy presupposes,
moreover, that the individual has native preferences to express.
The autonomous actor takes shape, in part, during the formative
period of childhood and adolescence prior to the emergence of
contractual capacity. Additionally, this emergence is a contempo-
raneous, existential matter, occurring through the experience of
familial and social relationships which are zones relatively free of
legal enforcement of bargains. The defective anthropology of the
individual autonomy model is apparent in this failure to recognize
that individual autonomy grows from prior relationships of nur-
turance and simultaneous relationships of personal concern.6 '" Be-
879, 903-05.
If children are born of a relationship, whether marital or not, the model of con-
tract leaves something to be desired. Children seem to be strangely untouched by
benefits that equality may provide to their parents. Indeed, the privacy rights of
their mothers may exclude them from being born or even conceived, and if they
are born they may appear as intruders, since they are not parties to the contract
of their parents.
Weyrauch, supra note 30, at 433 (footnote omitted). See generally Comment, The Rights
of Children A Trust Model, 46 FORD. L. REV. 669 (1978) (discussing the rights of chil-
dren as they relate to parents, trustees, the courts, and the schools).
653. See Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 804-05 (contract has both "minimum condi-
tions and maximum potential" and its goal is an "equilibrium between autonomy and wel-
fare"). A similar argument of self-contradiction is employed by John Stuart Mill to justify
prohibitions on self-enslavement. J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTA-
TIVE GOVERNMENT 213 (A. Lindsay ed. 1951). It has also been noted that contracts "in-
crease the risk that biological parents will feel it is acceptable to abandon less-than-perfect
infants after, they have been born." Areen, Handicapped Child Becomes "Damaged
Goods," N.J.L.J., Feb. 18, 1988 at 25, col. 1.
654. See C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED (1975);
Hafen, supra note 132, at 476-78 (culture and values of society are transmitted through
the familial status relationships); Radin, supra note 28, at 1885-86 ("universal commodifi-
cation" reflects an "inferior conception of human flourishing"). John Locke argued that
"natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together, and are both founded on
the same principle." J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 61 (J. Gough
ed. 1956). Max Weber theorized that a purposive (commercial) contract presupposes an
"unchanging core identity" independent from the contract, antedating and outlasting it
relative to group status. 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRE-
TIVE SOCIOLOGY 671-73 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. & trans. 1968). See generally Rosen-
feld, supra note 13, at 810-14 (discussing Weber's theories on status and contract and
modern contract as on instrument of dissociation). Macneil sees essentially the same dis-
tinction, but describes it in terms of "transactions" and "relations." He would trace rela-
tions into the commercial area. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL L.
REV. 691, 720-25 (1974).
The renewed importance of static relations in society is sometimes discussed in terms
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cause it ignores these two elements of mutual dependency between
individual autonomy and natural endowment, the individual au-
tonomy model is the reductio ad absurdum of Sir Henry Maine's
thesis on the character of progressive societies. 55 To the same ex-
tent, it loses its validating link to the Lockean notion of social
contract.6
56
of "the new feudalism." E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 1.7. By contrast, the continuing
emphasis on "transactions" under capitalism is sometimes referred to as "commodity
fetishism:"
The transformation of the commodity relation into a thing of "ghostly objectiv-
ity" cannot therefore content itself with the reduction of all objects for the grati-
fication of human needs to commodities. It stamps its imprint upon the whole
consciousness of man; his qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of
his personality, they are things which he can "own" or "dispose of" like the
various objects of the external world. And there is no natural form in which
human relations can be cast, no way in which man can bring his physical and
psychic "qualities" into play without their being subjected increasingly to this
reifying process.
Radin, supra note 28, at 1874 n.91 (citing Luk~cs, Reification and the Consciousness of
the Proletariat, in HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 100 (R. Livingstone trans. 1971)).
For a discussion in the new reproductive technologies context, see Note, supra note 8; see
also note infra 788.
655.
The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect.
Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of
family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The Indi-
vidual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take
account ....
Nor is it difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which re-
places by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their
origin in the Family. It is Contract. Starting, as from one terminus of history,
from a condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up
in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of
social order in which all these relations arise from the free agreement of
Individuals ...
All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of Persons were derived
from, and to some extent are still coloured by; the powers and privileges an-
ciently residing in the Family. . . . [W]e may say that the movement of the
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.
H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 168-70 (4th ed. 1870) (emphasis in the original).
656. J. LOCKE, supra note 654, at 4; see also Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Pri-
vate Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 461, 480-90 (1987); Rosen-
feld, supra note 13 (exploring the relationship between "freedom of contract" and the "so-
cial contract"). The value of individual autonomy vindicated under "freedom of contract,"
as received within the American legal tradition, finds its normative grounding in the idea of
"social contract." The stress on autonomy in contemporary arguments is pushed beyond
what the concept of social contract will bear. At a minimum, this approach to "freedom of
contract" moreover, appears to shift from a Lockean to a Hobbesian conception of social
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While the application of contract to those human relation-
ships implicated by the new reproductive technologies will dimin-
ish the constraints that respect for natural endowment currently
places on individual autonomy, it is a mistake to suppose that the
result will be unfettered individual autonomy. The contractual re-
lationships in question may loosen the traditional structures of
kinship, but will be recontextualized within a social structure that
market forces create.657 In the consumer rights type of the model,
contract, wherever discussions of utility assume that the state is responsible for the global
distribution of benefits and burdens, either by action or by default. See, e.g., Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089-93 (1972) (discussing "entitlement" and state distribution of
property).
At the same time, Rosenfeld notes that a fundamental postulate of liberalism is "an
instrumental rationality of means" and corresponding skepticism about any "rationality of
ends," so that liberal individualism is bound to reject as illegitimate any social organization
seeking to impose a particular vision of the common good on society. Rosenfeld, supra note
13, at 779. Yet, if it is to avoid devouring itself, even a consistent liberalism must stop
short of extending contract in such a way as to treat contracting parties as things con-
tracted for. To remain coherent, the freedom of contract must be grounded in a social
contract or some other mode of representing a shared vision of the value of the contracting
individual. Since the inception of liberalism, the freedom of contract has tended to decon-
struct the communitarian patterns that validate the dignity and value of the individual, but
only to the extent that freedom of contract is burdened by the "myth of pure transaction-
ism." The problem is that "[contractual relations] tend to merge past, present and future
into a continuum in which the present, however sharply focused the consciousness, is part
of both the past and the future, and they part of it." Macneil, supra note 654, at 803.
Notwithstanding the place of expectation interest in contract, the future must come, it
cannot be made "here." Id.
Theoretically, the principle of individual autonomy also has a corresponding tendency
to erode the Lockean natural justice foundation of individual dignity that is implicitly nec-
essary to validate freedom of contract.
Although nineteenth century courts and doctrinal writers did not succeed in en-
tirely destroying the ancient connection between contracts and natural justice,
they were able to elaborate a system that allowed judges to pick and choose
among those groups in the population that would be its beneficiaries. And, above
all, they succeeded in creating a great intellectual divide between a system of
formal rules - which they managed to identify exclusively with the "rule of
law" - and those ancient precepts of morality and equity, which they were able
to render suspect as subversive of "the rule of law" itself.
Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917,
955-56 (1974).
657. See M. WEBER, supra note 654, at 668-81 (arguing that freedom of contract
itself is the result of market forces); Weber, Freedom and Coercion, in THE ECONOMICS OF
CONTRACT LAW, supra note 43, at 230-33 (freedom of contract actually restricts the exer-
cise of individual autonomy by those with few economic resources). One commentator
notes:
Thus the new technology of prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion does indeed
offer new choices, but it also creates new structures and new limitations on
choice. Because of the society in which we live, the choices are inevitably
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they will be further contextualized within professional and govern-
mental bureaucracies.65 8 Both contexts limit freedom of contract
as an exercise of individual autonomy. The contours of these de-
limiting structures will tend to become the object of governmental
action, rather than private cooperative planning, as has been the
experience with ordinary contract during the century that fol-
lowed the classical definition of freedom of contract. 59
To the extent that individual autonomy recognizes natural
endowment as the basis of parental rights in the ordinary case, it
undermines the security of assigning parental rights based on con-
tract. Rights of natural endowment that are placed in abeyance
may always be revived and reasserted against exceptional rights
based on individual autonomy. 660 The consequence is a predictable
tendency within the individual autonomy model to drift into sub-
ordination to the state conferral model of assigning parental
rights. In the longer run, it is questionable whether the individual
autonomy model, if implemented, would further the value of per-
sonal autonomy as it has been undeistood within the American
constitutional tradition.
The American constitutional system accords natural endow-
ment an irreducible role in the legal allocation of parental rights,
which flows from the breakdown of experience and meaning of
individual autonomy at the boundaries of human life. Due to the
continual stream of births and deaths, human identity is intrinsi-
cally intergenerational.6 1 Voluntary contractual exchanges cannot
take care of business between generations; hence the need for the
law of wills and estates. 662 Each generation is dependent, at its
outset, on the previous, and, at its conclusion, on the succeeding.
It is impossible for the new generation to contract for care and
couched in terms of production and commodification, and thus do not move us to
see new levels of genuine choice, or to provide us with genuine control.
Rothman, The Products of Conception: The Social Context of Reproductive Choices, 11 J.
MED. ETHICS 188, 192-93,(1985).
658. P. BERGER & H. KELLNER, supra note 180; see supra text accompanying notes
203-12.
659. See supra text accompanying notes 46-54; infra text accompanying notes 692-
97.
660. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LImITs OF JUSTICE (1982).
661. See supra note 581.
662. The concept of posthumous reproduction threatens to blur the concept of "gen-
erations." For example, in a French case, a widow won the right to inseminate herself with
the preserved sperm of her late husband, who had been dead for two years. Judgment of
August 1, 1984, Trib. gr. inst., Fr., 1984 G.P., II 560. Many proposals call for prohibiting
posthumous retention of gametes.
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nurturance from the previous one, and it is difficult at best for the'
outgoing generation to contract successfully for such consideration
from the one succeeding it.663 The legal principles governing
human relationships in these zones beyond contract are properly
grounded in notions of equity, rather than the consent of the
parties.664
In ordering the dependent relationship of children to those
who raise them, the law ought to appeal to principles that the
child can appropriate as he or she progresses towards autonomy
and the capacity for consent. Basing parental rights on willingness
and ability to pay is not such a principle. Allowing parental rights
to flow from a de facto relationship of nurturance, however, is
such a principle, as is permitting parental rights to flow from line-
age. 65 Both nurturance and lineage represent forms of donation,
663. "[T]he challenge confronting the law is to avoid the degradation of personhood
and the debasement of birth by treating it as a matter of contract and technology rather
than as a celebration of life and continuity," L. TRIBE, supra note 311, at 1362 (footnote
omitted). "[E]ven if a father is not in a position to make an immediate financial contribu-
tion, locating him, ascertaining his paternity and fixing his responsibility ultimately may
turn into a valuable asset for his child." Krause, supra note 650, at 129. This can also be
viewed as a need to balance the values of individual autonomy with those of community
and responsibility. See Ryder, Comment,; in THE EcONOMICS OF THE FAMILY, supra note
641, at 77 ("[T]he replacement of a continually aging citizenry by new recruits is much
too important to the entire body politic to tolerate untrammeled individual choice to hold
sway.").
664. AID laws have been criticized for not requiring permanent records. This prac-
tice impedes the application of equitable principles. Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond
the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor, in GENETICS AND THE LAW II 331, 338 (A. Milun-
sky & G. Annas eds. 1980). A preference for the birth mother in AID laws rests on the
bond formed during the nine months of pregnancy rather than contractually expressed in-
tention. L. KAss, supra note 12, at 114-15; J. TRISELIOTIS, supra note 164; Bartlett, supra
note 222, at 30, col. 1.
665. In the words of Leon Kass:
. Our society is dangerously close to losing its grip oh the meaning of some
fundamental aspects of human existence. . . . [W]e noted a tendency . . . to
reduce certain aspects of human being to mere body, a tendency opposed most
decisively in the nearly universal prohibition of cannibalism. Here, in noticing
our growing casualness about marriage, legitimacy, kinship, and lineage, we dis-
cover how our individualistic and willful projects lead us to ignore the truths
defended by the equally widespread prohibition of incest (especially parent-child
incest). Properly understood, the largely universal taboo against incest, and also
the prohibitions against adultery, defend the integrity of marriage, kinship, and
especially the lines of origin and descent. These time-honored restraints implic-
itly teach that clarity about who your parents are, clarity in the lines of genera-
tion, clarity about who is whose, are the indispensable foundations of a sound
family life, itself the sound foundation of civilized community. Clarity about
your origins is crucial for self-identity, itself important for self-respect. It would
be . . .deplorable public policy to erode further such fundamental beliefs, val-
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the principle governing the laws of intestacy and inheritance and,
therefore, relations between the generations. Further, both genetic
endowment and nurturance of the child provide fundamentals of
human identity underlying the child's emergent capacity for
consent. 6
Traditionally, the only natural endowment relationships an
adult could enjoy with a child would be direct donation of the
physical requisites of life: sperm, ovum, nurturance in gestation,
or postnatal nurturance. The right to assume postnatal nurturance
as a function of parental right belonged, in the past, to the gesta-
tional mother and the genetic father who tendered immediate
postnatal nurturance. 667 Now, claimants also may include the
donatrix of the ovum who has not provided gestational care, as
long as she tenders immediate postnatal nurturance. 66 8 Arguably,
procreative intent separated from a genetic or nurturance contri-
bution might also be counted as a new source of claims in natural
endowment. Its characterization as natural endowment rather
than individual autonomy would focus upon the donation of life
which the intention confers on the child.6 ' However, this argu-
ment stretches the definition of natural endowment too far. The
element of intention alone does not unite persons in a relationship.
Even when donative, it is essentially an expression of individual
autonomy. Only conferral of the requisites of life is sufficient to
qualify as a basis for recognizing rights grounded in natural
endowment.
In either its strong or moderate type, the natural endowment
model of allocating parental rights rules out the acquisition of pa-
rental rights by contractual alienation. To resolve conflicts among
the parties who may claim parental rights based in natural endow-
ment, the law might give priority to gestational nurturance, as an
established nurturing relationship with the child in being.670 Other
ues, institutions, and practices.
L. KASS, supra note 12, at 113; see also P. RAMSEY, supra note 12 (grounding the defini-
tion of human life in flesh and the nature of parenthood); Kass, supra note 650, at 32-60.
666. L. KASS, supra note 12, at 254.
667. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
668. See supra text accompanying notes 167-74.
669. It has been suggested that this element of intentionality is meaningful to the
child and may pre-empt lineage, if not nurturance. Note, supra note 326, at 683.
670. Bartlett, supra note 222. The exclusion of contract under the natural endow-
ment model cannot be explained within typical law and economics formulas for moderating
conflicts between persons who wish to procreate and others who wish that they do not. See
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1099 (hypothesizing a requirement that people
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relevant principles might include recognizing that any other claim
in natural endowment is contingent both on formal respect of
marriage and the family as the preferred forum for child rearing
generally 71 and, in a particular case, on the demonstrable best
interests of the child. 67 2 Under the natural endowment model,
claims to parental relationship based on natural endowment would
presumably be suppressed to no greater degree than deemed nec-
essary for guaranteeing the best interests of children in general,
and the best interest of the child in a particular case. 73
The natural endowment model provides for the expression of
individual autonomy in a wider array of procreative projects than
the choice of marriage partner within the traditional regime of the
marriage contract.6 74 The model requires secondary state confer-
ral of status to resolve foreseeable conflicts among mutually exclu-
sive claims and perhaps also, to support marriage and the family
as the preferred forum for raising children, as well as state adjudi-
cation favoring the best interest of the child in concrete con-
flicts. 67 5 Yet, the model receives normative validation within the
American constitutional tradition precisely because it acknowl-
edges that neither third-party contractual consent nor state con-
ferral are reasons that justify the subjection of a generation to the
"parental" power of the generation raising it.
2. Enforcement of Promises to Reallocate Procreative
Resources and Parental Rights
The reasons underlying the legal enforcement of promises
have varied throughout the course of history and continue to do
so. Normative evaluations of contract-based proposals for the new
legal ordering of human reproduction sometimes begin by consid-
ering whether it is appropriate to enforce promises to reallocate
procreative resources and parental rights, rather than seeking the
buy the right to have children). Although the capacity for having children should be
treated as inalienable, it does not fit clearly within the category of "merit good" which
Calabresi and Melamed postulate as inalienable, because it is required by every person
attempting to fulfill an individual life plan. Id. at 1100. None of the law and economics
formulas provides an adequate explanation of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) or Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
671. Hafen, supra note 132, at 475-76.
672. Krause, supra note 303, at 192.
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abstract grounds for parental rights. When this occurs, the discus-
sion shifts to an assessment of the reasons proposed for the en-
forcement of promises.
The most categorical reason supporting the legal enforcement
of promises is the intrinsic moral force of promise itself. The idea
of the intrinsic moral force of promise contributed to the emer-
gence of the enforcement of purely executory contractual promises
in the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries.67 6 Within An-
glo-American case law, the idea crystallized in only one highly
particularized version, the will theory.6 7 In this form, it provides
the pivotal justification of enforcement of obligation in classical
contract theory. 78 According to the will theory, the state is justi-
676. Contract as "moral obligation" or even "mere intention to make a present"
evolved from Roman law in ecclesiastical courts. The concept remains in some civil law
jurisdictions in forms like the French cause. However, the idea had limited influence in the
development of the common law of contract because the English courts refused to use
canon law to interpret agreements. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 247, at 412-13. Nonethe-
less, some see modern contract as having roots in the enforcement of promises through
actions for breach of faith (laesio fidei) in English ecclesiastical courts. E.g., H. POTTER,
supra note 42, at 451.
The intrinsic moral enforceability of promises as a basis for legal enforcement, how-
ever, was lost in the wake of the doctrine of nudum pactum under common law. Id. at 452.
One commentator has suggested that common law courts developed assumpsit as a basis
for enforcing promises in order to compete with the equitable enforcement of promises
available in ecclesiastical courts and the Chancery. Id. at 450. Moral enforceability resur-
faced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 40. How-
ever, public morality, social welfare, and considerations of enforceability, at some point,
became reasons for limiting enforcement. See generally R. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE
RISE OF CAPITALISM (1926)(tracing medieval through modern theological thought on social
and economic issues).
The biblical story of Abraham begetting Ishmael of Hagar has been cited as a warrant
for societal approval of hired maternity arrangements. See, e.g., Hollinger, supra note 6, at
866; Ikemoto, supra note 326, at 1273; Katz, supra note 20, at 1-2. However, exegesis of
the biblical text does not support this use. In the narrative, the arrangement gives rise to
serious discord, with the "intended" mother so abusing the "surrogate" that the latter is
driven into the desert where she nearly dies. This presentation cannot be counted as a
ringing endorsement by the biblical writer. The backdrop of the narrative is, moreover, an
arrangement which would today be deemed slavery. The impregnation of the "surrogate,"
for instance, is presented as nonconsensual. The text could as easily be used to support
slavery as "surrogacy." See Genesis 16:1-16.
677. P. ATIYAH, supra note 44. The will theory is said to be-a product of formalism.
See Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 272-74 (1986) (wills
are enforced as contractual obligations representing the testator's desire to be bound). See
generally Horwitz, supra note 656 (discussing the development of will theory in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries).
678. See P. ATiYAH, supra note 44, at 41 ("[W]hat was new in contractual theory
was not the idea of a relationship involving mutual rights and duties, but the idea that the
relationship was created by, and depended on, the free choice of the individuals involved in
it."). Calamari and Perillo identify five variations on this theme: "Sovereignty of the
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fled in coercing the individual into performing the promise, based
on the individual's own exercise of his autonomous will in choos-
ing to be bound."" The state is required to coerce him, based on
his inducement of a similar exercise of will in another.680
Another ground for enforcement, related to morality, is the
equitable conviction that one who induces another to rely on a
promise should be held liable for detrimental harm that flows to
the other from subsequent nonfulfillment of the promise."' 1 This
ground was used to justify some recoveries in assumpsit prior to
the rise of the bargain theory of contract. 82 A second equitable
Human Will," "Sanctity of Promise," "Private Autonomy," "Reliance," and "Needs of
Trade." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 48, § 1-4(f). "Five theories - the will,
reliance, efficiency, fairness, and bargain theories - are most commonly offered to explain
which commitments merit enforcement and which do not." Barnett, supra note 677, at 271
(footnote omitted) (arguing for an updated theory based on "consent"). Formalism shifted
the ground to the reasonable or "objective" interpretation of the individual's words. None-
theless, choice, intention, and will still serve a normative role, with liability flowing from
the appearance of choice. Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Ap-
proach, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 145-46.
679. P. ATiYAH, supra note 44, at 71.
680. Id. Farnsworth calls this the "libertarian" justification. E. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 33, § 1.7; see also I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 134-44 (A. Albrecht trans.
1921) (defining the freedom of will as the source of law); Pound, The Role of Will in Law,
68 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1954) (describing the evolution of the extreme will theory of obliga-
tions to a foundation for the enforcement of reasonable expectations); Radin, Contract Ob-
ligation and the Human Will, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 575 (1943) (arguing that government
should enforce all voluntary agreements). Ultimately, the shift away from the idea of a
"just bargain," which had currency in the middle ages, to the enforcement of the intentions
of the will, which formed the basis of classical contract theory, reflects the influence of
Hobbes. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 71 (noting that Hobbes' view of the individual as
sovereign is the basis of property rights). The normative significance of will in classical
contract is also seen in the doctrine of "willful breach." Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230
N.Y. 239, 244, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921). In classical doctrine, a broader notion of moral
obligation is rejected as a ground of enforcement. See Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.
207, 210) 225, 228 (1825) ("[I]f there was nothing paid or promised for it, the law, per-
haps wisely, leaves the execution of [the agreement) to the conscience of him who makes
it."). See generally 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 38, § 148 (moral obligations are unenforce-
able because the concept of morality is individual and thus too vague to serve as a test for
enforceability).
Arguments for avoidance of the contract reallocating parental rights need not rely on
the impermissibility of the object. They may also be based on doctrines of unconscionabil-
ity, fraud, illusory promise, or the inapplicability of specific performance. See, e.g., In re
Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 376, 525 A.2d 1128, 1159 (1987), modified, 109 N.J. 396,
537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
681. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 48, §§ 1-4; Fuller & Perdue, supra note
55, at 54.
682. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 55, at 68. See generally Feinman, The Mean-
ing of Reliance: A Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1373 (discussing the rise of
the reliance theory of contract).
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conviction that has been used to support the enforcement of
promises is the idea that one who is indebted to another for a
performance received should be required to give compensation.
This justification was used to support recoveries in common law
debt actions."' s A related principle is seen in the law of quasi-
contract or unjust enrichment. 84 Both equitable principles are in-
telligible as applications of the traditional moral ideal of commu-
tative justice.6 85
The enforcement of contractual promises has also been justi-
fied by reference to social policy or broader social goals. 86 In
classical contract theory, the goal was to encourage private, fu-
ture-oriented economic planning and the functioning of markets,
both of which would generate wealth.687 In particular, each would
further the concrete tasks of implementing the technological dis-
coveries of the industrial revolution and exploiting the natural re-
sources that advances in transportation and communication made
available to the mature colonial age .6 88 A related justification is
683. P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 189-93.
684. Id. at 181.
685. Id. at 71 ("Commutative justice ... is receiving what you are contractually
entitled to receive."); see also J.W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 6 (1956); Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 780.
686. P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 36. A significant shift in the rationale underlying
contract enforcement came with the eclipse of the subjective will theory in its pure form
and its replacement by the "objective" theory of contract. "If . . . it were proved -by
twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, intended something else than the
usual meaning which the law imposes on them, he would still be held, unless there were
some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort." Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200
F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, J.), aft'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff'd, 231 U.S.
50 (1913).
687. Farnsworth calls this the "utilitarian" justification. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note
33, § 1.7. "Only a contract that involves an actual meeting of minds satisfies the econo-
mist's definition of a value-maximizing exchange." Kronman & Posner, supra note 643, at
5. See generally Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921) (dis-
cussing the development of contract). Enforceable promises have been described as a
"unique social engine" and the greatest tool ever invented. D. FESSLER & P. LoISEAUX,
supra note 57, at 1. During the classical period, contracts were certainly valued as instru-
ments to enforce autonomous market agreements. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 83.
For an explanation of "wealth maximization" as a normative ideal, see R. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 88 (1983); Greenawalt, Utilitarian Justifications for Observance of
Legal Rights, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS. AND THE LAW 139-47 (J. Pennock &
J. Chapman eds. 1982) (explaining the benefits of utilitarianism to society through the
operation of legal rights); Laycock, The Ultimate Unity of Rights and Utilities, 64 TEx. L.
REV. 407 (1985) (explaining the optimal balance of individual rights and social utility).
For a critique, see Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
688. This theory stands in contrast to the static social order of the middle ages. J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 48, §§ 1-3.
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the legal organization of the private sphere around the self-inter-
ested bargain. Benefits flowing directly to the individual as a re-
sult of the availability of contract enforcement as well as benefits
flowing indirectly from the aggregate enrichment of a society or-
ganized around the market were deemed to be a basis for ob-
taining common assent to the rule of law."'9
In its contemporary form, the social policy justification has
evolved to understand wealth in a more radically pluralist sense of
satisfaction of individual preference. The furtherance of the mar-
ket through the enforcement of contract is, in this form, deemed
justified because it facilitates the greater aggregate satisfaction of
all such preferences. 90 The current, related justification is the le-
gal organization of the private sphere around maximizing individ-
ual satisfaction of discovered desires.6 91
In the legal system, as it has evolved since the height of class-
ical contract theory, the role of contract is sharply limited, regard-
less of which rationale for enforcement is adopted.692 The freedom
to create contractual obligation does not structure the relation-
ships that comprise the greater part of the so-called private sector.
Complex corporate organizations largely dictate forms of coopera-
tion and individual roles. 93 Individuals do not, in most cases, con-
tract with each other for the productive generation of wealth. A
relatively small number of corporations contract for this pur-
pose.69 4 Although individuals contract for the satisfaction of their
689. "[Man] will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his
favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of
them .... [N]ever talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages." 1 A.
SMITH, supra note 33, at 26-27 (footnote omitted); see also P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at
81-83 (discussing Smith's proposition that individual interests and the common good bene-
fit from the enforcement of promises); Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 873-77.
690. See R. POSNER, supra note 639, at 100-05 (discussing how wealth maximization
reflects the preferences of those in society who produce the wealth); see also Coleman,
Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980) (comparing
wealth maximization theory to utilitarian theory).
691. The gestational mother in a hired maternity arrangement is said to receive not
only economic gain, but also experience with positive social response, the opportunity to
work out guilt over past abortions or children relinquished for adoption, and altruism. Rob-
ertson, supra note 222, at 650.
692. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 716-17; see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note
33, § 1.7 (tracing the evolution of contract theory). But see Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975) (arguing that increased public interven-
tion in contract is inevitable).
693. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 716-17, 734-35.
694. See id. at 716-17. Moreover, as business gets too complicated for courts to un-
derstand, the adjudication of contracts will not shape the conduct of business. L. FRIED-
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preferences as consumers, many of their needs are satisfied under
administrative law through the dispensation of governmental ben-
efits.6 95 Where they do contract for their needs, they generally do
so under standardized form contracts that are heavily regulated
by the state. 96 Patrick Atiyah argues that the judicial regulation
of contract has become less a matter of enforcing expectations
won in discrete bargains, and more a matter of adjusting condi-
tions in ongoing relationships, with contract viewed as a channel
for present exchanges.697
It is against this backdrop that the persuasiveness of argu-
ments for the enforcement of promises to reallocate 'procreative
and parental rights should be judged. Arguments based on the in-
trinsic moral force of promises and the autonomy of the will are
now generally ignored. In nearly all sectors, the law shows a cor-
responding reluctance to enforce purely executory promises. "The
somewhat mystical idea . . . that an obligation could be created
by a communion of wills, an act of joint, if purely mental, procre-
ation" has gone out of favor.698 The historically conditioned char-
acter of the will theory is now apparent. Its credibility was depen-
dent on the dominance of the small business in the economy such
as occurred during the period of industrialization that spanned the
century from 1770 to 1870.699 Its emergence was related to a shift
in the nature of property rights from a static, land-based system,
under which rights were acquired to be retained, to one based on
expectations for voluntary exchanges of rights of participation in
MAN, supra note 32, at 200.
695. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 1.7.
696. For discussions of the development of standardized contracts, see Siegelman v.
Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1955); 0. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDI-
ZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937); Kess-
ler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629 (1943); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
making Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971).
697. P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 724-25. Lawrence Friedman sums up the develop-
ment as follows: contract is "the system of rules applicable to marginal, novel, as yet un-
regulated, residual and peripheral business, and quasi-business transactions, transactions
which might, in exceptional cases, call for problem-solving and dispute settling. 'Contract'
stepped in where no other body of law and no agency of law other than the court was
appropriate or available." L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 198; see also Singer, The Reli-
ance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 647 (1988) (the consent basis of contract
has been undermined by modern economic conditions).




corporate profits.700 During its ascendancy, the will theory facili-
tated this transition by providing a formal notion of contractual
obligation that could be applied neutrally to all particular circum-
stances, without regard to the disparate social roles of the par-
ties. 70 1 It allowed the courts to overlook the harsh costs that the
mercantile system imposed on particular classes.702 And, it en-
couraged the market's ongoing leveling effect on status distinc-
tions based on class or occupation.703
When it became apparent that "freedom of contract" led to
monopolies and market failure, the will theory was shown to be
inconsistent with its secondary economic rationale.0 The result-
ing eclipse of the theory was hastened by a change in views on the
relationship between law and ethics. Deep-rooted philosophical
pluralism has led to hesitancy in applying moral imperatives di-
rectly to the justification of laws.7 0 5 The will theory, in particular,
suffers from a general shift in the law away from presupposing the
existence or moral significance of free will.706 Equitable rights and
700. The alienability of land represents a societal "evolution from the feudal policy
to the commercial policy." Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nine-
teenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1220 (1985)
701. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 408.
702. See, e.g., Monte v. Wausau Paper Mills Co., 132 Wis. 205, 111 N.W. 1114
(1907) (justifying failure to impose responsibility for death of worker upon employer). See
generally Kronman & Posner, supra note 643, at 267 (discussion of arguments that the
application of the doctrine of constructive conditions to employment contracts was prejudi-
cial to workers). Historically, the alienability of land has been said to have converted social
relations into relations to things, obscuring the issue of owner-state and owner-nonowner
relations. Alexander, supra note 700, at 1220-21.
703. The generality with which the principles of classical contract are stated is to be
contrasted with the particularity of earlier theory. In Blackstone's Commentaries, for in-
stance, the law of contract is conceived of in terms of particular forms of relationships.
Atiyah notes that in Blackstone's volume on the law of persons, chapters on Master and
Servant, Corporations, Husband and Wife, and Parent and Child contain material that just
forty years later, in a commentary written by Powell at the beginning of the classical pe-
riod, would be contained in a treatment of the general law of contract. P. ATIYAH, supra
note 44, at 215-16.
704. The idea of efficient breach demonstrates that, at times, modern economics re-
quires a departure from enforcing one's will. Where the marginal gain from breach exceeds
the gain from completion to the other party, breach should be encouraged as "value-maxi-
mizing," notwithstanding the fact of bargain. R. POSNER, supra note 639, at 90.
705. But see C. FRIED. CONTRACT AS PROMISE 16 (1981) (intentionally invoking a
convention leading to enforcement justifies enforcement). According to Owen Fiss, "[t]he
realists of the twenties and thirties were . . . intent on demystifying the law, and insisted
that the law's claim to determinacy and objectivity was a sham. . . . Their critique was a
prelude to having the law become an effective instrument of good 'public policy.'" Fiss,
The Death of Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 9 (1988).
706. C. FRIED, supra note 705.
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duties based on measurable benefits received and detriments suf-
fered are another matter. But, even the recognition of these has
tended to shift from a commutative to a distributive model of
justification.0 7
Curiously, arguments for legal enforceability based on the in-
trinsic moral force of promise have resurfaced in a surprisingly
strong form in the case of reallocation of procreative resources
and parental rights. One factor is explained by Patrick Atiyah:
In one major area of life, there has been, it may be urged, a
significant increase in the respect accorded to individual freedom
of choice. In all matters concerned directly or indirectly with
sexual morality, from homosexuality to abortion, from pornogra-
phy to adultery, the trend both of social mores and of the law
has been towards a greater recognition of the rights of con-
senting adults to lead their own private lives without interfer-
ence from the State. It seems paradoxical if, while these devel-
opments have been taking place, there has been at the same
time a decline in the values of individual freedom of choice in
the economic or commercial sphere. But the paradox must be
faced since there is no real doubt that both of these movements
have been taking place over recent decades.7 18
In an increasingly structured, impersonal, and static society,
the individualism cultivated by traditional market ideology finds
expression in the private realm of sexuality and procreation.
Within this realm, autonomy and choice are valued as supremely
meaningful. Here the will theory of contractual obligation finds a
new hold. Dimensions of life, which, in the classic model, remain
the bastion of status because they are seen as the source of indi-
vidual identity, become uniquely suited to appropriation and alien-
ation by the individual. Thus, there is a plausible ring to argu-
ments that promises to reallocate procreative resources and
parental rights ought to be considered legally enforceable, because
they represent an exercise of personal autonomy which has in-
duced a reciprocal exercise of autonomy in another. Subliminal
resonances from traditional ideas of the indissolubility of mar-
riage, as well as from primitive notions of the irrevocability of sex-
707. "[T]o deny the remedy of restitution because a breach is wilful would create an
anomalous situation .... Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias
Parish, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 22, 230 P.2d 629, 632 (1951).
708. P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 726-27. Such theories continue to be asserted but




ual union, reinforce this argument for legal enforceability based
on the moral force of promise in this context.70 9 Such reasoning
seems to underlie and inform Robertson's belief that the value of
individual autonomy is uniquely implicated in procreation and his
consequent insistence that contracts in the area should be enforced
as consistently as commercial contracts were under the late nine-
teenth century laissez faire approach. 10
A second justification is drawn from the social policy favoring
the generation of wealth. Once wealth is defined as the satisfac-
tion of individual preferences, then societal wealth can be in-
creased by encouraging exchanges that satisfy preferences. "
Again, the paradigm of the individual exercise of preference has
moved into the domain of sexuality and procreation.71 2 Thus, some
propose the enforcement of contracts reallocating procreative re-
sources and parental rights on this basis. Under such a system of
enforcement, however, market forces would rapidly effect social
reorganization, and the state would respond with regulation. The
satisfaction of individual preferences, then, would take place
within a whole new framework of static constraints. In the Rob-
ertson approach, one can, in principle, imagine state intervention
into the market process to uphold a favored distribution of the
requisites of sexual autonomy.713 Opening up sexuality and pro-
709. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 727.
710. Others urge a check on primitive, anti-social behavior.
[Human beings] are . . . creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to
be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is
for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who
tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, . . . to use him sexually
without his consent ....
...Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's
aggressive instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check by psychical
reaction-formations.
S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 58-59 (J. Strachey trans. 1930); see also A.
HUXLEY, supra note 12, at xix ("As political and economic freedom diminishes, sexual
freedom tends compensatingly to increase."); L. KASS, supra note 12, at 114 ("For them
the body is a mere tool, ideally an instrument of the conscious will, the sole repository of
human dignity. Yet this blind assertion of will against our bodily nature [is] in contradic-
tion of the meaning of the human generation it seeks to control ....").
711. P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 726-27. The business contract model of marriage
would promote state neutrality regarding party intentions and preferences. L. WEITZMAN,
supra note 226, at 204, 245; see also Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative
Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 242 (1980) (criticizing the use of wealth maximizing
principle to intensify the effects of the natural lottery and proposing that these effects
ought to be mitigated).
712. See supra note 710.
713. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1040.
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creation to contractual reallocation would gradually diminish the
meaning and justification of autonomous choice. Procreative con-
tracts would remain privileged just long enough to restructure the
procreative dimension of social life.
The lessons learned from the role of the will theory in classi-
cal contract should be applied in this context as well. The theory
itself has proven unpersuasive. It allows natural endowment to be
appropriated, alienated, and commercially exploited. On the
"other side" of the market waits a new static ordering. It would
be ironic if the ideology of nineteenth century laissez faire con-
tract found one last instance of recognition, and, in so doing, un-
dermined the very basis of belief in individual autonomy.
The argument that contractual reallocation of procreative re-
sources and parental rights will make society richer in the aggre-
gate satisfaction of individual preferences is also deficient. It ag-
gregates satisfaction of preferences that can be fulfilled through
individual exchanges but ignores satisfaction that emerges from
inalienable identity and enduring personal relationships. More
wealth in a market form means less "wealth" of another kind. 1
The trade off is not one which market reasoning itself can prop-
erly resolve. Further, the normative force of the mandate that in-
dividual preferences should be satisfied depends on the moral dig-
nity of the individual, a value -which is undermined by
commercializing human reproduction.
The equitable interest in charging an individual for the harm
flowing from the reliance of another on his promise or for a bene-
fit which he receives in connection with his promise is, in other
contexts, routinely made contingent on the societal judgment that
individuals should be encouraged to rely on promises of the kind
714. Dworkin, supra note 687. The expectation of a binding marriage constitutes a
non-market good. This expectation contributes to a distinctive type of societal wealth not
subject to advancement through market transactions. Hafen, supra note 132, at 486. Rela-
tional interests, such as sexual gratification, are distinct from interests in property and
personalty. Id. at 534 n.348. "It may be said that the less the profit motive enters into any
aspect of human reproduction, the more likely it is that having children will retain the
qualities of love and dignity." DUNSTAN REP., supra note 62, § 8.5.
With respect to legal restrictions on market exchanges, Owen Fiss argues that "[tihe
issue is not quantity but quality: It is not that a larger role for law must be assumed, but
rather that its role should be understood in qualitatively different terms. . . . [T]he duty
of the judge is not to serve the market, but to determine whether it should prevail." Fiss,
supra note 705, at 7. Market rhetoric, if adopted by everyone and in all contexts, would
change the social world. Radin, supra note 28, at 1884; see also Robertson, supra note 9,
at 408 (arguing that it is not the market transaction per se that warrants protection, but
the self-realization made possible by "procreative choice").
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in question or to confer benefits in connection with them.715 Ad-
mittedly, when reallocations of procreative resources take place,
detrimental reliance or the conferral of benefits seem to be rele-
vant to the equities of enforcement. However, these considerations
are only relevant to the extent that the promisee has been led by
society to consider reliance on the promise reasonable.710 Even as
between adult participants, they are not the only factors relevant
to equity. There are no grounds that compel the enforcement of
agreements to reallocate procreative resources or that justify the
enforcement of transfers of parental rights by contract. Promises
to reallocate procreative resources or to transfer parental rights
would be appropriately enforced as binding only if such realloca-
tions and transfers were found to be socially constructive for rea-
sons independent of the promises themselves. 7
3. Restrictions on the Alienation of Procreative Resources and
Parental Rights
If the presumption of individual autonomy underlying liber-
alism, libertarianism, and the law and economics movement7118 is
made the starting point of discussion, the evaluation of legislative
responses to the new human reproduction turns on the validity of
constraints on individual choice. A matter of peculiar appeal to
715. "A less than total commitment to the keeping of promises is reflected in count-
less ways in the legal system." Macneil, supra note 654, at 730; see also Eisenberg, supra
note 48 (exploring the extent to which contractual promises should be enforced based on
the bargain principle). Some have gone so far as to suggest that the present trend may
favor dispensing with the enforcement of the expectation interest altogether in favor of
compensating reliance. P. ATIYAH, supra note 644, at 5-6. Even "will" theorists and objec-
tivists concede that the scope of contract was set by the range of morally permissible or
legal objects. It is the absence of such limits that makes the more unidimensional approach
of the new formalism such a potentially compelling force for social transformation. G. GIL-
MORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 108 146-47 n.lI (1977).
716. "[W]e have never had and never shall have unlimited liberty of contract, either
in its phase of societal forbearance or in its phase of societal enforcement." A. CORBIN,
supra note 32, § 1376. Even if the promise is one that might be enforced, it can still be
attacked as failing to meet the minimal meaningful conditions for valid assent. Carbone,
The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity of Surrogacy Contracts, 28 S.
CLARA L. REv. 581, 597-600 (1988); see infra notes 772-76 and accompanying text.
717. See J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 253 (1966). As ap-
plied within the context of hired maternity, see Barnes, Delusion by Analysis: The Surro-
gate Motherhood Problem, 34 S. DAK. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1989) (courts should proceed
from values rather than doctrine in choosing a child's parents).
718. See R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181-204 (1985); C.B. MACPHER-
SON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1962); R. POSNER, supra note
639, at 113; Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 777-79.
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liberalism and allied movements is the freedom to alienate rights
and resources that an individual finds at his or her disposal."1 9
Any constraints on alienation must be justified. When the norma-
tive discussion of contracts for the reallocation of procreative re-
sources and parental rights is stated in these terms, the discussion
turns to an examination of whether any ground is powerful
enough to justify constraining alienation.
Judge Richard Posner makes the positive argument for the
alienation of procreative resources, new born infants, and corre-
lated parental rights.7 2 Posner sets forth an individual right to
maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences through exchanges
with others.7 21 Free exchanges, then, are self-validating in that
both parties, by definition, prefer what they receive over what they
sacrifice in the exchange.7 22 Judge Posner also suggests that the
parties have a right to government enforcement of promised per-
formance because the expectation of enforcement increases the
present value of the promise.'2' He applies this reasoning to
719. P. ATIYAH, supra note 44, at 113. For a general treatment and critique, see
Radin, supra note 28. From other perspectives, there is no such general presumption.
Michael Walzer, for example, stipulates the enforceability of contract only within the
sphere of goods appropriately treated as alienable. M. WALZER, supra note 17, at 100-03.
Under the Coase theorem, conferring entitlements furthers productivity and ultimately re-
sults in an efficient distribution, regardless of how and to whom these entitlements are
initially granted, assuming that there are no transaction costs. Coase, supra note 643.
720. He has offered the proposal both in the adoption context, R. POSNER, supra note
638, at I 11, 139-43; Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 70; Is Buying Babies Bad?, The
Economist, Jan. 12, 1985, at 14, and hired maternity context, Posner, supra note 7; Landes
& Posner, supra note 195. The position is critically analyzed in Prichard, supra note 642.
721. R. POSNER, supra note 687. Posner represents the head of this so-called "nor-
mative" branch of law and economics. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evalu-
ation of Economic Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 73, 76 (1989).
722. Posner, supra note 7, at 22-23; Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 323. But
see, Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOESTRA L. Rv.
711, 760 (1980) ("For every legal entitlement there is an equal and opposite legal expo-
sure."). On the separate question of monetary exchange or "market-alienability," ethical
criticism is considerably sharper. It has been judged "inconsistent with human dignity that
a woman should use her uterus for financial profit and treat it as an incubator for someone
else's child." WARNOCK REP., supra note 21, §§ 8.10, 8.17. Based on similar reasoning,
payment is considered, under existing law, to vitiate adoption consent. See, e.g., Franklin v.
Biggs, 14 Or. App. 450, 461, 513 P.2d 1216 (1973).
723. In the view of law and economics, contract's "basic function is to provide a
sanction for reneging, which, in the absence of sanctions, is sometimes tempting where the
parties' performance is not simultaneous. . . .[I]f such conduct were permitted, people
would be reluctant to enter into contracts and the process of economic exchange would be
retarded." As such, contract has been called "a standard set of risk-allocation terms." Even
assuming that a predictable allocation of risks is socially useful, there are other ways of
achieving predictive clarity than unwavering enforcement of contracted bargains. The
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demonstrate that contracts for the reallocation of procreative re-
sources and parental rights should be permitted and enforced,
since they enrich all adult parties to the exchange.2
Posner argues that constraints on enforceable contracts in
this area create inefficiencies leading to social disruption.7 25 One
example, which Posner made famous in his 1979 article with Eliz-
abeth Landes, is the shortage of babies now available for adoption
which is simultaneously accompanied by an excessive number of
abortions. 26 According to Posner, the net result of opening pro-
creation and parental rights to reallocative exchanges would be an
overall increase in efficiency, leading to higher quality babies ob-
tained at reduced average cost.7 27 By allowing. individuals to freely
exchange rights and resources, Posner believes that market forces
are unleashed which further enrich society.7 28
In order to justify any constraint on the exchange or its en-
forcement, in Posner's view, one must show either that the pros-
pect of mutual enrichment is illusory or that it is offset by exter-
nal costs to others, so that its value for efficiently fulfilling
aggregate preferences disappears.729  For instance, information
value, seen in this particular allocation, is that it "discourages, careless behavior."
Kronman & Posner, supra note 643, at 4.
724. Enforcement would seem to include specific enforcement, wherever it is bar-
gained and paid for. See Nerlove, The New Home Economics, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE
FAMILY, supra note 634, at 528, 532 ("the problem results from the condensation of a
sequential, dynamic set of decisions into a theory of choice based on the maximization of a
single, static, timeless utility function"); Posner, supra note 7, at 22-23; see also Schwartz,
The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (arguing for greater availa-
bility of specific performance as a remedy). The law and economics approach has been
criticized for assuming, without justification, the intertemporal consistency of desires. Kel-
man, Misunderstanding Social Life: A Critique of The Core Premises of "Law and Eco-
nomics." 33 J. LEGAL EDuC. 274, 277 (1983).
725. Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 324-27. According to these authors a
commercial market already exists, but is not acknowledged. Posner, supra note 200, at 59-
60; see also Robertson, supra note 222, at 28 ("long queues for distributing healthy white
babies").
726. Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 343.
727. Id. at 341. Law and economics provides an efficiency argument even for in-
stances of inalienability traditionally correlated with human dignity. For example: if it can
be safely assumed that almost no one would have a reason for self-enslavement, self-en-
slavement contracts can be assumed almost always to be the result of fraud or duress, so
that it is cheapest just to outlaw them, rather than determine on a case by case basis that
most should be avoided. A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 43, at 259.
728. Id. at 334-39. For a discussion of the efficiency effects of allowing the market to
operate in the production and distribution of human offspring, see Prichard, supra note
641, at 345-47.
729. "[Nlot all limitations on an individual's freedom of contract are inconsistent"
with a strong conception of individual autonomy which is a fundamental assumption of
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costs may render the prospect of mutual enrichment illusory. A
case for prohibiting the sale of human blood, for example, was
once made, based on the impossibility of discovering which blood
offered for sale with the prospect of financial gain was contami-
nated. After reliable tests were developed, this argument lost its
force, since the necessary information for a reliable bargain was
available at reasonable cost.7" A parallel argument, at least for
the voidability of hired maternity contracts, is that a woman has
no way of knowing how she will feel about relinquishing a child
after encountering her humanly unique offspring following child-
birth. Posner, however, argues that avoidance would occur so sel-
dom that no provision should be made for it.731
In assessing the economic efficiency of a transaction, the costs
and benefits imposed on all the parties to the transaction must be
taken into account. In the adoption setting, the emotional welfare
of the mother must be economically balanced against the welfare
of the baby in assessing the net gain. 3 2 Tort and criminal law
sanctions are intended to channel transactions to the marketplace.
If, for example, theft were not outlawed, economic actors would
not be likely to look to the marketplace to acquire goods. The law
positive economic analysis of law. Kronman & Posner, Note on Paternalism, in THE ECO-
NOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 43, at 253. An inalienability device which reduces
the costs of contracting and thus facilitates rather than retards the voluntary transfer of
entitlements would satisfy Posner's requirement. A limitation necessary to protect third
party interests would also suffice.
730. It has been proposed, on efficiency grounds, that there be no or only low pay-
ment for commercially exchanged sperm to avoid inducing non-disclosure of flaws in se-
men. Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 684. Conversely, on efficiency grounds, it has
been proposed that there be an open market in fetal tissues: "Persons who organize re-
sources and invest capital to provide viable fetal tissue for transplant are performing a
useful social activity. . . . [They should be given] the incentives necessary to organize and
provide the services in question." Robertson, supra note 199, at 477 (footnote omitted). On
restricting markets in human tissues, see BLOOD POLICY: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (D.
Johnson ed. 1976); R. SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1981); R. TITMUSS, THE GIFT
RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971); Annas, Life, Liberty &
the Pursuit of Organ Sales, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1984, 22-23.
731. Posner makes an assessment of satisfaction similar to that employed by any
other law and economics model. In making her decision, the gestational mother analyzes
the tradeoff between giving away a baby and the utility derived from the contractual re-
turn. Posner asserts that the relatively low incidence of litigation over hired maternity ar-
rangements indicates that women do not underestimate the personal cost of surrendering
the child. Posner, supra note 7, at 24-26. But see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656,
at 1113 (the unusual circumstances of hired maternity contracts undermine the validity of
assent and thus provide an efficiency rationale for denying the sale of entitlements).
732. See Posner, supra note 200, at 60 (analyzing an adoption transaction in terms
of its economic efficiency).
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against rape, then, can be seen as designed to protect the marriage
market. 3 The rationale for any inalienability of immunity under
tort or criminal law would be based on efficiency and a breakdown
in the possibility of rational choice. 3 Posner recognizes that the
children traded would be forced to bear such externalities. How-
ever, he asserts that these costs could be adequately checked by
licensing parents before they enter arrangements and regulating
their parenting after they have taken custody of the child.7 35 The
requirement of licensing is the only restraint on alienation Posner
is willing to recognize in bargains involving infants. The cost to
the child in the bargain is a lack of immunity from overt child
abuse. Posner's licensing requirement substitutes for the child's in-
capacity to contract to sell its immunity. In focusing on the palpa-
ble harms of overt child abuse, Posner accounts for the most su-
perficial dimension of the external effect on the child of
procreative contracts entered into by third-parties precedent to
conception or birth.7 36 This approach ignores the disposition of the
child's expectancy in life and relationship to others without its
consent. The weight of the practical and moral costs strains the
limits of Posner's notion of market failure.
If the exchanges in question are defined narrowly as the real-
location of procreative resources, leaving the ultimate allocation of
733. R. POSNER, supra note 639.
734. Id.
735. In Posner's view, the welfare of children cannot be harmed because by virtually
any measure they are better off alive than not alive. Posner, supra note 7, at 23-24. How-
ever, where efficiency may be diminished due to child abuse, Posner suggests licensing par-
ticipants as a condition to entering the contract. Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 343;
Posner, supra note 200, at 66.
736.
There is no presumption that the satisfactions of the thing traded, in most in-
stances a meaningless concept, are also maximized. If we treat the child as a
member of the community whose aggregate welfare we are interested in maxi-
mizing, there is no justification for ignoring how the child's satisfactions may be
affected by alternative methods of adoption. . . . [The] willingness to pay
money for a baby would seem on the whole a reassuring factor from the stand-
point of child welfare. Few people buy a car or a television set in order to smash
it. In general, the more costly a purchase, the more care the purchaser will lav-
ish on it.
Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 342-43. To the contrary, a rational economic actor
buys a durable good like a car or a television to "junk it" when its useful economic life is
over, or when a change in fashions or a change in the consumer's internal preferences
prematurely negates its utility. "All children may be burdened by special fears and insecu-
rities in a society where their parents may obtain money for family necessaries by giving
away newborn siblings." Allen, supra note 15, at 1763.
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parental rights to some alternative justification, then Posner's ar-
gument may, to some extent, be plausible. Once, however, paren-
tal rights are declared alienable, the parties do not merely expose
a third party, the child, to incidental harm that can be countered
with suitable regulation. They also assign power over every aspect
of the child's future. Appropriating and disposing of the child's
future for their own gain cannot be justified under the rubric of
the contracting party's right to free choice. Posner's failure to
draw this distinction leads to a fundamental inconsistency in his
attempt to justify the enforcement of contracts for the reallocation
of parental rights based on the value of individual preference.
The child may not exist at the time the contract is consum-
mated but will exist when the buyer attempts to assert rights over
the child based on the contract. The child may have received
the benefit of existence because of the parties' belief that the con-
tractual provision assigning parental rights would be enforced.
However, this simply signifies a donation by the intending parties
to the child. If individual autonomy is made the basis for parental
rights, donation does not justify the deprivation of the child's right
to consent to a third-party assignment of his future.
The exchange of resources requires that the resources be sub-
ject to appropriation and disposal; they must be subject to "reifi-
cation" or "commodification" sufficient to organize common un-
derstanding of the requisites of transfer and separate
ownership. 3 Posner agrees that the baby subject to a procreative
737. Any attempt to regulate hired maternity without considering this fact would
leave many problems unresolved. For example, there is the danger that the children "may
be burdened with extraordinary feelings of indebtedness to their biological fathers and re-
sentment toward their unknown natural mothers." Allen, supra note 15, at 1763.
738. Calabresi and Melamed view governmental acquiescence in "natural" patterns
of parenting where no contract enforcement is involved as a recognition of an implicit form
of property right or entitlement. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1090-91. While
these authors would stress that this property right is inalienable and does not amount to a
right in the child as a thing, they severely tax the usage of the language in this regard. Id.
at 1092-93. Even John Robertson makes this claim. Robertson, supra note 222, at 653
(buying right to rear child is not to treat gestational mother or child as a commodity); see
infra note 830. An alternative to the economics approach is to characterize the natural
patterns of parenthood in terms of given dyadic or bipolar relations, rather than individual
rights and entitlements. Liability rules can be expressed in terms other than an entitlement
to pursue individual preferences. They can be traced to both moral duties and a vision of
the social good underling politics. Professor Fiss has argued that this moral dimension is an
irreducible element in law, which law and economics can displace only by eliminating law.
Fiss, supra note 705, at 2-8.
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contract should not be delivered over to abuse.7 9 He asserts that
the standard of care required in relating to a person may be en-
forced in the case of the child, and that this guards against the
evil which the expression "commodification" connotes. However,
he misses the point. If the child is a person, then parental rights
are essentially "bipolar," and cannot be alienated without at least
the substituted consent of the child. Unilateral alienation by the
parent implicitly amounts to treating the right as a right in rem.
It is on this ground that personal services contracts are generally
not subject to delegation.7 40 By making parental rights subject to
the unilateral alienation of the parent, Posner implicitly treats the
child as a thing or commodity.741 At the very least, the restrictions
he admits as appropriate on the treatment of the child are indis-
tinguishable from regulations prohibiting cruelty to animals.
An argument could be made that it is in the interest of chil-
dren generally to be subject to a general rule that parental rights
be extended over the child according to a contract between third
parties contributing to the child's conception and gestation or
their assigns. In that case reference to state conferral and not
alienation by contract itself would account for the allocation of
rights. Posner does not recognize or pursue the need for such a
step in his argument. If he were to attempt it within the limited
framework he has already developed, the argument would fail. At
most, he can say that the rule generally leads to "better quality"
children at "lower cost. '7 42 But, quality is determined by the pref-
739. Posner, supra note 200, at 59.
740. See Wolf, Enforcing Surrogate Motherhood Agreements:. The Trouble with
Specific Performance, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 375, 403 (1987) (arguing that
breach of a hired maternity, like any personal service contract, should be remedied by a
damage award, not specific performance). The remedy of specific performance has been
said to violate the 13th amendment. Holder, Surrogate Motherhood: Babies for Fun and
Profit, 12 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 115, 117 (1984). Lawrence Tribe argues that
"rights that are relational and systemic are necessarily inalienable: individuals cannot
waive them because individuals are not their sole focus." Tribe, The Abortion Funding
Conundrum, Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99
HARv. L. REv. 330, 333 (1985).
741. "Children are potentially free, and life is the direct embodiment of this poten-
tial freedom. Hence they are not things, and cannot be said to belong to any one, their
parents or others." HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 177 (S.W. Dyde trans. 1896).
742. Efficiency in pursuing larger eugenics goals would clearly be more readily ob-
tained through coordination by the state. Intermediate eugenics and commercial projects
could be most efficiently pursued through corporate, rather than individual, activity. The
conception of children to be reared in families hardly begins to touch on the commercial
possibilities enabled by the new reproductive technologies, if pursued on a market basis.
See A. HUXLEY, supra note 12, at 3-5. Restrictions based on conservation and supply man-
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erences of third parties. The benefit of reduced cost likewise ac-
crues to third parties. In the individual case, only concrete circum-
stances and not the contract itself could possibly establish whether
the enforcement of the contract would lead to the material best
interests of the child.
Posner's framework is -insufficiently nuanced to alert him to
the error he makes here even within the terms of his own system.
While Richard Epstein vigorously rejects most limits on alienabil-
ity of rights and resources, he recognizes that consistency in his
postulates requires that alienability be restricted by the negative
norms of the criminal and tort law, since they provide the norma-
tive ground for upholding the enforcement of contract. 43 This
normative consideration offers a reasoned basis to limit the aliena-
tion of parental rights, even within a perspective according maxi-
mum recognition to the market, while avoiding the problems asso-
ciated with Posner's approach.
However, arguments for the inalienability of parental rights
may also be traced to externalities falling elsewhere than on the
children. Externalities of exchanges can fall not only on individu-
als, but can affect what are called "common pool" assets.7 44 The
management of common pool assets can be used to justify restric-
tions on alienation, without departing from the basic norm that
individual exchanges should be permitted wherever they maximize
the aggregate of individual preferences. 45 Susan Rose-Ackerman
treats the management of the human population as a common
pool problem, suggesting that the state limit forms of alienation of
agement are efficiency-related. See Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 341.
743. As a libertarian, Epstein seems to acknowledge a consistent normative founda-
tion bridging the market and other rights. This normative bridge allows him to justify the
restriction of the market in the narrow cases of threatened aggression against third parties,
overexploitation of common pool, exploitation of infants and insane persons, or breach of
fiduciary duty, as well as to compensate for market failure. Epstein, Why Restrain Aliena-
tion?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 970, 970, 983-90 (1985). According to Calabresi and Melamed,
the legal system cannot afford to present its criminal penalties as a matter of what the
scholastics called "a purely penal law," that is, one which citizens should feel free to ignore
as long as they are willing to pay the penalties imposed by the authorities. To do so would
impose economically quantifiable costs by undermining "rules and distinctions of signifi-
cance beyond the specific case." Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1126.
744. See Epstein, supra note 743, at 978 (A common pool exists where "one person
is not the exclusive owner of a single resource, but shares it in indefinite proportions with
other claimants.").
745. Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 931, 942 (1985).
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procreative resources that would lead to overpopulation.746 While
there may be a tendency to more readily credit common pool as-
sets of a tangible nature, it would be arbitrary not to credit intan-
gible common pool assets as well.747 One example is social lineage.
A parent cannot contract away his or her rights, without also con-
tracting away the relationships of grandparents, aunts, uncles, and
so forth. 48 On a greater level of abstraction, a parent cannot con-
tract away his or her rights without undermining the currency and
meanings of relationships based on lineage within society
generally.
Others have attempted to go further and articulate grounds
beyond efficiency and consistency which may justify inalienability,
even if their goal at times may seem to be as much to restrict as
to expand the range of grounds that merit recognition. One
ground for limiting alienability is the redistribution of wealth. 49
It must be understood that inalienability, in the liberal view, is a
redistribution of wealth, from those denied the opportunity of ex-
change to third parties who benefit from the prohibition on the
exchange.750 Some hold that any redistribution is wrongful and
746. Id.
747. For example, fish, pasture land, forests, oil pools, and deep sea minerals. Id. at
931-32.
748. In Baby M, for example, the grandparents sought visitation rights but were
denied. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. 313, 401-08, 525 A.2d 1128, 1172-76 (1987); see also
Foster & Freed, Grandparent Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 43
(1979). The status of the extended family underlies tribal rights to dictate child custody.
See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. [[ 1901 (1988).
749. G. CALABRESI, supra note 131, at 24-33; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 656, at 1093; Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472
(1980). In this view, wealth is broadly defined as maximal benefits relative to burdens on
individual preferences. At some points, wealth, so defined, will be evenly affected by either
outcome. Calabresi and Melamed stress that society must pursue some "distributional"
goal external to efficiency in making its choice. They even concede that distributional goals
may sometimes be appropriately pursued, even where doing so impedes the creation of
wealth. What they wish to uncover and exclude, however, are cases in which private inter-
ests garner special wealth at a net overall loss to society, but do so by manipulating distri-"
butional goals to their advantage. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1115. See
supra note 642.
750. As Posner puts it, "Are the infertile to be blamed for a glut of unwanted chil-
dren? If not, should they be taxed disproportionately to alleviate the glut?" R. POSNER,
supra note 687, at 24. Assuming that there is no principled side-constraint on the market
-at this juncture, some would argue that it would be better to tax those disadvantaged by
distributional goals and distribute the proceeds to those advantaged in the form of a direct
subsidy. Epstein, supra note 743, at 988-89. For a critique of the cost-benefit framework,
see Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 387, 388 (1981) ("[Tlhe program of generating a complete system of private law
rules by application of the criterion of efficiency is incoherent.").
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
that any rule of inalienability must be accompanied by payment
to those subject to its restriction to offset its redistributive ef-
fects.751 Since the initial allocation of economic power is the pre-
mise ftom which Pareto optimality is assessed, even an efficient
distribution is subject to criticism from the perspective of distribu-
tive justice.752  Others, therefore, admit that redistribution
achieved through inalienability may be acceptable, but request
that the state establish that the redistribution is "just" under some
secondary norm.753
Assuming that the redistributive effects of inalienability are,
in principle, subject to justification, the normative consideration
that justifies the denial of opportunities to undertake procreative
projects to those who are only able to do so through reallocative
exchanges must be identified. Similarly, a justification must be of-
fered for denying opportunities to make money and to experience
the subjective satisfactions of employment as a donor or vendor of
procreative resources and parental rights in order to redistribute
implicitly corresponding advantages to those who can reproduce
without such reallocations. The corresponding advantages under
this system of "inalienability" would be the "end-use" enjoyment
of parental rights, since those who are able to reproduce without
the reallocation of procreative resources would be equally prohib-
ited from alienating their parental rights. Thus, this system works
to the advantage of those who can procreate naturally and, at the
same time, wish to retain the custody of their children. On an-
other level, those who derive psychic satisfaction from the continu-
ing meaning of lineage as a basic term of social organization,
would also be deemed recipients of advantages. 54
One normative justification which the proponents of alienabil-
ity raise and reject as inappropriate, is the superior worth of those
751. Within a scheme of universal commodification, any rule of inalienability is a
taking. See Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurispru-
dence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1685 (1988) (discussing the role of "total
individual control" of property as "the underpinning of the market society"). For a discus-
sion of the dangers of attempting to achieve distributional goals through restraints on alien-
ation, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656 at 1114.
752. A distributive equilibrium is considered "Pareto-optimal" if no redistribution
would serve to make everyone better off. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMics 435 n.12 (11th
ed. 1980); see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1093-94 (arguing for eco-
nomic efficiency in determining entitlements).
753. See Posner, supra note 200, at 64-68.
754. Id. at 68.
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endowed naturally with procreative resources. 55 Another is a nat-
ural superiority in the psychic preferences of some for the continu-
ing meaning of lineage.75 '6 Both normative justifications are criti-
cized as violations of the principles of equality and neutrality. 57
But, these are not the norms that ought to be proposed to support
the "redistribution" implicit in the inalienability of procreative re-
sources. Rather, the relevant justification is that respect for non-
market, natural endowment distribution of opportunities for
parenthood best serves the needs of children, and, perhaps, also
produces the most desirable societal pattern of reltionships re-
lated to procreation.758
Even if one concedes, for the sake of argument, that respect-
ing natural endowment is "redistributive," this purpose is more
than sufficient justification. All legislative activity within a society
dominated by an activist state has redistributive effects.75 9 The
fact that the means of redistribution takes the form of an imposi-
tion of inalienability rather than a system of tax and subsidy or
some other means is irrelevant, beyond the need to take into ac-
count the peculiar costs inalienability may have for society.7 60
Under the existing activist welfare state, all that is generally re-
quired to justify such redistributions is a rational state purpose,
except where costs fall on the exercise of a "fundamental" right or
disproportionately on a "suspect class," in which case justification
755. Some "other justice" arguments can be exposed as subterfuge providing "a hid-
den way of accruing distributional benefits for a group whom we would not otherwise wish
to benefit." Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1115.
756. "The world is changing, and practices that seem weird and unnatural to mem-
bers of the current adult generation will seem much less so, I predict, to the next genera-
tion." Posner, supra note 7, at 24.
757. See supra notes 755-56.
758. In some areas, implicated deontological norms related to human dignity may be
so basic that it is inappropriate to treat market equilibrium as the base line from which to
identify redistributions. Relationships grounded in human procreative and rearing capacity
constitute one such norm.
759. G. CALABRESI, supra note 36; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1098
("All societies have wealth distribution preferences."). In the extreme view, equality would
be the only goal acknowledged outside of efficiency, validating governmental redistribution
of benefits and burdens. Equality might be defined as equal access by adults to the possibil-
ity of pursuing procreative projects. Contract, if seen as a "delegated public power," could
be understood as furthering this distributional goal.
760. Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) ("[I]t is for the legis-
lature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages."). But cf. First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 328 (1987) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (despite the temporary cost to the individual, redistributive policies are
not always a "taking" in the constitutional sense).
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requires a compelling state interest. The freedom of contract is
not viewed as a "fundamental" right.7 61
Calabresi and Melamed assert that some legitimate reasons
for restricting alienability, while technically redistributive, are
viewed more precisely as "other justice" concerns that are subject
to their own descriptive labels. Generally, they refer to such spe-
cial grounds for distribution as "moralisms. ' 762 One such ground
is "paternalism. 7 6 3 Although the idea of paternalism is anathema
to liberalism, some degree of paternalism is unavoidable in law,
because some members of society are less than autonomous.7 Pa-
ternalism, in fact, underlies all law dealing with the choices of
761. J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 71-87, 91 (1986); Feinberg, Autonomy, Sover-
eignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution? 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 445, 467-
83, 488 (1983). Moreover, a deontological norm rules out governmental redistribution of
some elements of natural endowment, such as intelligence or kidneys. At the same time,
most would agree that beneficiaries of this "initial" distribution have at least a supereroga-
tory moral obligation to share their personal gifts with others, or to use them in serving
others.
762. Calabresi and Melamed classify these concerns as aspects of distribution, the
only categorical alternative to efficiency. However, within their economic framework, it is
more precise to term them "other justice" concerns, as they themselves do on occasion:
To the extent that one wishes to delve either into reasons which, though possibly
originally linked to efficiency, have now a life of their own, or into reasons
which, though distributional, cannot be described in terms of broad principles
like equality, then a locution which allows for "other justice reasons" seems
more useful.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1105 (footnote omitted).
763. Brock, Paternalism and Autonomy, 98 ETHIcs 550, 551 (1988). This right is
somehow kept distinct from "the right to decide the life or death of the child." Robertson,
supra note 9, at 462. The child's psychic distress over its "weird" origins is acknowledged
as an externality, but dismissed on the ground that this distress will diminish if such ar-
rangements become customary. Posner, supra note 7, at 24. The reasoning structure Rob-
ertson proposes to support this point merits closer examination. He claims that the contract
right is fundamental since two moral values are implicated, individual autonomy and the
opportunity to pursue procreative experimentation. Because it has been granted a special
status as "fundamental," contract excludes other moral values, including respect for rela-
tionships grounded in lineage and nurturance, and for the dignity of the person. Other than
his two privileged values, all moral values are deemed by Robertson to be "interests"
claimed by adoption agencies and "pro-lifers" or other moralists. The crucial move
privileging his chosen values is attributing to them a "fundamental" status, which he never
justifies morally, and which is unsupported in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of
the United States. Robertson, supra note 9, at 426-29. Notwithstanding the lack of princi-
pled justification. Robertson gives his primary values such great weight that as between the
welfare of children and the unrestricted pursuit of his chosen values, the burden of proof is
on children's welfare. Id. at 434.
764. See Kronman & Posner, supra note 729; Kronman, Paternalism and the Law
of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983). For a moderate and well argued view that some
form of paternalism in lawmaking is unavoidable, but that it belongs more to legislatures
than courts, see Shapiro, supra note 481.
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infants and children, and it accounts for the law's restriction on
the right of children below the age of capacity to contract. 6 5 In
addition, the more substantial proposals to restrict the freedom to
enter into contracts related to procreation are grounded in a con-
cern for defending the equality and welfare of children from the
incursions of others, namely self-interested adults.766 This concern
is entirely unrelated to the quintessential case of paternalism, the
protection of the person from the consequences of his or her own
choices. 76 7 The assertion that restrictions on procreative contracts
are based on paternalism and, thus, are indefensible from the per-
spective of liberalism largely misses the point.
Secondary arguments against such contracts are adduced on
the grounds that harm may flow to adult participants. This is par-
ticularly true with respect to the potential harm to the gestational
mother as a result of forceable severance of the mother-child bond
at birth, based on an earlier promise.76 8 Calabresi and Melamed
note that paternalism is always a societal option, although many
would argue for a heavy presumption against it.76 9 Paternalism
would appear to be particularly offensive when directed against
women, who have historically suffered from masculine "imperial-
ism" in the guise of paternalism.7 °
However, it is not correct to identify most arguments against
procreative contracts based on potential harm to adult partici-
pants as simply paternalistic. Instead, they are what Calabresi
and Melamed term "self-paternalism. 77 1 Where the reasonable
765. This "presents a challenge to libertarians." Kronman & Posner, supra note 729,
at 254-56; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1113 (paternalism is some-
times based on the notion that adults know better than minors what is good for minors).
766. See Annas & Elias, supra note 12 at 157.
767. Paternalism, in its proper meaning, is present if the "sole justification for impos-
ing it is to promote or protect the individual's own welfare (or happiness or good)."
Kronman & Posner, supra note 729. Moreover, "the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others." J.S. MILL, supra note 176, at 10-I1.
768. Even advocates of an autonomy approach engage in paternalistic weighing of
advantages and disadvantages to the gestational mother, if only for the sake of argument.
See, e.g., Robertson, supra 222, at 34.
769. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1113; see also Shapiro, supra note
481, at 521 (arguing courts should only act on paternalistic grounds if legislature so
directs).
770. A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983): B. ROTHMAN, IN
LABOR: WOMEN AND POWER IN THE BIRTHPLACE (1982); Rubin, supra note 223, at 157;
see also J.S. MILL, The Subjection of Women, in ESSAYS'ON SEX EQUALITY 427 (A. Rossi
ed. 1970).
771. Consent theorists limit such grounds to those relating to freedom maximization.
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person would recognize that conditions may undermine valid as-
sent, he or she may wish for rules of law which protect against the
consequences of predictable weaknesses of judgment in those cir-
cumstances.772 In the context of contracts concerning human re-
production, this reason would support policies making some
promises voidable, especially in the case of hired maternity. Such
a policy is not sexist because it is not premised on any perceived
weakness peculiar to the feminine mind, but rather on the objec-
tive characteristics of gestation.773
Self-paternalism would avoid irrevocably binding a party to a
hired maternity contract for the personal performance of a service
which is against his or her bodily inclinations. This is one reason
that personal service contracts are not specifically enforceable and
one cannot alienate present certainty over future personal per-
formance. 7 If the gestational mother is irrevocably bound in ad-
See J. KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 55 (1984) (discussing the justifications of consent-based pa-
ternalism); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1113.
772. Calabresi and Melamed offer the example of Ulysses tying himself to the mast.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1113.
773. This is one version of inalienability, albeit weak, that can be applied to hired
maternity. See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (finding a hired mater-
nity contract void after gestational mother wished to disaffirm the contract); Allen, supra
note 15, at 1780 (suggesting that "the commercial character of the surrogate mother's
aims and motives necessarily takes her outside the realm of constitutionally protected pri-
vacy."). It is widely acknowledged that "the nine-month gestational period creates a unique
and powerful bond for both donor and offspring that seems to justify a claim in its own
right." Robertson, supra note 222, at 34. The restriction in question is a trade of short-
term restriction of choice for longer-term, more meaningful freedom of choice. Calabresi
and Melamed, supra note 656, at 1113.
774. For example:
[Tihe vital question remains whether a court of equity will, under any circum-
stances, by injunction, prevent one individual from quitting the personal service
of another? An affirmative answer to this question is not, we think, justified by
any authority to which our attention has been called or of which we are aware.
It would be an invasion of one's natural liberty to compel him to work for or to
remain in the personal service of another.
Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1894). Even where a contract would other-
wise be specifically enforceable, enforcement will be denied where there is special reason to
question the obligor's original assent, even where there is no contractual incapacity, or
where public policy is offended, even where it is not so offended as to allow an award of
money damages. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 12.7 (discussing specific perform-
ance and injunctions generally); 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 38, §§ 1423, 1427, 1429
(discussing specific performance as it relates to employment contracts and mistake, and
public policy reasons precluding such recovery).
The construct of classical contract law presupposes that money damages are the ap-
propriate remedy. Id. § 1338. One measure of the scope of contract is to ask what kinds of
transactions involve expectations which are properly monetizable, paralleling, on the one
hand, the border of legality, and, on the other, that of equitable rights not subject to money
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vance to deliver over the baby upon birth, she will find herself in
the position of alienation from her own bodily inclination for the
part of the pregnancy remaining after a change of mind. She may
be forced to relinquish the newborn contrary to a deep physiologi-
cal disinclination." 5
A somewhat weaker argument, also based in self-paternalism,
could be directed against the enforcement of irrevocable promises
to alienate parental rights even where gestation is not concerned.
Identity flows, even in an advanced culture, on at least one level
from lineage and genetic relationship. One can psychologically
overcome an irrevocable alienation of personal property. However,
this may not be possible with a promise to desist from asserting a
genetic relationship. The genetic relationship will always remain a
horizon of basic meaning which the person is forever barred from
exploring by such a promise, notwithstanding entirely unforeseen
changes in life circumstances.77 6 Self-paternalism could explain a:
rule making contractual alienation of parental rights provisional.
The best interests of the child would not be served by this power
of avoidance extending much beyond the time of birth. The reason
damages. See generally Kronman, supra note 764 (mistakes must be depersonalized
through money damages).
775. Cf. Means, supra note 16, at 459-62 (noting the reluctance of American courts
to specifically enforce personal service contracts). The idea that the assertion of money
damages against the mother in lieu of specific performance would save the arrangement is
not tenable. Such a rule would harm the child if the mother chose to retain custody and
pay damages, and the choice itself would pose a cruel and solomonic dilemma for the
mother. For an analogous proposal, see. Robertson, supra note 222, at 30 (noting that chil-
dren of "surrogate" parents, like many adopted children, may have problems with self-
esteem or try to discover the identity of the missing parent). The literature shows that the
management of hired maternity, regardless of the particulars of the arrangement, tends
towards a depersonalizing control over the gestational mother's personal autonomy.
A major source of uncertainty and stress is likely to be the surrogate her-
self. In most cases she will be a stranger, and may never even meet the [in-
tending] couple. The lack of a preexisting relation between the couple and surro-
gate and the possibility that they live far apart enhance the possibility of
mistrust. Is the surrogate taking care of herself? Is she having sex with others
during her fertile period? Will she contact the child afterwards? What if she
demands more money to relinquish the child? To allay these anxieties, the
couple could try to establish a relationship of trust with the surrogate, yet such a
relationship creates reciprocal rights and duties and might create demands for
an undesired relationship after the birth. Even good lawyering that specifies
every contingency in the contract is unlikely to allay uncertainty and anxiety
about the surrogate's trustworthiness.
Id. at 29-30.
776. It has been claimed that adoption is an act of violence and that women miss
their children years later. J. SHAWYER, DEATH By ADOPTION 91-120 (1979).
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is that the child has a right to establish an irrevocable bond of
nurturance with particular parents. This right is itself a matter of
natural endowment: it undermines the claim that parental rights
ought to be subject to unilateral alienation by contract. It simulta-
neously limits the freedom to revoke a waiver of parental rights
once the child's "right to nurturance" has concretely arisen.
Calabresi and Melamed propose one last "moralism" as a
ground for restricting alienability; that is, the psychic injury that
flows to observers who consider a given act morally offensive,
where such injury does not lend itself to "collective measurement"
permitting the sufferer to be compensated objectively for his or
her suffering.77 An example would be the widespread conviction,
embodied in law, that human flesh ought not to be prepared and
eaten as a victual or prepared and sold for this purpose. 78 This
notion is destined to be the locus of much of the debate critical to
whether society ultimately validates the contractual reallocation of
procreative resources and parental rights. Some writers, like
Judge Posner, tend to dismiss all arguments against the enforce-
ment of procreative reallocations as "symbolic" and "psychic"
emotivism.77 9 They mean to reduce all these arguments to "moral-
777. The authors define moralism, in this sense, as a "nonmonetizable external cost."
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1111-12. They concede that, at some point,
ethics has a place in public discussion: "Indeed when we approach bodily integrity we are
getting close to areas where we do not let the entitlement be sold at all and where economic
efficiency enters in, if at all, in a more complex way." Id. at 1125-26. They justify this
observation by noting that psychic perceptions of the cost of moral violations of bodily and
personal integrity are too subjective to allow a public aggregation of costs, "[W]e would
not presume collectively and objectively to value the cost of a rape to the victim against the
benefit to the rapist." Id. at 1125. Another example they give is the moral affront of future
generations threatened by "a despoiled, hazardous environmental condition which they are
powerless to reverse.". Id. at 1124. Cf. D. MEYERS, INALIENABLE RIGHTS 53 (1985) ("A
moral system would fail ... if it could require right-holders to relinquish the goods to
which inalienable rights entitle them or could prescribe abridgments of inalienable
rights.").
778. Another typical example is self-enslavement. See Kronman & Posner, supra
note 729, at 256-60.
779. Kronman and Posner treat "moralisms" as no more than the psychic anguish
experienced by an offended majority. They characterize the concept as an essentially un-
persuasive attempt to avoid the "embarrassment of paternalism." Further, they argue that
before the concept can be shown to be relevant, it must be established that it draws on "a
conception of liberty and personal dignity which is embodied in the central provisions of
our Constitution and to which we are committed as a people," and, further, that it is so
basic that "no person in his right mind would abandon the moral ideal." Id. at 258-59.
These authors question whether it makes sense to credit feelings that one person's self-
respect is undermined by the self-enslavement of another. Id. at 258. A contrasting position
can be seen in the work of Anita Allen who sees a distinction between "mere moralism and
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isms" and to dismiss moralisms as nonprobative.
As shown, the most substantial restriction on alienability pro-
posed in this area flows from the bipolar nature of parental rights.
Such an argument does not necessitate direct reference to the con-
cept of moralism, but rather consistently applies the premises of
individual autonomy and efficiency.7 80 Discussion of the normative
standing of moralisms should not detract from this fundamental
limit on the alienability of parental rights. Still, this fundamental
limit alone might not apply to reallocations of procreative re-
sources that do not expressly transfer parental rights in the result-
ing child. In other words, the scope of enforceable exchanges
might extend only to the physical disposal of gametes and gesta-
tional capacity within a procreative project. Contractual realloca-
tions might enable the autonomous individual to plan and execute
the procreation of the child, but not directly determine the alloca-
tion of parental and rearing rights. 81
In this latter scenario, the state might intervene to allocate
parental rights based either on natural endowment or state confer-
ral, allowing a role for contract only before the child's conception.
Contract would be available as an instrument for manipulating
the physical preconditions of conception for the purpose of estab-
lishing eligibility for parental rights based on secondary grounds
of natural endowment or state conferral. For instance, a party
might contractually arrange to enjoy absolute priority under a
scheme of natural endowment, by being the one to gestate the
baby or to have extra-legal possession of the baby at the moment
of bonding. As such, contract might provide a point of entry into
status, which in turn would provide the basis for subsequent legal
ordering.
The normative status of moralisms is decisive in deciding
whether contractual exchanges of procreative resources, which are
paternalism" and "degradation, exploitation, slavery, baby selling, or racism", fundamen-
tally compromising the dignity of the person. Allen, supra note 15, at 1763. Posner's re-
sponse is that the breakdown in a commonly affirmed moral fabric means that what once
could pass as objective assaults on human dignity now must be interpreted as subjective,
psychic moralistic injuries. See Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 344-46 (discussing
moral objections to baby selling and the social costs of alternatives); see also Posner, supra
note 200, at 70-71 (arguing that the question is how to regulate baby selling, not whether it
should exist).
780. See supra text accompanying notes 639-46 & 718-36.
781. See Jansen, Sperm and Ova as Property, 11 J. MED. ETHICS 123 (1985)(dis-
cussing conflicting views of ownership of donated gametes in light of these cells' ability to
carry readily usable genetic information).
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distinct from parental rights, ought to be enforced. One question
concerns the specific enforcement of promises to contribute ga-
metes or gestational capacity. At this point, no one seriously pro-
poses enforcement of either kind of promise. As to the vending of
gametes, present performance by the vendor triggers a contractual
obligation on the part of the purchaser to pay, not the other way
around.7 2 Future planning is facilitated by the long-term storage
of gametes, once the gametes are obtained.7 13 The purchaser has
no incentive to seek to specifically enforce promises of future do-
nations of gametes. The constitutional barriers to enforcing such
promises would be difficult to overcome. 84
The purchaser of gestational capacity has little or no incen-
tive to obtain a binding promise for future performance. The num-
ber of women willing to serve this purpose and a rough
equivalency in quality of the service, once the woman's health and
nutrition are ensured, yield a well-supplied market. Once again,
there are significant constitutional barriers to the specific enforce-
ment of promised future performance.7 85 The purchaser would
only have a significant incentive to obtain the enforcement of
promises to continue gestation once it had begun. But, here the
right to an abortion would seem to pose an insurmountable consti-
tutional barrier to obtaining specific performance. 88
Apart from the enforceability of contractual reallocations of
procreative resources is the issue of whether a "moralism" justifies
the restriction of even unenforceable monetary exchanges for pro-
creative resources. 787 There are arguably several of these moral-
isms, the strongest being that these exchanges inescapably create
782. See supra text accompanying notes 395-411.
783. See Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 671-72 (discussing state regulation of
commercial human gamete banks of employees in Canada).
784. The right to decide not to bear a child would be infringed. See Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Not even Judge Sorkow, who was otherwise enthusiastic about
enforcing hired maternity arrangements, would restrict the gestational mother's freedom to
abort the fetus in contravention of the contract. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 375,
525 A.2d 1128, 1159 (Ch. Div. 1987), aft'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537
A.2d 1227 (1988).
785. See supra note 784. Ironically, in some interpretations, it is permissible to cur-
tail autonomy through governmental restrictions on maternal behavior during pregnancy,
but not by allowing the avoidance of promised transfers of maternal rights. OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 21, at 277-78.
786. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(recognizing a woman's fundamental
right to decide whether to terminate pregnancy during the first trimester).
787. See Radin, supra note 28, at 1930-36 (discussing the more subtle problems
raised by hired maternity); see also supra text accompanying notes 195-99 & 467-70.
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the public impression that the essence of the transaction is nothing
other than the transfer of parental rights by contract in violation
of the dignity and emerging autonomy of the child. Of equal con-
cern is the likelihood that the public will interpret the passage of
money as the purchase of the child."'8
Another relevant moralism is that the adult participants
should not be treated as objects. Whether or not efficiency-based
arguments are in concurrence, it is generally believed that it is not
appropriate to enforce promises of self-enslavement or to waive
the immunities of the criminal law.789 Contractual promises to efn-
gage in sex acts are not only unenforceable, but are generally pro-
hibited.790 As these rules indicate, while the right to alienate labor
freely was one instrument that allowed modern liberal society to
supplant feudalism, there has been a concomitant trend to restrict
alienation where necessary to protect fundamentals of personality
788. Prichard points out that "the pricing of babies" could contradict two closely
held beliefs: "that life is infinitely valuable - 'a pearl beyond price'" and "that all lives
are equally valuable." He notes that "[w]ith higher prices for white than non-white chil-
dren, and higher prices for healthy than sick children, and other similar forms of price
differentials, the reality and the ideal would again clash." Prichard, supra note 642, at 351.
The New York State Task Force on Life amplifies these concerns, noting that hired mater-
nity may be "indistinguishable from the sale of children," and that it may undermine "ba-
sic premises about the nature and meaning of being human and the moral dictates of our
shared humanity." NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 221, at 118. Furthermore,
it may carry "severe long term negative implications for the way society thinks about and
values children." Id. at 119. Finally, as more immediate risks, it causes irrevocably and
deliberately fractured genetic, gestational, and social relationships as well as the deperson-
alization of women, and human reproduction. Id. at 119-21. The Task Force concludes that
the assignment of market values should not be celebrated as an exaltation of
"rights," but rejected as a derogation of the values and meanings associated with
human reproduction [and] derived from the relationship between the mother and
father of a child and the child's creation as an expression of their mutual love.
Id. at 121.
789. Michael Walzer holds that "blocked exchanges," those occurring outside the
monetary system, are necessary to define equality in a whole range of contexts, one of
which is "procreation and marriage." M. WALZER, supra note 17, at 100-03; see also D.
MEYERS, supra note 777. Commentators have implicitly adopted Walzer's approach in
dealing with hired maternity: "Judicial enforcement, that is, would constitute an official
imprimatur for the woman's depersonalized marketplace attitude toward her child and to-
ward herself as a 'producer of children.' The Court [in Baby M] was correct to fear the
social effects of this attitude and to withhold its approval from it." Burt, supra note 532, at
27, col I.
790. Even where prostitution is legal, it is generally illegal to induce women to be-
come prostitutes, advertising is prohibited, minors are excluded, and prostitution is re-
stricted to brothels. See J. DECKER, supra note 286, at 55 (discussing regulation of prosti-
tution in Western Europe and certain states such as Nevada).
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and the political worth of the individual.91
One way to frame the issue is to ask is whether the alienation
of gametes or gestational capacity for money offends basic notions
of human personality and dignity. At this point, commentators
such as Rose-Ackerman register concern that Calabresi and Me-
lamed's concept of "moralism" is too broad, opening the door to a
paternalism incompatible with respect for individual autonomy. 792
Rose-Ackerman proposes that this category of restriction on alien-
ability should be limited to rights of citizenship, as for example in
the sale of votes.793 In such cases, she concedes alienability should
be prohibited, but only because the transfer in question under-
mines a basic governmental function. If votes could be sold, gov-
ernmental decisions would suffer from distortion in favor of the
interests of the wealthy. 94 Rose-Ackerman thus does not ground
the limitation on concern with controlling the distribution of votes,
but rather bases it on concern with governmental function,79 5 pre-
sumably because she believes distributive concerns would embrace
anti-pluralist moral notions of merit or right.
The more extreme position, described earlier, validates re-
strictions on alienability only where necessary to correct market
failure.796 Rose-Ackerman's concern appears to be less with effi-
ciency, however, than with preservation of conditions of funda-
mental moral pluralism required to uphold her vision of individual
autonomy.797 The enactment of any "moralism" does impose costs
on those who come within its scope but disagree with its direction.
To this degree, the enactment of moralisms conflicts with individ-
ual autonomy. That is not to say the enactment of moralisms is
avoidable, even if individual autonomy is the ultimate goal.
The premise underlying respect for individual autonomy is it-
self a moralism. 98 Maximizing the scope accorded the market by
791. R. ScoTT, supra note 730. Posner dismisses this as a hypocritical token, since
there is no persuasive evidence that parties to a hired maternity contract are not well in-
formed of the consequences of their acts. Posner, supra note 7, at 25-26.
792. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 745, at 931.
793. Id. at 961-69.
794. Id. at 963.
795. Id. at 962-65.
796. See supra text accompanying note 729.
797. Rose-Ackerman believes this "is a way to rescue the concept of inalienability
from its simplistic rejection by market-oriented economists or its overly enthusiastic em-
brace by paternalistic moralists." Rose-Ackerman, supra note 745, at 969.
798. R. POSNER, supra note 687, at 88-113; Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis
of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOESTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). For
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limiting restrictions on alienability also imposes costs on individ-
ual autonomy. The protection of the market may be univocal with
respect to the generation of material wealth, but the equation of
the market with individual autonomy is not. The market ensures
autonomous economic exchanges, but it is not as clear that it en-
sures the expression of individual autonomy by members of com-
munitarian groups such as groups such as the Amish or Commu-
nists.7 9  The choice of the market is itself driven by a powerful
moralism, built on the assumption that the pursuit of individualist
projects and material wealth is a common goal among all diver-
gent personal and moral visions. Since free exchanges facilitate
these pursuits, autonomy, as expressed in market exchanges, be-
comes normative.
Rose-Ackerman's restrictions on the use of moralism to con-
strain alienability actually enshrines the particular moralisms em-
bodied in the market system. As such, it appears arbitrary and
overly rigid. The functional value of government, which she up-
holds, requires reference to some goal. If this goal is truly political
in nature, it requires reference to the political equality of the indi-
vidual, a moralism implying manifold restrictions on alienability.
If mere market efficiency is the goal, then efficiency is the moral-
ism underlying the market. This is a choice to honor the norma-
tive value of a particular conception of autonomy. Without this
moralism, the preservation of the market would not be a norma-
tive value. To fulfill its ultimate political value, the market must
a critique, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 687, at 237 (arguing that social value is a form of
wealth that traditional economic analysis fails to consider); Kelman, supra note 724 (as-
serting that traditional economic analysis fails to consider that a person has continuous
identity which distorts utility-maximizing behavior).
John Noonan finds connections between the inalienability that protects the element of
fidelity in the marital and sexual relationship and that which protects the impartiality of
justice in the political sphere. He notes the moral and legal decline in the ideal of marital
fidelity, and asks whether this may not give rise to a parallel decline in the belief that
justice should be considered inalienable. J. NOONAN. BRIBES 701-03 (1984). What Noonan
does not pursue, but fits well with his hypothesis, is the idea that the decline in belief in the
meaning of marital fealty should be followed by market alienability of sex and procreation.
Michael Walzer examines the connection on a functional level, and not in terms of
etiology as does Noonan. Walzer sees inalienability as necessary to protect equal participa-
tion in various aspects of the political process: political power and influence, criminal jus-
tice, civil rights, emigration, exemptions from government service, and political offices. M.
WALZER, supra note 17, at 100; see also supra note 652 and infra note 825.
799. Feminist writing is concerned that women should have the freedom to resist
attempts to objectify that which their sexual desirability and procreative role make natural.
They also stress that women have a more relational mode of reasoning. C. GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). The operation of the free market threatens this freedom.
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take into account the preferences of all those capable of autono-
mous choice. The political realm must aim to uphold this struc-
tural inclusiveness, as well as to prevent market failure.800
Rose-Ackerman's limiting mechanism would be more plausi-
ble if it were broadened to require only that any enactment of a
moralism be justified as essential to the expression of the political
dignity and equality of all persons. At points, this would be a mat-
ter of preserving equal and inalienable access to the political pro-
cess. At other points, it would be a matter of symbolic protections
of human dignity, in a more abstract sense. The prohibition on the
alienation of human flesh for consumption as food provides a sym-
bolic zone of protection of human political dignity and equality.
So, too, does the prohibition on the commercial alienation of sex.
Countervailing factors include the dissatisfaction imposed by ma-
jority enactments on those communities that exercise autonomous
choice according to alternative values.
Restrictions on even the present exchange of money for ga-
metes and gestational services may be deemed a necessary sym-
bolic protection, essential to society and the central political value
of the emerging child's dignity and equality. The sale of the physi-
cal constituents of the child's procreation might be deemed to cre-
ate the appearance that the child is put at the disposal of others in
a manner incompatible with both political personhood and the
value of individual autonomy which makes the market a norma-
tive goal. This would be particularly true if the sale of procreative
resources could not be distinguished from the sale of parental
rights or even the sale of the child.8 0' The countervailing costs to
both the efficient satisfaction of affected preferences and the
psychic dissatisfaction of minority communities not convinced of
the validity of the constraint would be substantial and politically
800. This is more generally true of liberalism. For example, one author has argued
that the legitimacy of the criminal law is based in a public morality, but that the recogni-
tion of such a morality is kept at a minimum in respect for liberalism's guiding value,
autonomy. The author argued further that such an approach represents a conscious depar-
ture on the part of the founders of the American republic from "classical republicanism's"
commitment to overarching notions of public virtue. Richards, Liberalism, Public Moral-
ity, and Constitutional Law: Prolegomenon to a Theory of the Constitutional Right to
Privacy, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 123-24 (1988); cf. Epstein, supra note 743, at
987 (discussing the rationale for the prohibition against the sale of votes in public
elections).
801. The public would have to accept the assertion made by some commentators that
"[tihe payments are not to purchase a child, but to compensate for personal services."
Hollinger, supra note 6, at 893.
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relevant, but not dispositive of the normative issue.
Society may reasonably deem restrictions on the exchange of
money for gametes and gestational capacity a necessary symbolic
protection or "moralism" supporting the political dignity and
equality of the contributor of gametes or gestational capacity. A
restraint on alienability grounded in this symbolic concern would
resemble existing restraints on the sale of organs, prostitution, and
self-enslavement. 0 2 The features associated with the sale of ga-
metes and gestational capacity that trigger this concern include
both the relation of these procreative resources to the bodily and
psychosexual identity of the contributor and their relation to the
contributor's capacity for essential 'human relationships.0 3 This
restraint must be distinguished from one grounded in paternalism,
since its purpose is not to save the person restrained from suffering
harm, but rather to uphold the essential core meaning of the value
of political dignity and equality, and, to a degree, the normative
force of individual autonomy as the value underlying societal pref-
erence for the market. Paternalism does not explain the objection
to alienability in this context. Therefore, the voluntary or consen-
sual element of the proposed transaction does not stand in mitiga-
tion of this symbolic objection.
Even if society does not deem restraints on the exchange of
money for gametes or gestational capacity a necessary symbolic
802. See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988) (prohibiting the
sale of human organs for use in transplantation); Note, supra note 199 (discussing how a
market in organs could be created); see also U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII; Peonage Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1994 (1988); Robertson, supra note 8, at 986 (noting that symbolic harm from
using embryos for tissue farming might justify banning the activity). See generally R.
ScoTT, supra note 730 (discussing the social, moral, and legal implications associated with
tissue and organ transplants); Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc.
PHIL. & POL'Y 179 (1986) (arguing that money damages are an insufficient remedy for
breach of a contract involving inalienable rights).
803. One commentator has noted that the practice in hired maternity has evolved to
prevent such relationships from forming.
To avoid the risk of a recalcitrant surrogate, contemporary surrogacy practice
now customarily uses donor eggs instead of the surrogate's egg. Thus practice
seems to have moved ahead of the 'Baby M' Case, insofar as the invalidity is
explicitly based on the fact that "[T]he surrogacy contract guarantees perma-
nent separation of the child from one of its natural parents."
S. GREEt & J. LONG, supra note 84, at 67. Some literature stresses the depersonalization
of such arrangements. See Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
But see D'Aversa, The Right of Abortion in Surrogate Motherhood Arrangements, 7 N.
ILL U.L. REV. 1 (1986) (favoring development of methods to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition of contractually alienating the right to terminate a pregnancy); Note, supra
note 8 (arguing in favor of enforcement of hired maternity contracts).
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protection for the political dignity and equality of either the child
or the contributor of gamete or gestational capacity, it might,
nonetheless, deem limitations on the enforceability of these ex-
changes necessary as symbolic protection, at least with respect to
the contributor. By treating these exchanges as voidable, the law
would avoid the objectification implied in coercing involuntary
performance.804
In conclusion, arguments, such as those of the law and eco-
nomics school, based on the liberal presumption of alienability fail
to provide any conclusive arguments in favor of legally enforcea-
ble alienation of either parental rights or procreative resources as
separate from parental rights. The essential bipolarity of parental
rights prevents their exchange without violation of the fundamen-
tal postulates of individual autonomy and market efficiency, un-
derstood as normative goals. A rule of commercial inalienability
prevents the market redistribution of procreative resources and re-
sults in a pattern of distribution according to natural endowment.
This distributive choice is not premised on the merit of parents,
but on the dignity and welfare of the children. Any element of
paternalism at work in this redistribution is an essential aspect of
the state's ordinary and appropriate desire to protect children.
The principle of "self-paternalism" justifies, at a minimum, the
voidability of any contractual obligation to provide gestational ser-
vices. The idea of "moralism" explains the prohibition of ex-
changes of money for procreative resources, as well as the
voidability of promises to transfer procreative resources. Symbolic
limits indirectly maintain the values of individual autonomy and
political dignity that sustain the market as a normative goal.
4. Balancing the Spheres: Politics, Privacy, and the Limits of
the Marketplace
Choices within each phase of normative discussion, so far ad-
dressed, have consequences for the balance of the political, pri-
vate, and market spheres, which, at a basic level, constitutes the
social order. A normative evaluation of proposals for the realloca-
tion of procreative resources and parental rights by contract will
804. See Wolf, supra note 740, at 394-99, 404-06 (proposing a dual standard in
evaluating hired maternity arrangements, including the "best interests of the child" test
and a "competing parental claims" balancing test); see also Position of the National Or-
ganization for Women, Resolution on Surrogate Motherhood (May 1987) (urging rules
that would retain the biological mother's rights until sometime after the birth of the child).
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be complete when their implications for this fundamental balance
have been explored. If it is to rest on a sound foundation, the ex-
ploration must begin with self-reflective clarification and valida-
tion of this final formulation of the normative question.805 The
ramifications of the contractual reallocation of procreative re-
sources and parental rights for the balance of politics, privacy,
and the marketplace can then be meaningfully elaborated and
normatively critiqued.
Judge Richard Posner contests that the balance of politics,
privacy, and the marketplace poses a meaningful moral or politi-
cal question.8 08 He assumes that human nature is biologically de-
termined, and that there is little besides economic efficiency that
politics should hope to achieve in attempting to shape human soci-
ety.8 0 7 History, nonetheless, reveals some startlingly diverse con-
figurations of the market, in relation to both the family and poli-
tics. 08 Even if one attempts to explain these as adjustments aimed
at maximum economic efficiency under circumstances of time and
place, the measure of efficiency depends on three variables that
economics itself cannot supply. Arguably, each requires separate
resolution even where the market is assumed as a universal politi-
cal ideal. These variables are: 1) who is an economic actor; that is,
whose preferences count? 09 2) what is the initial distribution of
wealth?81 0 and 3) what preferences do or should economic actors
seek to fulfill through economic activity?811
While libertarians may argue that politics exceeds its proper
scope when it concerns itself with the second or third questions,
the first is, by any standard, a necessary concern of politics even
805. See M. WALZER, supra note 17, at 279.
806. Posner, supra note 200, at 70.
807. "People are what they are, and what they are is the result of millions of years of
evolution rather than of such minor cultural details as the precise scope of the market
principle in a particular society." Posner, supra note 7, at 26-27.
808. See supra text accompanying note 218.
809. See R. NOZICK, supra note 179, at 150-51, 153, 155-64 (discussing the entitle-
ment theory of distributive justice); Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of
Law, J. PHIL & PUB. AFF. 3, 32-41 (1975) (discussing Posner's consumer sovereignty con-
cept of the market); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1090 ("[T]he fundamental
thing that law does is to decide which of the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail.").
810. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1096 (noting that market effi-
ciency depends on the distribution of wealth in the economy).
811. See V. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL
VALUE OF CHILDREN 19 (1985) (discussing how the tension between the economy and
personal values can obstruct the expansion of the market).
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within "the economics of justice." 812 The normative appeal of eco-
nomic efficiency, as a modern political goal, presupposes respect
within both economics and politics for the equality of all those
capable of economic choices, i.e., all citizens, more or less.813 Per-
haps most societies in history have, in fact, failed to respect this
principle. Efficiency in these societies would have been measured
by unequal regard for the preferences of their members, as, for
example, has been the case in slaveholding societies. From the
perspective of the most extreme market ideology, the recognition
of the equality of all rational decisionmakers remains a political
goal alongside and underlying the goal of economic efficiency.
Even from this extreme perspective, politics has something to be
concerned about besides the proper functioning of the market. At
a minimum, politics must balance its activities to foster political
equality and, consequently, the market.
Classical nineteenth century liberalism solved this problem by
mandating a minimalist laissez faire state, which protected do-
mestic order and political equality, as reflected in the bill of
rights, and otherwise looked to the market to organize and fulfill
social needs.814 A primary function of the state was the further-
ance of the market through enforcement of private contract.815 In
this dichotomous scheme, the activities of the state fell within a
"public" or political sphere. 1" The activities of the market defined
a "private" sector of public social life.817 The family formed a
812. See R. NoziCK, supra note 179; Epstein, supra note 743, at 970 (arguing that
the law is designed to protect economic actors defined as property owners).
813. Equality itself presupposes that the individual does not exist for the good of
society but may act on occasion for the good of society, whether intentionally or not. R.
NOZICK, supra note 179, at 32-33.
814. Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism:
United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 L. & Hist. REv. 249, 252-53 (1987) (noting
the concern among American jurists of the 1880s-1920s for "combating paternalism").
815. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Rela-
tions: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST.
970 (1975).
816. "[O]nly the nineteenth century produced a fundamental conceptual and archi-
tectural division [public/private] in the way we understand the law." Horwitz, supra note
482, at 1424.
817. Contract serves to make such use of state coercion "private." See P. ATIYAH,
supra note 44, at 713 (discussing how government tempers and modifies the risk/reward
system of contract as an instrument of private planning). The public/private distinction is
still spoken of this way. See D. FESSLER & P. LOISEAUX, supra note 57, at 174 ("[i]t is not
the function of government - of the courts - to make contracts for individuals, but to
construe and enforce them."). Some authors do not find this view tenable within the picture
of the modern legal system as a whole. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 31, at 1349-57
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third pole in the construct. 18 The family, like the market, was
considered private, but, like the state, was organized around ina-
lienable rights and duties and was clothed in a "public" inter-
est.819 The separation of family and market into mutually exclu-
sive dimensions of privacy served critical functions. First, it
anchored the political dignity and equality of the citizen in a kind
of "natural," non-market source. Second, it created a sphere of
organization for the personal relations of dependence and interde-
pendence that are unavoidable in human society, but were thought
to be inexplicable in market terms. As a sphere of interdepen-
dency, the family was the "womb" within which individual auton-
omy could ripen to the point of emancipation enabling the forma-
tion of market relationships.82
As an explanatory model, this construct was dealt a fatal
blow by the entry of the state into the organization of private wel-
fare during and after the New Deal.821 Yet, like the classical the-
ory of contract itself, it is a construct that continues to give a kind
of gravitational orientation to a legal system no longer properly
explained by it. Heirs of nineteenth century market ideology, like
Gary Becker, first suggested that economics could be helpful in
explaining non-market "transactions" within the family by anal-
(1982) (arguing that the public/private distinction no longer has analytical meaning);
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454 (1909) (arguing that the public/private
distinction has blurred, making freedom of contract less distinctly private). The origin of
the distinction goes back to John Locke's social contract theory. See J. LOCKE, supra note
654.
818. Olsen, supra note 29, at 1501 (noting the place of the family as a world apart
from the market or government).
819. The zone of illegality limiting contract did not include marriage and family
relationships. See C. ASHLEY, supra note 38, § 51(b)("The theory of modern civilization
bases the welfare of the State upon the safety and happiness of the home. Hence the law
favors marriage as an advantage to the community, and the Courts frown upon any ar-
rangement which tends to interfere with the freedom of individuals to contract for or con-
tinue this status, or which has a tendency to taint the relationship with pecuniary mo-
tives"); J. LAWSON, supra note 37, §§ 319-22 (noting that contracts impinging on marriage
and family stability were unenforceable). But see Kennedy, supra note 31, at 1356 (argu-
ing that the separation of family and state was artificial and never clear).
820. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (the
home is "the seat of family life" and is fundamental to the formation of societal
relationships).
821. See Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495
(1908) (noting how due process concerns have permitted the encroachment of government
into private activities); Paul, Searching for the Status Quo, 7 CARDOZO U.L. Rav. 743,
746-74 (1986) (arguing that public law has been "submerged" by public law in the courts
and legislatures).
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ogy to market phenomena. 22 Others, like Judge Posner, have
taken the next step by proposing the enforcement of cash transac-
tions in the formation of basic family relationships, thereby elimi-
nating the political distinction between family and market.82 3
While proponents of the "economics of the family" are the heirs
of nineteenth century liberalism, their bold moves prove the com-
plete collapse of the legal and social vision of classical laissez faire
principles.
Employing contract for ordering reallocations of procreative
resources or parental rights bluntly contradicts the ordering of so-
ciety according to classical laissez faire principles. Those advanc-
ing these proposals bear the burden of explaining and justifying
the societal balance of politics, private realm, and marketplace, to
which their proposals would contribute. Defining market behavior
as "natural" and asserting market efficiency as the legitimating
ideal that drives law making does not suffice to carry this bur-
den. 24 Rather, proponents of contract must justify the market as
a political ideal. They also must justify the dominant social struc-
tures created by the pursuit of the market.
The constructive effort called for cannot be accomplished in
the language of economics or market ideology. What is needed is
a language of political discourse adequate to describe economic
efficiency as a political ideal and to assign its place in relation to
other ideals.825 It is, in fact, the breakdown in the language of
822. Becker, The Economics of the Family, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY
supra note 641, at 299; cf. V. ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1979)(discussing life insurance as creating a
need for the evaluation of life, death, human organs, and children in monetary
equivalents).
823. Landes & Posner, supra note 195.
824. Posner, supra note 7. Within the sphere of commercial agreements, the imposi-
tion of fiduciary obligations is easier to justify under contract law than under a theory of
self-interested bargain. See DeMott, supra note 652, at 892-93.
825. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 718, at 205. More than the political value of the
person is at stake, so too is some minimal vision of the social good adequate to sustain
political life. See Bartlett, supra note 326, at 313 (making reference to "the central politi-
cal question of what kinds of families our society is prepared to allow or encourage"). The
solution is not, however, to turn to law and economics for normative political direction,
which it cannot legitimately give. See Dworkin, supra note 687, at 191. See generally Cass,
Coping with Life, Law and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the Law-and-Economics
Debate, 67 B.U.L. REV. 73 (1987) (discussing four objections to the economic analysis of
law); Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 307 (1979) (qualifying and clarifying Posner's theory of economic analysis); see
also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1090 n.2 (noting that a model such as law
and economics is not to be mistaken for the total view of the phenomenon, but rather
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meaningful political discourse that has encouraged the hardy
weed of law and economics to clog and obscure the channels of
political choice which would permit full and rational consideration
of all relevant values on questions like the new reproductive tech-
nologies.8 26 When the language of economics is substituted for the
discourse of politics, the result is the undue conceptual restriction
of "freedom" to mean the freedom to engage in economic ex-
changes, and the undue conceptual restriction of "the good to be
achieved by political choice" to mean the maximization of utility
attained through such exchanges. 27 As a "thought experiment,"
the use of economic categories to understand the moral or political
meaning of freedom may be useful . 28 But, if the metaphorical or
analogical character of the experiment is lost, society loses its ca-
pacity to perceive the value of the broader range of freedom at
stake in a given issue. Dean Calabresi succinctly expressed the
danger of overextending the scope of economic analysis in at-
tempts to understand moral and political questions: "[t]raduttore,
traditore" or, imperfectly translated, "to translate from one lan-
guage to another is to betray." '29
should be seen as resembling just "one of Monet's paintings of the Cathedral at Rouen").
Some commitment to seeking a common notion of authentic human flourishing is a
necessary basis of pluralist political life. Radin, supra note 28, at 1877-86. A renewed
structural understanding of the relationship between the political ideals of the dignity and
equality of the human person and the deeper structures of the legal system is equally nec-
essary. One solution would be to rethink and affirm some variant on the Lockean social
contract. See Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 847-73.
826. See Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and
Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309 (1986) (economic analysis of law should be admired
for its descriptive value, but not for its conclusions); Kelman, supra note 724 (law and
economics approach has obscured legal study as -much as it has enlightened it);
Michelman, Reflections on Professional Education, Legal Scholarship, and the Law-and-
Economics Movement, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 197, 209 (1983) (arguing "[n]ot that law-and-
economics scholarship is evil, stupid, useless, trivial; just that is partial and limited; that
there are important tasks of inquiry to which it is ill suited and to which it does not
pretend").
827. Posner, supra note 200, at 61-62.
828. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 656, at 1127-28.
829. Calabresi, Thoughts on the Future of Economics in Legal Education, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 359, 364 (1983). Max Weber noted that expanding formal freedom may
coexist with coercion in practice. M. WEBER, supra note 654, at 230-33; see also Fiss,
supra note 705, at 8 ("The normative claim of law and economics can be defeated only by
challenging its first premise, namely, the one that relativizes all values . . . . [A]II values
are [not] reducible to preferences and [not] ...all have an equal claim to satisfaction.
Values are values."); Singer, supra note 697, at 645 (footnote omitted)(criticizing "the
attempt to legitimate the mass of our social, economic, and institutional practices by refer-
ence to the myth of the free market. The ultimate effect of this project is to make the great
bulk of market transactions appear to be the result of free consent."); West, Authority,
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The minimal objectives of market-oriented politics include
the preservation of the value of equality of all rational deci-
sionmakers, and some provision for allowing unemancipated mi-
nors to develop the individual autonomy required for meaningful
rational decision. However, when a fully political viewpoint is
adopted, even these goals must be subsumed into the larger range
of issues related to safeguarding the political dignity and equality
of persons and the pursuit of diverse societal ideals, only one of
which is the generation of material wealth.830 As a political mat-
ter, it is necessary to ask whether the social world, constituted by
the balance of personal and familial privacy, the marketplace, and
politics resulting from the enforcement of contracts for the reallo-
cation of procreative resources and parental rights, would be a
good one. In order to answer this question, the first step is to de-
scribe the balance that the contractual ordering of human repro-
duction would create. The second is to pursue the normative eval-
uation of that balance.
Each model sketched in the taxonomy reached in the article's
first section tends implicitly to represent one point of balance on
the spectrum of possible forms of interplay among politics, pri-
vacy, and the marketplace. By returning to those models employ-
ing contract, it is possible to draw out their respective ramifica-
tions for this final question of societal balance. For example, in the
event that the individual autonomy model, in either its strong or
its moderate type, was adopted, logic demands an expectation of
major change in the relation of the market place to the private
sphere of family and personal social interaction. In some percent-
age of cases, the planning of children would be taken out of a
context of personal and social bonding and expressly pursued ac-
cording to modes of "production" and "acquisition" typifying the
commercial marketplace. In the cases remaining, the "natural"
generation of children for retention and rearing would come to be
understood, at least in part, as an alternative to market alienation
Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz
Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 424 (1985) (footnote omitted) (arguing
that Posner's ideas rest "on an inadequate picture of human nature").
830. See Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913
(1980). Alienability in a matter so intimately connected with common human patterns of
identity and relationships of personal intimacy must be subject to some restrictions if the
idea of the citizen as a political and moral agent is to be preserved. See Meyers, The




and acquisition. 83 1 The basis of legal recognition of parental rights
even in the latter cases would also necessarily shift towards the
value of individual autonomy. In such cases, rights would, as a
legal matter, almost certainly come to be recognized as based on
the autonomous choice to produce a child for retention as an alter-
native to alienation.832
If reproduction comes to be understood as the project of au-
tonomous individuals, pursued even in part through ordinary con-
tract, the marital contract would lose further its raison d'etre as a
status relationship. The way would be paved for the further "con-
tractualization" of marriage and other relationships of cohabita-
tion, with the consequence that the marital and cohabitative part-
ners could more fully decide participation in common property, as
well as rights and duties related to reciprocal services.833 The allo-
cation of procreative resources and parental rights, whether within
the relationship or ad extra, would become just one of a range of
commodified exchanges available to the individual partners.
In all but one improbable scenario,834 the recognition of pa-
rental rights under the individual autonomy model would be based
on contractual alienation. The consequence is the commodification
of children.83 5 At the time custody is acquired, the child is dis-
831. Engaging in a reproductive project without desiring the offspring fundamentally
changes the way society views children. Instead of seeing them as unique individual person-
alities to be desired in their own right, they may come to be perceived as commodities or
items of manufacture to be desired because of their utility. See Krimmel, supra note 157.
832. See Radin, supra note 28, at 1925-34.
833. Contra Robertson, supra note 222, at 31 ("Surrogate mothering is another
method of assisting people to undertake child rearing, and thus serves the purposes of the
marital union.").
834. The exception would be a state conferral system based on the idea of notice
filing. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
835. For a current case that explores the issue of whether to treat embryos as per-
sons or property, see Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn App LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Cir.
Ct. filed Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn App LEXIS (Ct. App. filed Sept. 13,
1990). Divorcing parents argued over the fate of frozen embryos they had cooperated in
creating. The husband wished them treated as property, but the trial judge gave custody to
the mother on the ground that they should be treated as "human beings" and "children"
whether or not persons "in the constitutional sense." Id.
There may be hazards associated with the depersonalization of children and potential
children in contractual relationships.
"Where the market is allowed to follow its own autonomous tendencies, its par-
ticipants do not look toward the persons of each other but only toward the com-
modity; there are no obligations of brotherliness or reverence, and none of those
spontaneous human relations that are sustained by personal unions. They all
would just obstruct the free development of the bare market relationship, and its
specific interests serve, in their turn, to weaken the sentiments on which these
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posed of as a res, not respected as a person. The justification of
parental power over the child throughout its minority continues
this in rem treatment. The transition to autonomy as a party ca-
pable, for example, of contract would take on an arbitrary and
problematic character. The logic of the model tends towards ex-
pressly classifying not just procreative resources and unborn chil-
dren, but also children below the age of consent as chattel. In this
view, human maturation brings into play a transition "from prop-
erty to personhood." In fact, considerable state regulation of the
treatment of children is compatible with their status as chattel. 38
obstructions rest."
A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 43, at 262 (quoting 2 M. WEBER, LAW IN ECON-
OMY AND SOCIETY (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. & E. Fischoff trans. 1968)). Further, "[iln
a market transaction, what is bought or sold must be an object, a commodity. The buyer or
seller (the subject) relates only to an object: all orientations are subject-object, never sub-
ject-subject." Baker, supra note 809, at 35.
The Warnock Report attempts to find a middle ground between acknowledging the
difficulties in treating potential persons as property, while recognizing parental rights to
embryos:
We recommend that legislation be enacted to ensure there is no right of owner-
ship in a human embryo. Nevertheless, the couple who have stored an embryo
for their use should be recognised as having rights to the use and disposal of the
embryo, although these rights ought to be subject to limitation. The precise na-
ture of that limitation will obviously require careful consideration. We hope the
couple will recognise that they have a responsibility to make a firm decisions as
to the disposal and use of the embryo.
WARNOCK REP., supra note 21, § 10.11 (emphasis omitted). In an attempt to define the
parameters of donor rights, the committee states that the sale or purchase of human ga-
metes is "undesirable," while allowing reimbursement of expenses to a licensed semen
bank. The report suggests that commercial transactions should be permitted if the vendor
is licensed. Unlicensed transactions, by contrast, would be criminalized. Id. § 13.13. Knop-
pers and Sloss suggest that committee reports, such as the Warnock Report, tend to take
"a hybrid person-property approach to the question of the legal status of the embryo ...
Even while the 'potential human person' approach advocates that the life of such a poten-
tial person be respected, the degree of control to be given to donors closely resembles own-
ership." Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at 699. The authors note that "even in the
absence of declared real property rights, donors would generally maintain full control over
the uses to which their material is put." Id. One leading treatise concludes that the trend is
to treat children as assets and commodities, and that the "[p]roprietary conceptions of the
parent-child relationship" may be "here to stay." Weyrauch & Katz, supra note 218, at
498.
It has been argued that the most appropriate response to the new reproductive technol-
ogies is one based on a "body of jurisprudence conceptualizing the legal base for children's
rights." Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 58, at 511. The implication that
potential children have individual rights would seemingly rule out the contractual alloca-
tion of parental rights, whether grounded in individual autonomy or state conferral. The
issue of the potential person's individual rights also surfaces in the contemporary "fetal
abuse" controversy. See, e.g., Pregnant? Go Directly to Jail, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1988, at 20.
836. The Supreme Court has repeatedly considered the relative constitutional rights
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While reclassifying children as chattel would unquestionably serve
the convenience of the present parental generation, it is not hard
to see that it is vulnerable to a devastating political critique. First,
insofar as individual autonomy is considered a political value, the
psychological sciences show that personal respect must be shown
to children as a condition of their development as autonomous
adults. Children must be treated as persons before they can be
expected to mature into autonomous citizens.837 Second, when the
intergenerational transition is considered as a primary political
concern, the younger generation must be able to appropriate, as
just, state acquiescence in the power of parents over children., 8
The in rem treatment of children is not subject to such personal
appropriation.
Another effect of contractualizing procreation within the in-
dividual autonomy model would be a substantial realignment of
the respective societal spheres of the "public" and the "pri-
vate. ' 839 Under the traditional nineteenth century market ideal of
of the state, parents, and children. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977) (right of minors to contraceptives); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969) (right of minors to free speech); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right of
minors to due'process); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (right of minors to
protection from parental control). See generally, Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework
for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 255 (1979) (proposing a framework for analyzing
children's rights); Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FA. L.Q. 343 (1972)
(proposing "Bill of Rights" which considers children as persons rather than property).
837. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 168, at 6; Annas & Elias, supra
note 12, at 157 ("To protect the interests of the resulting children and the integrity of
noncoital reproduction, primary consideration should always be given to the welfare and
the 'best interests' of the potential child, rather than to the donors, the infertile couple, or
the physician or clinic.") (footnotes omitted); Bartlett, supra note 326, at 303; Frankel &
Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to Adoptions, 67 B.U.L. REV. 99, 101-03
(1987) (outlining the dangers inherent in returning to the classification of children as prop-
erty); Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 933, 989-1009 (1985) (emphasizing that the rules governing family relations are
based on trust).
838. This action is not equivalent to the social construction of the economically-use-
less child. See V. ZELIZER, supra note 811, at 11.
839. Prejudging the issue by saying that any attempt to order noncoital reproductive
techniques according to public values must be based on "personal moral views" effectively
blocks reasoned discourse, and invites subterfuge. See Robertson, supra note 371, at 8-9.
Insofar as the normative discussion revolves around the structure of societal spheres, liberal
theorists have "cast doubts on the 'essential dichotomy'" of public and private, leaving an
"ambivalent, if not contradictory, relationship of citizen and state that plagues modern
liberal theory." Private realm constitutional protections do not prevent the state from ac-
quiescing in private property seizures, parallel with the enforcement of contract in Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). All that seems to remain of the social sphere is individual-
ism. Brest, supra note 101, at 1302. The solution must be something better than a superfi-
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the minimalist state, the private sphere had two tiers. The first
tier was the market, in which the government interfered only to
enforce "private intentions." The second tier of the private sphere
was the family. The government did not intervene even to enforce
contracts, but limited its intervention to that susceptible of parens
patriae justification. The market sphere has long since lost its sta-
tus as purely "private" and has become quasi-public, or, in some
views, public.840 State regulation to one degree or another har-
nesses private contract for public purposes. Privacy is increasingly
defined, in non-market terms, as immunity from state intrusion
into personal space, individual consciousness, and autonomous
self-determination, particularly with respect to the body and pro-
creative choice.
Proposals to contractualize reproduction, according to the in-
dividual autonomy model, would essentially weld nineteenth cen-
tury notions of market privacy to the twentieth century notion of
individual immunity from governmental intrusion. The result is a
new domain of laissez faire enforcement of contracts within the
sphere formerly occupied by marriage and the family. This devel-
opment would bring with it a complete restructuring of this zone
of more intimate privacy. In the revised structure, dyadic and tri-
adic relationships grounded in lineage and nurturance would tend
to give way to relationships grounded in individual autonomy. In
some cases, this change would occur by direct operation of law. In
the cases remaining, the availability of legal coercion as an instru-
ment in furtherance of projects based on individual autonomy
would bring change through a secondary reorientation of basic so-
cietal attitudes. 41
cial harmonization. Kennedy, supra note 31, at 1352-57 (discussing the issues and difficul-
ties in attempting to deal with the public and private spheres in one set of legal principles).
840. Horwitz, supra note 482, at 1428.
841. Legal enforcement has traditionally been left out of the marital relationship for
this reason: "One spouse could scarcely be expected to entertain a tender, affectionate re-
gard for the other spouse who brings him or her under restraint." Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268
Ala. 475, 480, 107 So. 2d 885, 889 (1958). Weber stated that the "market community"
constitutes "the most impersonal relation of practical life into which humans can enter
with one another." Kronman & Posner, supra note 43, at 261-62 (quoting M. WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. & E. Fischoff trans. 1968)). The
choice by the state to put -coercive power behind private agreements raises questions of
societal responsibility. See J. STONE, supra note 717, at 253. The explication of racism that
would accompany pricing people in this society is a general concern. See Allen, supra note
15, at 1763 ("The pouring of private resources into surrogacy so that couples may adopt
healthy white babies sends a message of rejection and despair to non-whites and the handi-
capped"); Landes & Posner, supra note 195, at 345 ("[P]rices for babies are racially strat-
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The balance resulting from adopting contract to order procre-
ation, on the ground of individual autonomy, would inject the
family and other important, intimate dimensions of personal rela-
tionships into the market place."42 At the same time, the privacy
traditionally acknowledged as part of this intimate sphere, if pre-
served at all, would be retranslated into heightened barriers to
state regulation and more thorough enforcement of contractual
obligation. Increased restrictions on freedom of contract in non-
procreative exchanges, flowing from increasingly complex and ex-
haustive corporate organization of human enterprises, state' regu-
lation for public purposes, and common pool problems represented
by escalating ecological crises would tend to further the identifica-
tion of procreative exchanges as the illustration of market freedom
par excellence. Market enthusiasts may envision a world in which
state regulation disappears and is replaced by enforcement of con-
tractual obligation both in business generally and in human pro-
creation in particular. The likely outcome of the acceptance of the
individual autonomy model, however, would be that publicization
of the traditional market sphere would be left intact. The intimate
privacy of the family sphere would yield to a marketization, which
is itself a further retreat of privacy before state intrusion. 43 The
locus of intimate privacy would shift away from dyadic and tri-
adic relationships of lineage and nurturance and center, more
strictly, on the individual autonomy of eligible adults. The sphere
protected from state intrusion would be defined by the scope of
decision making about whether, how, and when to enter privileged
reproductive contracts. Communications and interactions pro-
tected would center on relationships between the individual and
professionals and bureaucrats.844
To understand fully the balance of politics, privacy, and mar-
ified as a result of different supply and demand conditions in the different racial groups,
but perhaps bringing this fact out in the open would exacerbate racial tensions in our
society.").
842. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 226, at 239-46 (discussing the various effects and
criticisms of placing intimate relationships on the colder business plane).
843. Weitzman cites this as the ideal. Id. at 244 (noting that the bargaining process
is a forum for sharing goals and desires, thereby increasing trust and intimacy).
844. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING
STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 20-21 (1977) (arguing that the parent-child relationship
should be the next important consideration); Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in Ameri-
can Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1288-89 (1984) (noting the mutual interdependence of
law and society); Singer, supra note 697, at 652-55 (arguing that the market model dis-
tracts from basic human relationships).
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ketplace which contractualizing procreation would bring about, it
is important to focus on an intrinsic dynamic favoring an evolution
from the individual autonomy model to the state conferral model,
even where individual autonomy is adopted as the model of choice.
Under the individual autonomy model children must, at some
point, graduate from property to personhood. The recognition of
personhood, under the individual autonomy model, would tend to
coincide with legal majority, so that the child's status prior to that
time would be discontinuous with what follows. If personhood is
openly acknowledged substantially prior to the emergence of au-
tonomy, the idea of transferring parental rights contractually is
untenable. The obvious solution is to rely on state conferral as the
basis of personhood or eligibility to claim rights based on individ-
ual autonomy.
By conferring personhood, state conferral achieves a priority
over individual autonomy as a value. The state must then deter-
mine the reasons that it should be willing to accept individual au-
tonomy based on its own conferral without also claiming to confer
parental rights. In addition the state retains a strong interest in
providing for the best interests of children, both at birth and in
the course of rearing. These elements of state referral may. inevi-
tably lead to grounding parental rights in that model rather than
individual autonomy. Ultimately, a choice of any form of the indi-
vidual autonomy model in fact will lead to the adoption of the
moderate form of the state conferral model. Within this model,
contract would be used to organize the exchange of procreative
resources. Individual autonomy would be allowed to the extent
that it would yield desired state conferrals of parental rights. 45
Within this evolutionary dynamic, the regulatory force of
government would be brought to bear within the privileged con-
tractual sphere of procreative projects. Market "privacy" would
be allowed to operate only to the extent necessary to supersede
natural endowment as the source of parental rights. Once contract
serves the purpose of reorganizing human conduct and relation-
ships in the area of procreation, state regulation would become
845. State conferred individual autonomy liberates the child and the adult "from the
shackles of such intermediate groups as the family .. " L. TRIBE, supra note 311, at
1418. In this view, respect for human relationships grounded in lineage and nurturance is
interpreted as an attempt to suppress the individual. Knoppers & Sloss, supra note 99, at
667 ("[I]n the name of protecting the 'unconceived' or conceived-but-not-yet-implanted,
State control of the person . . . is expanding.").
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even more pervasive under the banner of the best interests of the
child than it already is in the general marketplace. The govern-
ment then would be functioning as parens patriae and not in loco
parentis. As an incident to this evolution towards state conferral
the Lockean idea of the social contract, in which legislative pow-
ers are constrained by natural rights, 46 will be fully displaced by
the Hobbesian notion of social contract, in which governmental
powers are constrained by whatever limits the government chooses
to respect.847 A dichotomous scheme comprised of dual sovereign-
ties, the state and the individual, would replace a system drawn to
three poles: state power, individual choice, and natural rights.
Because the value of individual autonomy, if adopted as the
basis of parental rights, would almost certainly come to rely on
state conferral for its validation, state power would receive prior-
ity in the duality of state and individual. Individual autonomy
would tend to become just one among many state purposes. 48 The
reasoning of the Ontario Law Reform Commission illustrates the
implicit consequences of attempting to replace natural endowment
with contractual transactions as a basis for parental rights. In the
final analysis, the Commission saw only one category: state action.
The question that remains is whether the moderate form of state
conferral could be adopted as a stable option, or whether it would
846. J. LOCKE, supra note 654.
847. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89-90 (L. Macpherson ed. 1968); see also M. GLEN-
DON, supra note 1, at 119-25 (noting that Hobbes' state and its enforcement of its laws is
based in power, not consent); Radin, supra note 751, at 1685 n.92 ("There is an interesting
problem here lying in wait for those who think the body is property: can the government
condemn kidneys at fair market value?").
Paul Ramsey develops the point in the following terms:
Perhaps it is the fate of all the industrialized, urbanized, secular societies to
complete the movement from status to contract in every human relation. Only
not quite complete that movement, since where only contractual relations are the
web of life there is anarchy, no society. There will remain the naked power of
government over an aggregation of individuals, and the accoutrements of power.
P. RAMSEY, supra note 592, at 12, n.8 (emphasis in original).
848. One such purpose might be eugenics. The history of the introduction of technol-
ogy to reproduction reveals an early connection to eugenics. However, proponent of the
individual autonomy model, such as Robertson, typically fail to examine the provenance of
the "rights" they assert. See Robertson, supra note 9, at 405. In fact, the birth control
movement was thoroughly enmeshed at its origin in the eugenics movement, and linked
with theories of racial superiority and proposed programs of forced sterilization for the
unfit. M. HALLER, supra note 183, at 88-138. The understanding of enforcement of con-
tract as an instrument for a state purpose in eugenics would be in keeping with an existing
understanding of contract. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 48, § 1.4(c) ("[Tlhe
foundation of contract law" is seen "as a sort of delegation of power by the State to its
inhabitants.").
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itself tend to gravitate toward the strong form of the model: the
reproductive bureaucracy of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World.
The danger of applying contract to ordering human reproduc-
tion ultimately is that all rights and respect for individual auton-
omy will come to be viewed as conferred by the state. This is a
result that is incompatible with the American political tradition.
Within that tradition, the state has a twofold interest in procrea-
tion. The first is in the welfare of children. The second is the
maintenance of the human population within society more gener-
ally. This latter interest, however, is misrepresented if it is charac-
terized as the state's need for generating bureaucrats and soldiers.
The interest is, rather, one exercised on behalf of society. Every
individual within society needs the goods, services, and other con-
tributions provided by diverse societal sectors. As the individual
ages, these needs can be fulfilled only if there is a subsequent gen-
eration. The state has an interest in ensuring that such a genera-
tion comes into existence, for no other reason than that society has
such a need. Until now, the state has pursued this twofold interest
by facilitating, regulating, and encouraging certain dyadic and tri-
adic relationships based on lineage and nurturance. In removing
the normative value of these relationships, the individual auton-
omy model of contract opens the way for the state to claim a more
direct interest in human reproduction, thereby undermining the
implicit basis of democratic values.
In finding the correct balance between politics, privacy, and
the marketplace, society must, on the one hand, seek to defend the
political equality of all persons as a goal distinct from, if related
to, that of defending the efficient functioning of markets. On the
other hand, it must respect the basic human meaning of relation-
ships grounded in lineage and nurturance as fundamental givens.
Within this balance, individual autonomy, from most political per-
spectives, remains a key goal. Increasingly, however, community,
nurturance, and personal relationships are also acknowledged as
goals to be valued and pursued with political resolve. 849 Proposals
849. See M. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 139-42 (discussing the role of law in pro-
moting social interaction); M. GLENDON, supra note 269, at 459-60 (urging a view of law
reflecting the interdependence within families and society); C. LASCH, supra note 654 (the
only way to preserve the family as a sanctuary in the face of an increasingly harsh world is
to change the conditions of public life); see also R. DWORKIN, supra note 366, at 195-97
(arguing that all relationships evolve, rather than being "formed in one act of deliberate
contractual commitment."); Bartlett, supra note 326, at 294 (notion of parenthood based
on benevolence and responsibility "intended to reinforce parental dispositions toward gener-
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to apply contract to ordering human procreation fail to withstand
normative evaluation because they effectively remove the meaning
of relationships grounded in lineage and nurturance °50 The conse-
quence is a system of dual sovereignties, individual autonomy and
state conferral. In such a bipolar system, it is predictable that the
pull of state conferral will eventually extinguish individual
autonomy.
CONCLUSION
Resort to contract proposals for ordering human procreation,
whether in keeping with the state conferral or the individual au-
tonomy model described at the outset of this article, risks the
structural breakdown of the American political tradition of re-
spect for the dignity and equality of persons. Within the limits of
this tradition, the choice raised by the new reproductive technolo-
gies is whether society wishes to adopt the strong or the moderate
type of the natural endowment model. This is the same choice im-
plicitly addressed by traditional family law, 51 and which under-
lies the changes in family law over the past twenty-five years. 52
In both the recent and distant past, the primary tension within the
law of the family has been between rights and duties arising from
genetic and gestational relationships, on the one hand, and a per-
ceived need to ground rights and duties in the external social form
osity and other-directedness" preferable to those grounded in "exchange and individual
rights"). Paul Ramsey has commented:
[T]he notion that an individual human life is absolutely unique, inviolable, irre-
placeable, noninterchangeable, not substitutable, and not meldable with other
lives ... is so fundamental in the edifice of Western law and morals that it
cannot be removed without bringing the whole house down.
P. RAMSEY, supra note 592, at xiv; cf. Robertson, supra note 9, at 460 (mere "[m]oral
concerns about the nature of the family or how the rearing role should be entered would
not justify state interference" in the private sphere).
850. R. LIFrON, supra note 11. Respect for such relationships is essential to authen-
tic human community.
851. H. CLARK, supra note 23. Within the natural endowment model, there remains
room for debate as to the place of marriage and the traditional family. Glendon, supra note
275, at 715-17.
852. Some argue that framing the issue in these terms is misleading since this ques-
tion is too complex and divisive to permit clear and definite resolution, at least within the
short term. See Healey, supra note 5, at 144. One concrete legal reform that is required is
clarification of the basis on which AID provisions operate as natural endowment, and not
state conferral or individual autonomy. See Annas & Elias, supra note 12, at 149-50 ("It is
an unfortunate paradigm, however, because it places the private contractual agreement
among the participants regarding parental rights and responsibilities above the 'best inter-
ests' of the child.").
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of the family, only imperfectly mirroring the realities of genetic
and gestational relationships, on the other.
While this article has used the term liberal in its classical
sense, the popularly employed, contemporary liberal-conservative
distinction, though ungainly, has some descriptive value in map-
ping the spectrum of alternative approaches. Liberal discourse is
divided: some liberals, notably John Robertson, argue in favor of
the contractual reallocation of parental rights and procreative re-
sources because it advances individual autonomy. Other liberals,
such as Ronald Dworkin and Anita Allen, would disfavor such
reallocation because reliance on contract will allow those in pos-
session of market power to extend their control and thus subvert
individual autonomy. From a conservative perspective, Judge Pos-
ner advocates the enforcement of contractual reallocation in this
context as a means of achieving market efficiency. This article has
developed an argument against the enforcement of the contractual
reallocation of parental rights and procreative resources which
also might be considered conservative. It is conservative in the
sense that it preserves a continuity with the ideal that has
animated the traditional legal approach to the family. This argu-
ment is based on the value of natural endowment. The natural
endowment approach assumes that the fundamental relationships
that give rise to meaningful individual autonomy and authentic
forms of community, rather than the will of the individual or the
state, justify the imposition of the force of law. Natural endow-
ment emphasizes genetic, gestational, and nurturance bonds as the
basis of parental rights.
The natural endowment approach is open to both traditional
and progressive social forms. In its strong, traditional form, this
approach resolves disputes between claims based on genetic or ge-
stational rights in ways that give priority to the family as an ex-
ternal social form tending to revolve around marriage. The pro-
gressive, moderate form allows resolution of such disputes in a
way that gives priority to honoring diverse interests based on ge-
netic or gestational contribution, even though the results are un-
predictable and polymorphous. It is along this spectrum that valid
differences about the appropriate legal response to the new repro-
ductive technologies can and should be proposed, debated, and
resolved.
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